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ABSTRACT
Accident law is the body of legal rules governing the ability of victims of harm to sue and to collect
payments from those who injured them. This paper contains the chapters on accident law from a
general, forthcoming book, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law (Harvard University Press,
2003). The analysis is first concerned (chapters 2-4) with the influence of liability rules on
incentives to reduce accident risks. Then consideration of accident law is broadened (chapter 5) to
reflect the effect of liability rules on compensation of victims and the allocation of risk. In this
regard a central issue is the roles of victims' insurance and of liability insurance, and how they alter
the incentives inherent in liability rules. Finally, the administrative costs of the liability system,
namely, the private and public legal costs of litigation, are examined (chapter 6). These costs are
significant and thus bear importantly on whether use of accident law is socially desirable. It is
emphasized that social intervention -- either to curtail use of the legal system or to encourage it --
may well be needed because the private incentives to use the system are generally different from the
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  Chapter 1 
 
  INTRODUCTION 
 
1. The Economic Approach to the Analysis of Law 
Under the economic approach to the analysis of law, two basic types of questions about legal 
rules are addressed. The first type is descriptive, concerning the effects of legal rules. For 
example, what is the influence of our system of liability for automobile accidents on the number 
of these accidents, on the compensation of accident victims, and on litigation expenses? The 
other type of question is normative, pertaining to the social desirability of legal rules. Thus, it 
might be asked whether our system of liability for automobile accidents is socially good, given 
its various consequences. 
In answering the two types of questions under the economic approach, theoretical 
attention is usually focused on stylized models of individual behavior and of the legal system. 
The advantage of studying models is that they allow descriptive and normative questions to be 
answered in an unambiguous way, and that they may clarify understanding of the actual 
influence of legal rules on behavior and help in the making of legal policy decisions. 
Descriptive analysis. When considering the descriptive questions in the models, the view 
taken will generally be that actors are forward looking and “rational.” That is, they will behave 
so as to maximize their expected utility. Given the characterization of individuals’ behavior as 
rational, the influence of legal rules on behavior can be ascertained. This can be done with 
definitude in the world of the models, because all relevant assumptions about individuals’ 
desires, their knowledge, their capabilities, and the environment will have been made explicit. 
For example, whether a person will drive carefully will be determinable, for it will have been 
stated how difficult it is for the person to exercise precaution, whether the person will himself be 
at risk of injury from an automobile accident, what the rule of liability is, what circumstances 
will give rise to suit, whether the person owns accident insurance and liability insurance, and so 
forth. 
Normative analysis.
1 The evaluation of social policies, and thus of legal rules, will be 
 
     
1The discussion to follow here is amplified in chapters 26-28 of the book.    
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undertaken with reference to a stated measure of social welfare. One legal rule will be said to be 
superior to a second if the first rule results in a higher level of the stated measure of social 
welfare. 
It should therefore be noticed that normative analysis is conditional in nature, in that the 
legal rule that is best may depend on the social welfare criterion under consideration. If the 
social goal were simply to minimize the number of automobile accidents, the best rule might 
well involve severe punishment for causing an accident, whereas if the social goal were also to 
involve the benefits people obtain from driving, the best rule would be unlikely to involve very 
rigorous punishment for causing an accident. 
This raises the question of which measures of social welfare are considered in economic 
analysis of legal rules.  Before discussing this question, let me comment briefly on the nature of 
the measures of social welfare. 
According to the framework of welfare economics, social welfare is assumed to be a 
function of individuals’ well-being, that is, of their utilities. An individual’s utility, in turn, can 
depend on anything about which the individual cares: not only material wants, but also, for 
example, aesthetic tastes, altruistic feelings, or a desire for notions of fairness to be satisfied.  
Hence, social welfare can depend on any of these elements, and will depend on them to the 
extent that individuals’ utilities do. It is thus a mistake to believe that, under the economic view, 
social welfare reflects only narrowly “economic” factors, namely, the amounts of goods and 
services produced and enjoyed. 
Moreover, the measure of social welfare can embody the desirability of equality of utility 
among individuals. That is, the function that represents the measure of social welfare may be 
such that it is higher if individuals have similar utilities than if their utilities are dispersed (but 
have the same sum). Social welfare functions with the property that equality of utilities tends to 
raise social welfare are studied by economists in many domains, and notably in the area of 
income taxation. 
Therefore, the conception of social welfare employed in welfare economics is quite 
general and plausibly can accommodate the views of the social good of most readers.   
           Nevertheless, it is standard for economic analysts to restrict attention to fairly simple 
measures of social welfare, and I will do that here. Two types of assumptions that I will tend to 
make should be noted at the outset. One is that the measure of social welfare will usually not 
accord importance to the distribution of utilities; thus, the effect of legal rules on the distribution 
of well-being will not be relevant to their evaluation under the measure of social welfare. This 
assumption is not made because of an opinion that the distribution of utilities is in fact 
unimportant. Rather, taking the effect of legal rules on distributional factors into account would 
complicate our analysis and yet would not in the end alter our conclusions. Why would taking 
into account distributional factors not alter our conclusions? The answer is that society has an 
income tax and transfer system that it can utilize to redistribute income. Thus, if I were to 
incorporate the income tax and transfer system into our analysis, a change in that system could 
offset any undesirable distributional consequence of a legal rule. If, for example, some legal rule 
turned out on balance to help the rich and hurt the poor, the former could be taxed more heavily 
and the latter less, so that the use of the rule would not necessarily have any distributional impact   
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after the optimal adjustment in the tax and transfer system were made. Thus, if one assumes that 
the income tax and transfer system will be used to effect desirable changes in the distribution of 
income, the distributional impact of the choice of legal rules should not matter. Of course, one 
might not make the assumption that the income tax and transfer system would always be used to 
redistribute wealth beneficially, in which case the choice of legal rules might be decided in part 
on the basis of their redistributive effects. The other type of simplification that I want to note 
now concerns notions of fairness and morality. Consider, for example, the classical conception 
of corrective justice, demanding that a wrongdoer compensate his victim for harm sustained. It is 
clear, I think, that the idea of corrective justice has substantial importance to individuals, 
especially in the context of accidents, and thus might be thought to enter into measures of social 
welfare. I will usually exclude such notions of fairness, however, from the analysis proper for 
analytical convenience. I will, though, sometimes mention, after the analysis of a legal rule, how 
a relevant notion of fairness would affect my conclusions. (Also, as I note below, I will take up 
the general issue of the integration of morality and notions of fairness into normative analysis 
later in the book.) 
What distinguishes economic analysis of law from other analysis of law? One might ask 
whether there is any qualitative difference between economic analysis of law, as defined here, 
and other approaches to its assessment. Is it not of interest to every legal analyst to determine 
how legal rules affect behavior and then to evaluate the rules with reference to some criterion of 
the social good? The answer would seem to be “yes,” and thus in this general sense, one cannot 
distinguish economic analysis from other analysis of law.   
What does seem to mark economic analysis are three characteristics. First, economic 
analysis emphasizes the use of stylized models and of statistical, empirical tests of theory, 
whereas other approaches usually do neither. Second, in describing behavior, economic analysis 
gives much greater weight than other approaches to the view that actors are rational, acting with 
a view toward the possible consequences of their choices. And third, in normative evaluation, 
economic analysis makes explicit the measure of social welfare considered, whereas other 
approaches often leave the criterion of the social good unclear or substantially implicit. 
History of the economic approach. The economic view may be said to have originated 
mainly with writings on crime by Becarria (1767) and, especially, Bentham (1789). Bentham 
developed in significant detail the idea that legal sanctions may discourage bad conduct and that 
sanctions should be employed when they will effectively deter but not when they will fail to do 
so (as with the insane). Curiously, however, after Bentham, the economic approach to law lay 
largely dormant until the1960s and 1970s. In that period, Coase (1960) wrote a provocative 
article on the incentives to reduce harms to neighbors engendered by property rights 
assignments; Becker (1968) authored an influential article on crime, casting into modern terms 
and extending Bentham’s earlier contributions; Calabresi (1970) published an extended 
treatment of liability rules and the accident problem; Posner (1972a) wrote a comprehensive 
textbook and a number of articles, and he established the Journal of Legal Studies, in which 
scholarship in economic analysis of law could be regularly published. Since that time, economic 
analysis of law has grown fairly rapidly. 
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2. Outline and Goal   
            This book is divided into a number of parts, the first of which are concerned with the 
basic areas of private law -- liability for accidents, contract law, and property law -- and with 
civil litigation. These areas of law are said to be private because they are enforced by the 
bringing of suits by private parties.   
In the next part of the book, I deal with public law enforcement, in which the state uses 
enforcement agents, such as police, safety inspectors, and tax auditors, to detect violators and to 
sanction them. Crime and criminal law are discussed in this part. In a subsequent, brief part of 
the book, I examine general questions about the overall structure of the legal system, such as 
why some behavior is controlled through private law and other behavior through public law 
enforcement. 
Then, in the final part, I consider the relationship between welfare economics and 
morality, issues relating to income distributional equity and the law, and commonly-encountered 
questions about the economic approach to analysis of law. 
The goal of the book is to set out the major elements of economic analysis of the central 
areas of law in a way that, as I mentioned in the preface, should be accessible to a wide audience. 
Thus, although most sections of the book are organized around models of behavior and of the 
legal system, the analysis is not technical in nature (all mathematics is contained in footnotes).  
Accordingly, legal readers without any formal background in economics should find the book 
easy to understand. At the same time, economists should find the subject matter to be of natural 
intellectual appeal, and they should not have any difficulty owing to their lack of legal 
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  LIABILITY AND DETERRENCE: BASIC THEORY 
 
Here and throughout Part One, we will be considering a model of accidents involving two types 
of parties, injurers and victims. We might think, for example, of injurers as drivers of 
automobiles and of victims as bicyclists, or of injurers as parties conducting blasting operations 
and of victims as passersby.
2 
Injurers may face legal liability for accidents that they cause, and the effect of this 
possibility on their behavior, victims’ behavior, and specified measures of social welfare will 
now be considered in several increasingly general versions of the model of accidents. The two 
major rules of accident liability, strict liability and negligence (and certain variations of them), 
will be the focus of our analysis.
3   
We will assume that accidents and consequent liability arise probabilistically.  In order to 
analyze the effects of liability rules in an uncertain setting in the simplest way, we will often 
suppose that parties are risk-neutral. A risk-neutral party makes decisions on the basis of 
probability-discounted, or expected, values. For example, a risk-neutral person who faces a 
liability of $100,000 with probability 10 percent will consider this uncertain payment to be 
equivalent to a certain payment of its expected value of $10,000.
4 An interpretation of the 
$10,000 expected liability amount is that it is the payment that the person would make on 
average were he repeatedly to face a 10 percent risk of having to make a $100,000 payment.  
 
2Accidents involving parties of only one type – such as accidents involving just drivers of automobiles, or just 
hunters -- are not in strict logic described by this model.  But it will be evident to the reader that many of the conclusions 
that will be drawn would carry over to a model of these single-activity accidents. 
3This chapter is based on a more complete treatment of its subject matter in chapter 2 of Shavell 1987a, which 
also presents proofs of claims that are made. In footnotes to this chapter, however, proofs of a number of the more 
important conclusions are given or are sketched. 
4If this assumption were not made, and account were taken of risk aversion, then a liability of $100,000 
with 10 percent probability would deter more than a certain liability of $10,000. We will consider risk aversion in 
chapter 5 below.   
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1. Unilateral Accidents and Levels of Care 
In the first version of the accident model, it will be supposed that accidents are unilateral in 
nature: Only injurers’ exercise of care or precautions affects accident risks; victims’ behavior 
does not. When an airplane crashes into a building, for example, or when a rupture in a water 
main causes a flood in a basement, the victims probably could not have done much to prevent 
harm.  In these cases, the accidents may be seen as almost literally unilateral. Other types of 
accidents might be seen as approximately unilateral if the victim’s role was slight; consider for 
example automobile-bicycle accidents in which bicyclists’ actions are of minor importance in 
reducing risks.  
The social goal will be taken to be minimization of the sum of the costs of care and of 
expected accident losses. This sum will be called total social costs. 
1.1 Social welfare optimum. Before determining how injurers will act under different 
liability rules, let us identify the level of care that minimizes total social costs. This socially 
optimal level of care will clearly reflect both the costs of exercising care and the reduction in 
accident risks that care would accomplish. Consider the following example. 
Example 1. Suppose that accidents that cause losses of 100 occur with a probability as 
described in Table 1.  
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To understand why exercising moderate care minimizes total social costs, observe on one hand 
that raising the level of care from none to moderate reduces expected accident losses by 5, but 
involves costs of only 3; it thus lowers total social costs. On the other hand, raising care beyond 
the moderate level would reduce expected accident losses by only 2, yet involve additional costs 
of 3; hence it would not be worthwhile.// 
Note that the example illustrates the obvious point that the optimal level of care may well 
not result in the lowest possible level of expected accident losses (for that would require the 
highest level of care).
5 Let us now examine how much care injurers will be led to exercise in the 
absence of liability and under various liability rules.   
                                                           
5The formal version of the model illustrated in the example is as follows. Let x be the level of care, p(x) the 
probability of an accident  (where p is decreasing in x), and  h the harm that an accident would cause. The socially optimal 
x miminizes x + p(x)h and is denoted by x*. Unless indicated otherwise, I will assume that x* is unique in these notes.   
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1.2 No liability. If there is no liability for accidents, injurers will not exercise any care, 
for doing so would entail costs but not yield a  benefit to them. Total social costs will therefore 
generally exceed the optimal level; in Example 1, for instance, total social costs will be 15 rather 
than 13. 
1.3 Strict liability. Under the rule of strict liability, injurers must, by definition, pay for 
all accident losses that they cause.
6 Hence, injurers’ total costs will equal total social costs; and 
because injurers will seek to minimize their own total costs, injurers’ goal will be identical to the 
social goal of minimizing total social costs. Consequently, strict liability induces injurers to 
choose the socially optimal level of care. In Example 1, strict liability leads injurers to exercise 
the optimal, moderate level of care. 
1.4 Negligence rule. Under the negligence rule, an injurer is held liable for the accident 
losses he causes only if he was negligent, that is, only if his level of care was less than a level 
called due care that the courts specify. If the injurer exercised a level of care that equaled or 
exceeded due care, he will not be held liable. The negligence rule is sometimes said to be fault-
based because liability is found only if the injurer was at fault in the sense of having been found 
negligent. 
If the courts set the level of due care equal to the socially optimal level of care, then 
injurers will be led to exercise due care, and thus the outcome will be socially optimal. To see 
why, first reconsider Example 1. If courts define due care to be the socially optimal, moderate 
level, the expected liability for an injurer would equal total social costs when no care is taken 
and would be zero when moderate or high care is taken. When at least moderate care is taken, 
then, the injurer’s total costs equal just the cost of care -- see Table 2. Hence, injurers will indeed 
be best off exercising moderate care. 
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More generally, there are two reasons why injurers will necessarily be led to take due 
care if it is chosen by courts to equal the optimal level. First, injurers plainly would not take 
more than due care, because they will escape liability by taking merely due care. Taking greater 
                                                           
6 It is assumed for the most part in this and the next chapter that an injurer is able to pay for losses caused.  The 
important possibility that injurers are unable to pay for losses caused is considered in section 3 of chapter 4. 
   
 
 
Chapter 2 – Page 4  
                                                          
care would therefore be to no advantage yet would involve additional costs.
7 Second, injurers 
would not wish to take less than due care if due care is set at the socially optimal level. If 
injurers took less than due care, they would be exposed to the risk of liability, so their expected 
costs would equal total social costs. Thus, injurers would want to choose their level of care so as 
to minimize total social costs. But this in turn means that they would wish to raise their level of 
care to the socially optimal point -- which by hypothesis equals due care and therefore allows 
them to avoid liability entirely.
8 
1.5 Liability rules compared. Both forms of liability result in the same, socially optimal 
behavior, but they differ in terms of what courts need to know to apply them.
9 Under strict 
liability a court need only determine the magnitude of the loss that occurred, whereas under the 
negligence rule a court must in addition determine the level of care actually taken (a driver’s 
speed) and calculate the socially optimal level of due care (the appropriately safe speed). To do 
the latter, in turn, a court needs to know the costs and the effectiveness of taking different levels 
of care in reducing accident risks.
10 
1.6 Several dimensions of care.  Suppose, as would be usual, that there is more than one 
dimension of an injurer’s behavior that affects accident risks (not only a driver’s speed, but also 
the frequency with which he looks at the rear-view mirror).  In this situation, under strict liability 
an injurer would be led to choose optimal levels of all dimensions of care, because his goal 
would be to minimize his expected total costs.  But under the negligence rule, an injurer would 
have a motive to choose optimal levels only of those dimensions of care that are incorporated in 
the due care standard.  And in fact some dimensions of care will usually be omitted from the due 
care standard because of difficulties that courts would face in ascertaining them (how would a 
court obtain information about the number of times per minute a driver usually looks in his 
rear-view mirror?) or in determining proper behavior in respect to them. 
 
7It is assumed here (and elsewhere in this chapter) that a court can determine a party’s level of care with complete 
accuracy. Otherwise, it might well be worth a party’s while to take more than due care to reduce the likelihood of a court 
mistakenly finding him negligent. This and related issues are analyzed in section 1 of chapter 4. 
8In terms of the model mentioned in note 4 above, the claim of this section is that if the due care level equals x*, 
then injurers will be induced to choose x*.  To demonstrate this, observe that, as stated, an injurer will not choose x > x*, 
for if he chooses x*, he spends less and still bears no liability. Thus, x # x* must be true.  If x < x*, the injurer will be 
found negligent if he causes an accident, so that he will bear liability. Thus, given that x < x*, the injurer will choose x to 
minimize x + p(x)h. But x + p(x)h > x* + p(x*)h by definition of x*, and because x* + p(x*)h $ x*, it follows that  x + 
p(x)h > x*; thus, the injurer will prefer to choose x* than any x less than x*.  
9The rules also differ in how they allocate risk, in the administrative costs that they generate, and in their 
distributional effects. As indicated in the introduction to Part One, these issues will be discussed in later chapters. 
10These disadvantages of the negligence rule (as well as the disadvantage to be noted in the next section) may 
become attenuated or may be reversed in the bilateral version of the model to be considered in section 2 below.   
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2. Bilateral Accidents and Levels of Care 
Now let us consider a bilateral version of the model of accidents, where victims as well as 
injurers can take care and thereby lower accident risks. The social goal will continue to be 
minimization of total social costs, which here will be the sum of injurers’ as well as victims’ 
costs of care, plus expected accident losses. 
2.1 Social welfare optimum. The optimal levels of care of injurers and of victims will 
reflect their joint possibilities for reducing accident risks and their costs of care. Consider the 
following example. 
Example 2. The probability of an accident that would cause losses of 100 is related to the 
different possible combinations of injurers’ and of victims’ levels of care as shown in Table 3. In 
this example, it is assumed for simplicity that there is only one positive level of care for parties 
of each type. 
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11 
From the last column of the table, it is apparent that it is socially optimal for both injurers and 
victims to take care. To see why, observe, for instance, that if injurers alone take care, expected 
losses are 10, whereas if victims also take care, at a cost of 2, expected losses fall by 4; hence 
total social costs are reduced when victims also take care. Similar reasoning shows that the 
situation in which victims alone take care can be improved when injurers also take care.// 
Although in this example it is socially optimal for both injurers and victims to take care, 
other examples can obviously be constructed in which it is optimal only for injurers to take care 
or only for victims to take care (or for neither to do so). These possibilities are not the focus here 
(but see section 2.11) because in most real situations it would be best for both injurers and 
victims to take a positive degree of care, however small.
11 
                                                           
11The formal version of the bilateral model is the natural extension of that of the unilateral model (see note 4): 
Injurers choose a level of care x, victims choose a level of care y, the probability of an accident is p(x, y), which is 
declining in both x and y, and the social goal is to minimize x + y + p(x, y)h. It will generally be assumed, as just noted in 
the text, that the optimal levels of care x* and  y* are positive and also that they are unique.   
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2.2 Behavior in the bilateral model. In the bilateral context, the way in which one type 
of party behaves will often depend on how the other type of party behaves. For example, how 
watchful drivers are for bicyclists may depend on how cautious bicyclists tend to be (drivers 
might be very watchful if bicyclists are not very cautious), and how cautious bicyclists generally 
are may depend on the usual attentiveness of drivers. 
The possible interdependence of parties’ actions means that if we want to show that some 
pattern of behavior will hold true, we have to show that it will be an equilibrium pattern in the 
sense that neither type of party would want to change what he is doing given the behavior of the 
other type of party. Injurers’ and victims’ behavior in equilibrium will now be determined in 
various liability settings. 
2.3 No liability. As before, injurers will not take care in the absence of liability, and the 
outcome will therefore generally depart from the optimal. However, because victims bear their 
accident losses, they will have a reason to take care. In Example 2, although injurers will not 
take care, victims will take care, because for a cost of 2 they will lower their expected accident 
losses from 15 to l2.  Note that this outcome is an equilibrium. It is in victims’ interest to take 
care, given that injurers do not take care; and it is in injurers’ interest not to take care, given that 
victims take care (or, for that matter, if they do not). The reader will be able to verify similarly 
that other outcomes below are equilibria, when this is not pointed out in the text. 
2.4 Strict liability. Because injurers will be liable for the accident losses that they cause 
under strict liability, they will have a proper motive to take care. However, because victims will 
be fully compensated by injurers for accident losses, victims will be indifferent to the occurrence 
of accidents. Therefore, victims will not take care,
12 and the outcome will not be optimal. In 
Example 2, injurers will take care because doing so will reduce their expected liability from 15 
to 10 at a cost of only 3, but victims will not take care. 
2.5 Strict liability with the defense of contributory negligence.  Under this rule an 
injurer is liable for the accident losses he causes only if the victim’s level of care was at least 
equal to the victim’s due care level.  If the victim’s care level was less than due care for him, the 
victim is said to be contributorily negligent and must bear his losses. (Contributory negligence is 
called a defense because it is a legal defense for the injurer: Its successful assertion by the injurer 
relieves him of liability.)  
If courts choose the level of due care for victims to equal the socially optimal level of 
care, then victims will prefer to exercise due care and injurers also will prefer to take the socially 
optimal level of care. Thus, the socially optimal outcome will occur. To establish that this is true, 
note, first, that injurers will exercise optimal care, given that victims take due care, because then 
injurers will be liable for accident losses. (If bicyclists take due care, then drivers will be liable 
for accident losses and will decide to take optimal care.) Second, observe that victims will take 
 
12However, victims would obviously have an incentive to take care if they would not or could not be 
compensated fully for their accident losses, as where the losses involve serious personal injury or death (which will be 
considered in section 8 of chapter 4 and section 6 of chapter 5). Thus, here (and often below) the reader may find it useful 
to think about examples of accidents in which victims would suffer only property losses.  Nevertheless, the example in 
which victims are bicyclists will continue to be discussed in the text for expositional convenience. One might imagine, for 
example, that bicycle accidents damage bicycles but do not injure riders.   
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due care because they will wish to avoid being found contributorily negligent and thus having to 
bear their own losses. The specific reasoning is analogous to that in the explanation in section 
1.4 of why injurers will take due care under the negligence rule.
13 
To verify the claim in Example 2, assume that due care for victims equals “care,” as 
victims’ exercise of care is socially optimal. Presuming that victims take care, injurers will be 
liable for accident losses that they cause. Therefore their expected liability will fall from 12 to 6 
if they spend 3 to take care, and they will take care. Conversely, assuming that injurers take care, 
victims will be induced to take care; for if victims do not take care, they will bear their expected 
accident losses of 10, whereas if they take care at a cost of 2 they will not bear their losses.
14 
2.6 Negligence rule. As in the unilateral model, if the courts choose due care to equal the 
socially optimal level, then injurers will be led to take due care. Victims too will be induced to 
take the optimal level of care because they will bear their losses if injurers take due care. 
(Drivers will be led to take due care; and knowing that they will bear their losses, bicyclists will 
decide to take appropriate care.) 
To illustrate these conclusions, assume in Example 2 that due care for injurers equals 
“care.” If injurers do not take care, their expected liability will be 12, presuming that victims 
take care; thus injurers will choose to avoid liability by spending 3 on care. Also, because 
victims will bear their losses when injurers take due care, victims will reduce their expected 
losses from 10 to 6 by taking care; as this will cost victims 2, they too will decide to take care.
15 
2.7 Negligence rule with the defense of contributory negligence. According to this 
rule, an injurer will only be liable for accident losses if he failed to take due care and the victim 
exercised due care himself. In other words, if the injurer was negligent, he still will escape 
liability if the victim was contributorily negligent. 
An argument very close to that of the previous section shows that if courts choose 
 
13This paragraph has explained only why both injurers and victims taking optimal care is an equilibrium.  But the 
situation in which both take optimal care is in fact the only equilibrium that can exist.  In other words, the only stable 
situation that can possibly exist under the rule of strict liability with the defense of contributory negligence (with due care 
for victims set at the optimal level) is that in which both injurers and victims take optimal care. That this equilibrium is 
unique follows from three observations: (1) Victims never have an incentive to take care y exceeding y* (for once they 
take due care they will be compensated for their losses). (2) Victims will not choose y less than y*, for if they do so, they 
will bear their own losses, injurers will take no care, and victims thus will minimize y + p(0,y)h.  But y + p(0,y)h = 0 + y + 
p(0,y)h  > x* + y* + p(x*,y*)h  > y*, implying that victims must be better off choosing due care y* than any y < y*.           
(3) Because in equilibrium victims thus take due care of y*, injurers choose x to minimize x + p(x,y*)h, which is 
minimized at x*. 
14To see why the only equilibrium in this example is the situation in which both injurers and victims take care, 
consider the other possibilities. For injurers to take care and for victims not to take care cannot be an equilibrium, since 
victims will wish to take care if injurers take care (or, also, if they do not). Similarly, for injurers not to take care and for 
victims to take care cannot be an equilibrium, since injurers will wish to take care given that victims take care.  Finally, for 
both injurers and victims not to take care cannot be an equilibrium, since victims will wish to take care to avoid liability 
(for if they take care, their costs will be 2, whereas if they do not take care, they will bear expected losses of 15). 
15The equilibrium in which both injurers and victims take optimal care is the only equilibrium under the 
negligence rule (assuming that due care is optimal). The socially optimal outcome is also the unique equilibrium under the 
next rule that we consider.   
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injurers’ and victims’ levels of due care to equal the socially optimal levels, both injurers and 
victims will be led to take due care and the socially optimal result will be achieved. Injurers will 
wish to take due care to avoid liability, under the assumption that victims take due care and thus 
will not bear their accident losses on account of contributory negligence. Also, victims will want 
to take due care, presuming that injurers take due care; since victims will then bear their losses, 
they will be led to take the socially optimal level of care, which by assumption is due care. (This 
may be verified in Example 2 exactly as it was in the preceding section.) 
Notice that the defense of contributory negligence is a superfluous addition to the 
negligence rule with respect to the objective of inducing victims to act optimally, for it was seen 
in the last section that victims take optimal care when the negligence rule is unaccompanied by 
the defense. Under the negligence rule without the defense of contributory negligence, injurers 
take due care to avoid liability. Consequently, victims bear their losses, and this by itself 
supplies them an incentive to take appropriate care. Accordingly, there is no need to provide 
victims another incentive to take care.
16 
2.8 Comparative negligence rule. Under this rule, as under the last, an injurer will not 
be liable for accident losses he causes if he takes due care. But the comparative negligence rule 
differs from the previous rule in the situation in which both the injurer and the victim fail to take 
due care. In that case each party bears a fraction of the accident losses, where the fraction is 
determined by a comparison of the amounts by which the two parties’ levels of care depart from 
the levels of due care. The fraction of losses a party bears will be higher the greater the 
difference between due care and his level of care. 
If courts choose optimal levels of due care under the comparative negligence rule, then 
both injurers and victims will be led to take due care. The rationale for this conclusion is 
precisely that of the last section. (Injurers will take due care to avoid liability if victims take due 
care, and so on.) 
The reason that there is no difference between the outcomes under the comparative 
negligence rule and under the negligence rule with (or without) the defense of contributory 
negligence is in essence this: Under both rules, if parties of one type take due care, then parties 
of the other type will reason that they alone will be found negligent if they fail to take due care.  
The allocation of accident losses when both injurers and victims are negligent -- the 
distinguishing feature of the comparative negligence rule -- therefore turns out to be irrelevant to 
the calculations of parties in equilibrium.
17 
2.9 Liability rules compared. We have seen that in the bilateral version of the model, 
strict liability does not lead to the socially optimal outcome for the obvious reason that it fails to 
furnish victims a motive to take care. We have also seen that strict liability with the defense of 
 
16However, the defense of contributory negligence may generate beneficial incentives if some injurers act 
negligently.  If some injurers act negligently and if there is no defense of contributory negligence, then a victim may 
decide not to take due care, since he may think he will be likely to obtain compensation for accident losses he suffers 
because they will be caused by a negligent injurer.  
17But the allocation of losses when both injurers and victims are negligent is relevant in situations in which there 
are reasons why some injurers and victims act negligently; on such reasons, see sections 1 and 3 of chapter 4.   
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contributory negligence and all forms of the negligence rule result in the socially optimal 
outcome. Under these rules, parties have one of two sufficient reasons to take optimal care: 
Either taking optimal care allows them to avoid entirely the bearing of accident losses (victims’ 
situation under strict liability with the defense of contributory negligence, injurers’ situation 
under the negligence rules), or else taking care reduces the level of (rather than the entirety of) 
expected losses that parties in fact bear (injurers’ situation under strict liability with the defense 
of contributory negligence, victims’ situation under the negligence rules). 
To apply each of the rules leading to optimality, courts need to determine the magnitude 
of accident losses and the actual level of care and the optimal level of due care for injurers or 
victims. Moreover, to ascertain the optimal level of due care for just one party, a court must 
generally determine (if only implicitly) the optimal level of care for the other as well, because 
the optimal level of care for one party will in principle depend on the other’s costs of, and 
possibilities for, reducing risk.
18 This latter point makes the comparison of liability rules with 
respect to their ease of application different from what it might at first seem to be. 
Consider, for instance, the rule of strict liability with the defense of contributory 
negligence and the negligence rule with the same defense. It may seem initially that strict 
liability with the defense of contributory negligence is the easier rule to apply, because courts are 
not directly concerned with injurers’ behavior under the rule, whereas courts must set due care 
for injurers under the negligence rule. But to apply the defense of contributory negligence, courts 
must determine optimal due care for victims, and, as just remarked, this effectively requires 
courts to determine the optimal level of care for injurers. Therefore, the main difference affecting 
the ease of application of the two rules is only that under the strict liability rule courts do not 
need to observe the actual level of care of injurers. 
2.10 Liability rules compared when care has several dimensions.  I noted in section 
1.6 that there may be dimensions of injurers’ care (such as the frequency with which drivers look 
in their rear-view mirrors) that courts would not take into account in the determination of 
negligence because of difficulties in assessing them. Injurers may therefore not exercise care in 
an optimal way in every dimension under the negligence rule, but they will be led to do so under 
strict liability. It is clear that a similar point applies when there are dimensions of victims’ care 
(such as the frequency with which bicyclists look for traffic behind them) that could not be 
included in their standard of due care. Specifically, victims will not take optimal care in these 
dimensions under strict liability with the defense of contributory negligence, but they will do so 
under the negligence rule (because they will bear their accident losses under that rule). In 
consequence, to know how the presence of multiple dimensions of care affects the comparison of 
liability rules, one must make a judgment about the relative importance of the dimensions of 
injurers’ and of victims’ behavior that would be excluded from their respective standards of due 
 
18That courts must generally consider the entire tableau of costs and effectiveness of care for the two parties to 
determine optimal care for either should have been evident from Table 3 and section 2.1. But it should be mentioned that 
in some situations the optimal level of care for parties of one type may be determinable without precise knowledge of the 
other’s optimal level of care. Suppose, for instance, that the use of lights by bicyclists when riding at night will 
dramatically reduce accident risks whatever the level of care taken by drivers. Then it would be optimal for bicyclists to 
use lights at night without determining what particular level of care is optimal for drivers.   
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care. 
2.11 The least-cost avoider. The notion of the least-cost avoider applies in situations in 
which the risk of accidents will be eliminated if either injurers or victims take care. In such 
situations it is clearly wasteful for both injurers and victims to take care; rather, it is optimal for 
the type of parties who can prevent accidents at least cost -- the least-cost avoiders -- alone to 
take care. Suppose,  for example, that injurers can prevent accident losses of 100 by taking a 
precaution that costs 10, and that victims also can prevent the losses by taking a precaution that 
costs 20. In this case injurers alone ought to take precautions, because in that way the social goal 
of minimizing total social costs is achieved. 
The model of the least-cost avoider may be misleading for thinking about the class of 
bilateral accidents examined in this book. In the situations examined here, there simply are no 
least-cost avoiders who alone ought to take care, for the assumption is that both injurers and 
victims generally ought to do something to avoid risk; the effect of liability rules is therefore 
different from that in the least-cost avoider model. If, say, injurers are the least-cost avoiders, an 
optimal outcome will be achieved under strict liability unaccompanied by the defense of 
contributory negligence. But in the bilateral model studied here, the defense of contributory 
negligence must accompany strict liability in order to induce victims as well as injurers to take 
appropriate care. 
2.12 Liability rules in use. The major rules of liability for accidents between strangers in 
the United States are the comparative negligence rule, the negligence rule with the defense of 
contributory negligence, and strict liability with that defense.
19 In England, France, and 
Germany, the usual forms of liability are the comparative negligence rule and strict liability with 
forms of contributory negligence defense.
20 
2.13 The determination of due care and the as if interpretation. Negligence in 
American law, according to the Restatement (Second) of Torts is “conduct which falls below the 
standard [of due care] . . . for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm,” and the 
concept of negligence is similar in other legal systems. Deciding on the standard of due care 
often requires some sort of weighing of the magnitude of risk against the disutility or cost of 
more careful conduct.
21 
As the reader has seen in the analysis here, the level of due care that minimizes total 
social costs implicitly involves just such a weighing of risk against the cost of care. This 
suggests that due care is in fact found by a process that operates as if it were designed to identify 
 
19See, for example, Keeton, Dobbs, et al. 1984, chapters 5, 11, and 13; and  Dobbs 2000, chapters 6, 11, and 23.    
20See Tunc 1983, for a summary of and bibliography on tort law in the entire world; Fleming 1998, for a 
treatment of tort law focusing on England and Australia; Von Bar, 1998, vols. 1 and 2, for a description of tort law in 
Europe; Von Mehren and Gordley 1977, chapters 8-10, for materials on tort law in France and Germany; and Zweigert 
and Kötz 1998, chapters 40-43, for a description of tort law in England, France, and Germany.   
21See the Restatement (Second) of Torts 1965, sections 282, 291-93. The Restatement is a summary of and 
commentary on the doctrines of tort law produced by leading scholars under the aegis of the American Law Institute. For 
discussion of the determination of negligence in other legal systems see, for example, Limpens et al. 1983, sections 23-27; 
Markesinis 1994, 72-74; Von Bar 1998, 1: 20-39, 2: part 2; and Zweigert and Kötz 1998, 599-600, 615-17.  
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behavior that minimizes total social costs, or at least approximately so (one does not know if the 
weighing is any more than qualitatively similar to that which minimizes total social costs).
22 
I use the words “as if” because the claim is hardly that individuals or courts think in 
terms of the mathematical goal of minimizing a sum. They obviously do not do anything so 
unnatural.  Rather, they appear to gauge the appropriateness of behavior by a rough 
consideration of risk and the costs of reducing it, ordinarily on the basis of felt notions of 
fairness.
23 Likewise, the as if interpretation carries with it no specific implications about the 
degree to which individuals and courts concern themselves about goals of deterrence, although 
they sometimes appear to be concerned about it. 
With these caveats in mind, observe that the as if interpretation is borne out not only by 
the mere fact that there is a weighing involved in the negligence determination, but also by a 
consideration of the character of the weighing. First, the list of factors that courts take into 
account in setting due care -- and the influence of those factors on the level of due care -- are 
what we would expect if courts were aiming to minimize total social costs: The level of due care 
is generally higher the greater the likelihood of harm, the larger the probable size of harm, the 
greater the number of individuals at risk, and the easier it is for injurers to alleviate risk.
24  
Second, the choice of due care levels probably reflects the possibilities for both injurers and 
victims to reduce accident risks, as is consistent with the bilateral model of accidents. Consider, 
for instance, the risk of accidents in which bicyclists run into car doors as the doors are opened.  
My surmise is that most of us would say that bicyclists should not have to proceed so slowly 
that, were a car door to open suddenly, they could virtually always stop in time; rather, we would 
say that, before persons open their car doors, they should look around to see if anyone is 
approaching. I suggest too that in coming to this view, most of us would have at the back of our 
minds -- if not in our conscious thoughts -- such ideas as that it would be a burden for bicyclists 
to have to go so slowly that they could stop immediately before running into car doors, that it is 
relatively easy for persons leaving cars to look for danger, and that it is not necessary for 
bicyclists to go very slowly if persons are properly cautious when leaving their cars. In other 
words, when deciding on the care that parties of one type ought to exercise, we quite naturally 
factor into our thinking the ability of parties of the other type to take care, the burden of doing 
so, and what their taking care would accomplish. 
Note on the literature. The first writer to study in an analytical way the theory of the 
 
22It will be clear to the reader that the “as if” interpretation can also be made about many other instances that will 
be mentioned in later chapters of this book of consistency between actual law and the law that is theoretically optimal 
(given the stated measure of social welfare). 
23An exception is Judge Learned Hand’s algebraic formula for determining the due care standard. In his opinion 
in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947), Hand said that a party is negligent if he failed to take 
a precaution when its cost, which he called its “burden,” was less than its expected benefit; he denoted the burden by B, the 
probability of loss in the absence of precaution by P, the magnitude of loss by L, and said that negligence should be found 
if B < PL.  
24See Fleming 1998, chapter 7, section 2; Keeton, Dobbs, et al. 1984, sections 29, 31, 33; the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, 1965, section 293. Note too that these effects on due care are consistent with Judge Hand’s formula.    
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effect of liability rules on parties’ behavior was Calabresi (1961, 1965, 1970). He examined the 
desirability of different rules, emphasizing the advantages of versions of strict liability, and 
assuming for the most part the goal of minimization of total social costs.
25 Posner (1972a,b, 
l973) later made significant contributions, especially in his analysis of the various principles and 
doctrines governing use of the negligence rule.
26 Although both these writers discussed 
suggestive numerical examples, neither recognized that liability rules would, as a general matter, 
lead calculating parties to choose levels of care such that total social costs are minimized. Brown 
(1973) put forward the first clear statement and formal proofs of this conclusion. He showed that 
the rules of strict liability with the defense of contributory negligence and the negligence rule 




3. Unilateral Accidents: Levels of Care and Levels of Activity 
We will now consider an injurer’s level of activity -- that is, whether, or how much, he engages 
in a particular activity. The number of miles an individual drives, for instance, might be 
interpreted as his level of activity. An injurer’s level of activity is to be distinguished from his 
level of care, which has to do with the precautions he takes when engaging in his activity (the 
precautions an individual takes when on the road, such as slowing for curves, as opposed to the 
number of miles he drives).  
             Our analysis will begin with the unilateral case, and we will assume for simplicity that 
an increase in an injurer’s activity level will result in a proportionate increase in expected 
accident losses, given his level of care. Thus, a doubling in the number of miles that individuals 
drive will result in a doubling in the number of accidents they cause, given the care with which 
they drive; or a doubling in the number of times individuals walk their dogs will result in a 
doubling in the risk that their dogs will bite strangers, given the care (leashing the dogs) they 
take to prevent attacks.  We will also assume that an increase in an injurer’s level of activity will 
result in an increase in his utility (at least up to some point); the more individuals drive or the 
more they walk their dogs, the greater will be their utility (until their need to drive is met or until 
walking their dogs turns into a chore). 
We will now assume the social goal to be maximization of the utility injurers derive from 
engaging in their activity less total social costs, that is, less the costs of care and expected 
accident losses. It makes sense, of course, to introduce the utility injurers derive from their 
 
25Many previous writers had, of course, recognized that liability rules would have some effect on behavior, but 
usually only in passing. Calabresi differed from his predecessors in that he made the effect of liability on behavior the 
focus of his work and carried it out in a self-conscious, sustained, and careful way. 
26See also Landes and Posner 1981a, 892-903, discussing what is called here the as if interpretation of the 
negligence determination. 
27Soon afterward Diamond 1974a,b also showed, in closely related models, that the negligence rule with the 
defense of contributory negligence induces parties to take levels of care that minimize total accident cost. See as well 
Green 1976, Shavell 1987a, 72-77, 86-91, Emons 1990, and Emons and Sobel 1991, who analyze liability when injurers 
and victims are heterogeneous.   
 
 
Chapter 2 – Page 13  
activity into the measure of social welfare, because the level of their activity is now a subject of 
study.
28 
3.1 Social welfare optimum. For social welfare to be maximized, an injurer must, as 
before, choose a level of care that is commensurate with the effect of care in reducing accident 
losses and with its costs. But now the injurer should also select his level of activity 
appropriately, which is to say, at the level that appropriately balances the utility he obtains 
against the additional risks he creates and the costs of care. 
Example 3. Let us build on Example 1 by assuming that it describes the situation each 
time injurers engage in their activity. Thus, injurers who behave optimally will take moderate 
care, at a cost of 3, and will reduce expected accident losses to 10. Consequently, if an injurer 
engages in his activity twice, taking optimal care each time, his total costs of care will be 6, and 
the expected accident losses he causes will be 20; if he engages in his activity three times, the 
figures will be 9 and 30, respectively; and so forth. These figures are shown in the third and 
fourth columns of Table 4. The second column in the table shows the total utility injurers derive 
from engaging in the activity, from which the figures for social welfare in the last column -- 
utility minus costs of care and accident losses -- can be calculated. 
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The optimal activity level is 2 because social welfare is highest at that level. One way of 
explaining why is as follows. Each time an injurer engages in the activity, he will increase total 
social costs by 3 + 10 = 13. Therefore, social welfare will be enhanced by his engaging in the 
activity another time if and only if the marginal utility he would gain exceeds 13. Because the 
utility he obtains from engaging the first time is 40, the marginal utility he obtains from the 
second time is 20 (that is, 60 – 40), and that from the third time is only 9 (that is, 69 – 60), it is 
                                                           
28The social goal considered above, minimizing total social costs, may be viewed as a special case of the present 
goal.  If we imagine the level of activity, and hence the utility from the activity, to be held constant, as we implicitly 
assumed was the case above, then maximization of the utility derived from the activity less total social costs is obviously 
equivalent to minimization of total social costs.   
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best that he stop at the second time.
29 //  
The general point illustrated by this example is that the socially optimal behavior of 
injurers can be determined in two steps: first by finding (as in section 1.1) the level of care that 
minimizes total social costs incurred each time injurers engage in their activity, and then by 
raising the level of activity as long as the marginal utility injurers derive exceeds the increment 
to total social costs.
30  
3.2 No liability. In the absence of liability, not only will injurers fail to take care, they 
also will engage in their activity to too great an extent. Indeed, they will continue to engage in it 
as long as they obtain any additional utility (individuals will go for a drive or walk their dogs on 
a mere whim) rather than, as would be socially desirable, only as long as they obtain additional 
utility exceeding the costs of optimal care plus the expected accident losses they cause. In 
Example 3 injurers will not take care and thus will choose activity level 4, the level at which 
they cease to gain utility from their activity, rather than the optimal activity level of 2. 
3.3 Strict liability. Under strict liability an injurer’s utility, net of his expected costs, will 
be equal to the measure of social welfare, because he will pay for the accident losses he causes, 
will naturally enjoy the benefits of engaging in his activity, and will bear the costs of care. 
Accordingly, injurers will behave so as to maximize social welfare; they will thus choose both 
the optimal level of care and the optimal level of activity. 
More directly, injurers will choose the optimal level of care because doing so will 
minimize the expected costs they bear each time they engage in their activity. And they will 
choose the optimal level of activity because they will wish to engage in the activity only when 
the extra utility they derive exceeds their costs of care plus their added expected liability 
payments for accident losses caused. (People will walk their dogs only when their utility gain 
outweighs the disutility of having to leash the dogs and the added liability risk due to dog bites.) 
In Example 3, we know (from section 1.3) that strictly liable injurers will take the moderate level 
of care. Hence, the last column in Table 4 will become injurers’ utility, net of their expected 
liability costs, and they will therefore choose the optimal activity level of 2. 
3.4 Negligence rule. As the reader recalls from previous analysis, injurers will be led to 
take optimal care under the negligence rule, assuming that courts choose the level of due care to 
equal the optimal level of care. Because they will take due care, however, injurers will escape 
liability for any accident losses they cause. They will therefore have no reason to consider the 
effect that engaging in their activity has on accident losses.   
Consequently, injurers will be led to choose socially excessive activity levels. 
 
29Notice that utility actually falls beyond activity level 4. (The fifth time one walks his dog, it is more a chore 
than a pleasure.) 
30The formal model illustrated in the example is as follows. Let z be the activity level, b(z) be the utility or 
benefit from the activity, and assume the social object is to maximize b(z) ! z(x + p(x)h), where x + p(x)h are social costs 
each time an injurer engages in his activity. Let z* and x* be optimal values of z and x. Note that x*  minimizes x + p(x)h, 
so x* is as described above in section 1; x* minimizes social costs whatever the level of activity. Therefore, z* is 
determined by bN(z) = x* + p(x*)h, which is to say, the condition that the marginal benefit from the activity equals the 
marginal social cost, comprising the sum of the cost of optimal care and expected accident losses (given optimal care).    
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Specifically, they will engage in their activity whenever the utility they derive net of the cost of 
care is positive (whenever the pleasure from walking their dogs net of the disutility of leashing 
them is positive), rather than only when their net utility exceeds the additional expected accident 
losses they create.
31 
This can be seen in Example 3, where we know that if due care is the optimal, moderate 
level, injurers will take due care. Because injurers take due care under the negligence rule, they 
will not be liable for accident losses and their situation will be that described in Table 5.  
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From the last column in the table it is evident that injurers will choose the activity level 3 
rather than the optimal activity level 2: They will increase their activity level from 2 to 3 because 
this will raise their utility by 9 and their costs of care by only 3; they will not consider that 
increasing their activity level will also raise expected accident losses by l0 (as shown in Table 4), 
for they will not be liable for these additional social costs. 
3.5 Liability rules compared. Under both strict liability and the negligence rule, injurers 
are led to take socially optimal levels of care, but under the negligence rule, they engage in their 
activity excessively because, unlike under strict liability, they do not pay for the accident losses 
that they cause.   
The importance of this defect of the negligence rule will clearly depend on the expected 
magnitude of the losses caused by an activity. If an activity is by its nature very dangerous even 
when carried out with appropriate precautions, it will be significant that under the negligence 
rule the level of the activity would be socially excessive. For example, if the walking of dogs of 
a vicious breed or if blasting creates high risks of harm despite the use of all reasonable (or due) 
care, it will be of real consequence that under the negligence rule people would walk their dogs 
                                                           
31In terms of the model (see the previous note), the point is as follows. Because an injurer will escape liability by 
exercising care x*, he will choose z to maximize b(z) ! zx*, so that z will satisfy bN(z) = x*.  However z* is determined by 
bN(z) = x* + p(x*)h, so that z will be excessive under the negligence rule (assuming that b(z) is a concave function).   
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excessively (rather than exercise them in a yard or rather than own dogs of another breed) or that 
firms would blast excessively (rather than employ other methods of demolition). If, however, an 
activity creates only a low risk of accidents when due care is taken, the importance of any excess 
in the level of activity under the negligence rule will be small. This is true, one suspects, of 
many, and perhaps most, of our everyday activities (mowing a lawn, playing catch, walking the 
friendly, domesticated dog). 
3.6 The source of the defect of the negligence rule. The failing of the negligence rule 
results from an implicit assumption that the standard of behavior for determining negligence is 
defined only in terms of the level of care,
32 an assumption that seems generally to be true in 
reality. Were the negligence standard defined so as to include the activity level, injurers would 
make sure not to engage in their activity to an excessive extent in order to avoid a finding of 
negligence. 
This consideration, however, immediately raises the question why the courts do not 
usually include the activity level in the determination of negligence. A possible answer concerns 
 the information that the courts would require. To formulate a standard for the level of activity, 
courts would need to ascertain the character of the benefits that parties derive from their 
activities. (Courts would have to inquire into the pleasure obtained from walking a dog or the 
importance of driving somewhere.) Because these benefits often seem practically unknowable, 
attempts by courts to determine  appropriate levels of activity would probably land them in a 
speculative realm. Deciding on appropriate levels of care, although by no means an easy task, 
usually appears to be less problematic. (We can say with fair confidence that a dog that tends to 
snap at others should be leashed, or that a person should not drive at 60 miles per hour along a 
residential street.) 
Aside from the difficulties that courts would face in formulating appropriate standards for 
parties’ levels of activity, courts would have to verify what parties’ levels of activity actually 
were. This additional burden might be a substantial one in some situations, especially because 
establishing an individual’s level of activity would require knowledge of what he did in the past. 
(How many times did a person walk his dog before the last time, when it bit someone?) By 
contrast, assessing an individual’s level of care often requires knowledge of his behavior only at 
the time of an accident. 
Nevertheless, there may be situations in which a court would have sufficient information 
to incorporate the level of activity into the negligence determination. One notable example is 
when a party engages even once in an activity that is very dangerous despite the exercise of care, 
and the activity yields the party only an obviously small utility. In this case the party could be 
called negligent merely for having engaged in the activity.
33 
 
32Notice therefore that the defect is similar to that discussed in section 1.6 concerning dimensions of care omitted 
from the due care standard. 
33In this regard, it is interesting to note the passage in the Restatement (Second) of Torts 1965, section 297, which 
reads in part, “A negligent act may be one which involves an unreasonable risk of harm . . . although it is done with all 
possible care.” By way of example, the Restatement comments that “there are many mountain roads which may properly 
be regarded as dangerous no matter how careful . . . the driver may be . . . there is an inescapable risk in driving down a 
narrow and illkept mountain road . . . particularly if . . . snow or ice has rendered the road slippery . . . mere use of such a   
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Note on the literature. In Shavell (1980c) I introduced the distinction between the level 
of activity and the level of care and first developed the points about strict liability versus 
negligence and the activity level that are discussed here and in section 4 below.  
 
4.  Bilateral Accidents: Levels of Care and Levels of Activity 
In this most general case victims as well as injurers will be assumed to choose levels of activity 
and levels of care. As with injurers’ levels of activity, increases in victims’ levels of activity will 
be assumed to raise their utility, at least up to some point, and will result in proportionate 
increases in expected accident losses. Thus, if a bicyclist rides an extra mile, he will enjoy extra 
utility and his chances of being involved in an accident will rise. The measure of social welfare 
will be taken to be the utility that victims and injurers derive from their activities less their costs 
of care and expected accident losses. 
The analysis that follows will be brief because most conclusions can be explained by 
appeal to the previous cases. 
4.1 Social welfare optimum.  Optimal behavior in the bilateral case will reflect not only 
the cost of care and its effect on accident risks, but also the utility that injurers and victims obtain 
from their activities. 
Example 4. Suppose for simplicity that victims either engage in their activity or they do 
not, and suppose the same for injurers; in other words, for parties of each type, there is only one 
possible positive level of activity. Suppose also that if parties of one type engage in their activity 
and the others do not, no accidents can occur -- it takes the presence of both injurers and victims 
for there to be accidents. Hence, if parties of only one type engage in their activity, it would be 
pointless and socially wasteful for them to take care. Finally, suppose that if both injurers and 
victims engage in their activities, the risk of accidents will be as described in Example 2. Thus in 
this case injurers ought to take care, which costs 3; victims also ought to take care, which costs 
2; and expected accident losses will be 6. Therefore, total social costs will be 3 + 2 + 6 = 11 if 
both injurers and victims engage in their activities and take care. 
Given these assumptions, it is easy to determine when it is optimal both for injurers and 
for victims to engage in their activities, as a function of the utilities they would each derive from 
so doing. Were parties of only one type to engage in their activity, none of the accident costs of 
11 would be borne (because no accidents could occur and no care would be taken). Therefore, it 
will maximize social welfare for both injurers and victims to engage in their activities only when 
each would obtain from their activity a utility exceeding 11. Otherwise, it will be best for the 
parties that would enjoy the greater utility to engage in their activity and for the other parties to 
refrain from engaging in their activity. 
To verify this claim, suppose for instance that injurers would obtain utility of 35 and 
victims 25 from engaging in their activities. If both injurers and victims engage in their 
activities, social welfare will be 35 + 25 ! 11 = 49; if only injurers engage in their activity, social 
welfare will be 35; if only victims do so, social welfare will be 25; thus it will indeed be optimal 
for both injurers and victims to engage in their activities. Next suppose that injurers would 
 
route . . . may be negligent unless the utility of the route is very great.”   
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obtain 35 from engaging in their activity and victims would obtain only 8. Then if both injurers 
and victims engage in their activities, social welfare will be 35 + 8 ! 11 = 32; if injurers alone do 
so, social welfare will be 35; if victims alone do so, social welfare will be 8; and it will be best 
for injurers alone to engage in their activity.
34 Similar calculations show that if injurers would 
obtain 8 and victims 25 from engaging in their activities, then it will be optimal for victims alone 
to engage in their activity.// 
The simplifying feature of this example, that parties either do not engage in their activity 
or engage in it at only one positive level, should not disturb the reader. The points to be illustrated 
below will carry over in obvious ways to the more realistic case in which there are many different 
positive levels of activity for each type of party. 
4.2 Strict liability with the defense of contributory negligence. As the reader knows 
from previous analysis, if courts select the optimal level of due care, then under strict liability 
with the defense of contributory negligence, both injurers and victims will be led to take optimal 
care when they engage in their activities.  Furthermore, because victims will take due care, 
injurers will pay for the accident losses they cause and thus, as is explained in section 3.3, they 
will choose the correct level of their activity given victims’ behavior. 
Yet because victims will be compensated for their losses, victims may engage in their 
activity too often. A victim’s only cost of engaging in his activity will be his cost of taking due 
care. Therefore, he will engage in his activity whenever his utility from so doing would exceed 
the cost of taking due care. But what would be desirable is that he engage in his activity only 
when his utility would exceed the cost of taking due care plus the expected accident losses that 
would result from his engaging in his activity. (A bicyclist will go for a ride whenever the 
pleasure he would gain from that ride exceeds the disutility from having to exercise appropriate 
care, rather than only when the pleasure exceeds the disutility of exercising such care plus the 
increment to expected accident losses.) 
To illustrate this point, consider the case in Example 4 in which injurers would obtain 
utility of 35 and victims utility of only 8 from their activities, and thus in which it is not optimal 
for victims to engage in their activity. Under strict liability with the defense of contributory 
negligence, victims need only take due care, at a cost of 2, to be assured of compensation for 
accident losses suffered. Hence, when they compare the utility of 8 that they would obtain from 
engaging in their activity to the cost of care of 2, victims will, undesirably, decide to engage in 
their activity (along with the injurers, who will compare their utility of 35 to their cost of care of 
3 plus their expected liability of 6). 
4.3 Negligence rule with or without the defense of contributory negligence. Again, 
the reader knows from previous discussion that under the negligence rule, both injurers and 
victims will be induced to take optimal care when engaging in their activities if courts select 
optimal due care levels. And since injurers will escape liability by taking due care, it is evident 
from the argument of section 3.4 that injurers may engage in too high a level of their activity. 
 
34It is not necessary that injurers enjoy utility greater than 11 for it to be optimal for them to engage in their 
activity. For instance, if injurers’ utility were 10, it would still be optimal for them alone to engage in their activity, and 
social welfare would be 10.   
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Victims, however, will choose the correct level of their activity given injurers’  behavior. 
Because victims will bear their own losses, they will engage in their activity a further time only 
if the utility they would obtain (net of the costs of taking care) exceeds the addition to expected 
losses. Consider the situation in Example 4 in which injurers would obtain utility of 8 and 
victims utility of 25 from engaging in their activities. In this case it is optimal for victims alone 
to engage in their activity, and under the negligence rule they will do so (for they will compare 
25 to 2 + 6), but so will injurers, undesirably (for they will compare 8 to 3). 
4.4 Liability rules compared. It should be evident from what has been said that strict 
liability with the defense of contributory negligence will result in higher social welfare if its 
disadvantage -- that victims engage too often in their activity -- is not as important as the 
disadvantage of the negligence rules -- that injurers engage too often in their activity. That is, 
strict liability will result in greater social welfare if it is more important for society to control 
injurers’ levels of activity than victims’. 
Whether injurers’ levels of activity are more important to control than victims’ will 
depend on the context. As discussed before, when an activity of injurers (walking dogs of a 
vicious breed) creates substantial risks despite their exercise of due care, the activity will be 
desirable to control. This point is not fundamentally altered if account is taken of the activities of 
victims that expose them to risk. Especially if the victims’ activities are just the activities of 
ordinary life (walking about, going to work), we would not want the activities constrained in 
favor of injurers’ more dangerous activities. Conversely, when an activity of injurers (playing 
baseball) is not very dangerous if appropriate care is taken, the importance of controlling the 
activity will not be great; instead, we may see some advantage in reducing certain activities of 
victims that subject them to particular risks (such as pushing a baby in a stroller across a baseball 
field while a game is in progress). 
4.5 Nonexistence of a liability rule leading to optimal levels of activity. Because 
neither of the liability rules, strict liability and negligence, induce both injurers and victims to 
choose optimal levels of their activities, one might ask whether there exists any conceivable 
liability rule that always results in optimal levels of activities. The answer is no. The reason, in 
essence, is that for injurers to choose the correct level of their activity they must bear accident 
losses, whereas for victims to choose the correct level of their activity they too must bear 
accident losses. Yet it is not possible for both injurers and victims to bear accident losses under a 
liability rule.
35 
Three comments should be made about this conclusion. First, the explanation just given 
for it directly suggests methods (different from liability rules) that in principle would lead to 
optimal behavior. For example, suppose that injurers pay fines to the state equal to harm done -- 
or taxes equal to expected harm -- and that victims bear their losses. Then the expected payments 
of injurers and of victims would each equal expected accident losses, and they would each 
choose optimal levels of their activity (as well as care). Second, the conclusion depends on the 
 
35The specific conclusion described in this paragraph is as follows.  Assume that a liability rule can depend only 
on the levels of care x and  y of parties and harm h, but not on their levels of activity. Then the rule cannot in general 
induce both injurers and victims to choose optimal levels of activity; see Shavell 1980c.  
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assumption that courts cannot incorporate parties’ levels of activity into the negligence or the 
contributory negligence determination (an assumption that may be justified by what was said in 
section 3.6). If negligence and contributory negligence could be defined in terms of levels of 
activity as well as levels of care, then the usual liability rules would lead injurers and victims to 
choose optimal levels of both care and activity. Third, the conclusion should not be interpreted 
as an unduly negative one. As more factors are incorporated into a model, it naturally becomes 
less likely that a hypothetically ideal outcome can be achieved. 
4.6 The reciprocal nature of harm. It is a truism that harm has a reciprocal aspect in the 
sense that a victim must be present to suffer harm just as much as an injurer must be present to 
do harm.  This observation has sometimes been said to imply that injurers should not necessarily 
pay for harm done, that harm should not necessarily be “internalized” to injurers.  That 
conclusion is supported by the analysis here, for as explained,  either strict liability or negligence 
rules could turn out to be best. 
The reciprocal nature of harm has also occasionally been suggested to mean that it is 
conceptually impossible to decide whether strict liability or the negligence rule should be 
applied, and even that the very notion of harm and its cause is rendered ambiguous.
36 This view 
is mistaken. There is no difficulty in principle in deciding whether strict liability or the 
negligence rule will be better in a given situation in a well-defined model (there was no difficulty 
in deciding the question with regard to Example 4, for instance),
37 and there is nothing 
problematic about the notion of harm.   
4.7 Actual use of strict liability and negligence rules. The choice between the two main 
forms of liability for accidents between strangers has been made in approximately the same 
manner in different legal systems.
38 Namely, negligence is the usual basis of liability; strict 
liability applies only in certain areas of accident. In Anglo-American law, liability for accident 
losses is “for most significant purposes governed by the concept of negligence”; use of strict 
liability is restricted to harms caused by wild animals, to certain types of harms due to fire, and 
to harms arising from “abnormally dangerous” or “ultrahazardous” activities, such as blasting, 
storage of flammable liquids, or transport of nuclear materials.
39 Most of the provisions of the 
German civil code impose liability only if the injuring party was at fault; strict liability is 
adopted in connection with harms due to animals other than domestic animals and, according to 
special legislation, in connection with harms arising from rail, road, and air traffic and from use 
 
36See Donohue 1989, 1057.  
 
37But that there are no difficulties in principle does not mean that there will be no difficulties in application.  
Suppose that just as a woodsman cuts down a tree, a hiker happens to come along and is struck by the tree. Here we might 
feel that there is no appealing notion of who ought to have been present because it is hard to make a relative judgment 
about the benefits the hiker and the woodsman derived from their activities. 
38Liability for accidents involving firms and their customers will be discussed in the next chapter. 
39See Dobbs 2000, chaps. 6, 23; Fleming 1998, chapters 6, 15-18, quotation p. 97; and Keeton, Dobbs, et al. 
1984, chapters 5, 13.     
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of electricity, gas, and atomic energy.
40 The situation in France is similar.
41 Two important 
articles of the French civil code specify fault or negligence as the general principle of liability; 
strict liability applies to harms due to animals or to certain dangerous things (including 
automobiles and aircraft). 
4.8 Strict liability and negligence rules in the light of the theory concerning levels of 
activity. As stressed in the analysis, the use of strict liability rather than negligence rules in areas 
of behavior where activities create high risks, despite the exercise of reasonable care, has the 
advantage that it will tend to reduce in a desirable way participation in these activities. 
This theoretical advantage seems consistent with reality in the sense that the impression 
given by the foregoing section is that the areas of activity covered by strict liability are generally 
more dangerous than those covered by negligence rules (certainly the reverse is not true). There 
are some exceptions to this pattern, however; the choices made between strict liability and 
negligence rules are not always easy to explain on the basis of differences in riskiness. (In the 
United States, is the danger due to the escape of wild animals from zoos, for which strict liability 
would probably apply, greater than that from automobile-pedestrian accidents, for which the 
negligence rule would govern?) Moreover, differences among countries in the areas of strict 
liability and of negligence are sometimes difficult to explain in terms of differences in 
dangerousness. (Why should the negligence rule govern liability for automobile-pedestrian 
accidents in the United States, while strict liability applies in Germany and France?)
42 The 
conformity of the observed pattern of use of strict liability and negligence rules to what would be 
suggested by the theoretical considerations of this chapter is somewhat rough. 
Putting aside questions concerning the actual dangerousness of the areas of strict liability 
versus those of negligence, I want to emphasize that one of the aims of the law is to impose strict 
liability on activities that are dangerous, or, more precisely, that are dangerous even if conducted 
with reasonable care. A particularly direct expression of this objective is provided by the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which says that, in deciding whether an activity should be subject 
to strict liability, one ought to take notice of possible “inability to eliminate the risk by the 
exercise of reasonable care.” Further, the Restatement draws a contrast to most “ordinary 
activities” that can be made “safe by the taking of all reasonable precautions” and for which 
liability should be based on negligence.
43 
But it should be added that the deterrent effect of strict liability on the level of 
participation in activities is not mentioned in the Restatement and is only infrequently noted in 
other places. Evidently, the mere creation of an unusual risk is seen as a justification for 
 
40See Limpens et al. 1983, sections 11-14; Markesinis, 1994, 676-720; Opoku 1972, 230-43; Tunc 1983, sections 
13, 79-85; Von Mehren and Gordley 1977, 557-66, 579-82; and Zweigert and Kötz 1998, chapter 42.  
41See Limpens et al. 1983, sections 5, 23; Tunc 1983, sections 12, 86-88; Von  Mehren and Gordley 1977, 555-
57, 579-82; and Zweigert and Kötz 1998, chapter 42. 
42On Germany, see Markesinis 1994, 710-20; and Opoku 1972, 240; on France, see Von Bar, 1998, 2: 410 – 11.  
43Restatement (Second) of Torts 1965, section 520.   
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imposition of strict liability. 
4.9 Note on empirical literature. A somewhat limited amount of empirical work has 
been undertaken on the effect of liability on accidents. See Dewees, et al (1996) for a general 
survey and, among others, Devlin (1990), Landes (1982), Sloan, et al (1994), Sloan (1998), and 
Cummins, et al (2001) on automobile accidents.  
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  Chapter 3 
 
  LIABILITY OF FIRMS 
 
In this chapter I reconsider the basic theory of liability and deterrence under the assumption that 
injurers are firms.
44 The first part of the analysis addresses accidents in which the victims are 
strangers to firms, such as an accident in which a gasoline tanker truck crashes and explodes, 
harming other vehicles or homes near the roadside.   
The second part of the analysis deals with accidents in which the victims are the 
customers of firms, for example, an accident in which a water heater that a person purchased 
ruptures and damages his property. The feature of chief interest about these situations is that 
customers’ willingness to purchase products will be influenced by what they perceive to be the 
product risks. As a consequence, firms will be motivated to reduce product risks not only to 
avoid liability but also to sell products at a better price. 
Firms will be presumed to maximize profits and to do business in a perfectly competitive 
environment. This means that the price of a product will equal the unit costs associated with 
production, including expected liability costs.
45 
The measure of social welfare that will be studied is similar to that in chapter 2: the 
utility customers derive from products (such as from gasoline or water heaters) and, where 
relevant, the utility that strangers obtain from their activities (such as driving,or locating their 





44The material here is based largely on chapter 3 of Shavell 1987a, which also contains proofs of conclusions. 
45Under perfect competition, a firm cannot maintain a product price exceeding total unit costs because 
competitors could then attract its customers by offering them the same product at a lower, yet still profitable price. The 
assumption of perfect competition is made mainly for convenience -- it means that the effect of changes in unit costs on 
price is simple to calculate. See section 2.9 for further discussion of this assumption. 
46This measure of social welfare should seem, on its face, a natural one to study, as it takes into account the 
obvious social benefits and costs associated with production of a risky product. Additionally, the measure is equivalent to 
the sum of the utilities of all relevant parties.  In particular, the measure is the sum of the utilities of customers, owners of 
firms, and strangers in the case in which strangers are accident victims  (the measure is the sum of the utilities of just the 
customers and the owners of firms in the case in which customers are accident victims). To verify this, observe that: Utility 
of customers = utility from product ! price; utility of owners of firms is firms’ profits, and firms’ profits = price ! direct 
production costs ! costs of care ! expected liability payments; utility of strangers = utility from their activity ! costs of 
care ! expected accident losses + expected liability payments. Adding these equalities and canceling offsetting terms, one 
obtains: Utility of customers + profits of owners of firms + utility of strangers = customers’ utility from product ! direct 
production costs ! firms’ cost of care + strangers’ utility from their activity ! strangers’ costs of care ! expected accident 
losses, which is as claimed.    
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1.  Victims Are Strangers to Firms 
Although the conclusions to be drawn about liability rules will be essentially the same in this 
case as in the last chapter, there are several differences in how the conclusions are demonstrated 
and interpreted that merit attention. 
1.1 Levels of care. The arguments given in chapter 2 with respect to parties’ levels of 
care apply directly in the present case. Victims are in an identical situation whether injurers are 
firms or are other individuals; and, as before, injurers, who in this case are firms, want to 
minimize their costs of care plus expected liability expenses (by doing so, firms maximize their 
profits). Hence, both firms and victims will be led to take optimal levels of care under strict 
liability with the defense of contributory negligence and under the various negligence rules. 
    The type of liability rule employed will, however, affect product price, a factor that was 
not relevant in the last chapter. In particular, the price will be higher under the strict liability rule 
than under the negligence rules. Under strict liability, the price will include expected accident 
losses, whereas under the negligence rules, it will not because, by taking due care, firms will 
avoid liability for accident losses.
47 
Example 1.  Firms’ direct costs of production per unit are 10, and the risk of accidents 
that would cause losses of 100 depends on whether firms take care (for simplicity, we consider 
the case in which accidents are unilateral). The exercise of care reduces expected accident losses 







































Under the negligence rule, firms will have to take care to avoid liability. Firms therefore 
will take care, and their costs per unit will be 12 -- the direct production costs of 10 plus the 
costs of care. Accordingly, the product price will also be 12 (by assumption, competition will 
drive the price down to unit costs).  
Firms will take care under strict liability too, in order to minimize their unit costs. But 
these unit costs, and thus the price, will equal 15 because the unit costs will include expected 
liability expenses of 3.// 
1.2 Levels of activity.  Assume, as is natural, that an increase in a firm’s level of 
                                                           
     
47As in chapter 2, it is assumed here that the negligence rule works perfectly. If it does not and firms are sometimes 
found negligent, the price will include a component attributable to expected accident losses (but this component would be 
less than expected accident losses).    
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production will result in a proportional increase in expected accident losses, given the firm’s 
level of care. The determination of the socially optimal level of production of firms will then be 
virtually the same as the determination of the socially optimal level of injurers’ activity 
discussed in the previous chapter. This is illustrated by elaborating the previous example. 
Example 2. Because the social costs of production per unit, including expected accident 
losses, are 15 in Example 1, social welfare will be enhanced by production when and only when 
a customer obtains utility exceeding 15 from a unit. Suppose, for instance, that there are 5 
customers who would derive the utilities shown in Table 2 from purchasing the product. (Or 
suppose that a single customer obtains increments to utility as shown in the table from 
purchasing successive units of the product.) 
 
 
Table 2: Utility from the Product 
 
                      Customer 
 
Utility from the product 
 
                              A 
 
         40 
 
                              B 
 
         20 
 
                              C 
 
         17 
 
                              D 
 
         13 
 
                              E 
 
         11 
 
Here, only customers A, B, and C, who derive utility greater than 15, should purchase the 
product; the optimal level of production (and of consumptions) is thus 3.// 
The general point of this example is that it is socially optimal for production to proceed 
when, but only when, the utility customers derive from consuming additional units exceeds the 
sum of the direct production costs, the costs of care, and the expected accident losses associated 
with the additional units. 
With this in mind, the analogues to the conclusions from the previous chapter about 
levels of activity can easily be seen to hold. Specifically, under the negligence rule the level of 
production will be higher than optimal (and thus too many accidents will occur): Because the 
price will not include expected accident losses, customers will make purchases when the utility 
they derive from the product is less than the social cost of production per unit. In Example 2, the 
price under the negligence rule will be 12. Therefore, not only A, B, and C, but also, undesirably, 
D will buy the product.  (Because, under the negligence rule, the price of gasoline will not 
incorporate expected accident losses due to its transport, too much gasoline will be purchased.)   
Under strict liability, however, the level of production will be optimal, because the price 
will equal the social costs of production per unit.  In Example 2, the price will be 15, so only 
customers A, B, and C will purchase the product.  (Because, under strict liability, the price of 
gasoline will include expected accident losses, the right amount of gasoline will be purchased.)   
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The conclusions about victims’ levels of activity are also as before. Under the negligence 
rule, victims will choose their levels of activity optimally, for they will bear their accident losses. 
And under strict liability with the defense of contributory negligence, victims will engage in 
their activity to too great an extent, for they will be compensated for their accident losses as long 
as they take due care. Thus, again, the choice between strict liability and negligence rules will 
depend on whether it is more important to control injurers’ levels of activity -- here firms’ levels 
of production -- than victims’ levels of activity. 
1.3 Exclusion of the level of production from the determination of negligence. It was 
implicitly assumed above that the level of production is not taken into account in the 
determination of negligence. This assumption describes actual practice -- firms, of course, are 
never found liable for having produced too much -- and is justified by the fact that if courts were 
to decide on permitted levels of production, they would have to determine and balance costs of 
production against consumer valuations. The courts’ problem, in other words, would be 
tantamount to that of devising production responsibilities in a centrally planned economy. 
1.4 Actual liability of firms to strangers. The liability of firms for harm done to 
strangers is determined as described generally in the last chapter. A distinction must be made, 
however, between accidents in which harm comes about in the course of productive activity 
(such as when gasoline explodes during transport) and accidents in which harm to strangers is 
caused by products after their sale (such as when a boiler is purchased and explodes harming 
strangers). In accidents of the latter type, the finding of liability is complicated by certain 
doctrinal considerations and especially by the possibility that the purchasers of products may 
have played a contributory role.
48 
Note on the literature. Legal scholars and economists have virtually always mentioned 
that when strangers might be harmed by firms, imposing strict liability would raise prices and 
reduce purchases relative to not imposing liability. But a comparison with the situation under the 
negligence rule, in which prices do not reflect accident losses and are socially too low, has not 
usually been made. This comparison is first developed in Polinsky (1980c) and Shavell (1980c). 
 
2. Victims Are Customers of Firms 
As was indicated at the outset, firms’ behavior in this case will be influenced not only by their 
potential liability, but also by customers’ perceptions of product risks, for the latter will affect 
customers’ willingness to make purchases.
49 More precisely, a customer will buy a product only 
 
     
48See Keeton, Dobbs, et al. 1984, sections 93, 95-98 on the United States; and Stone 1983, sections 260, 289-91, and 
Von Bar 1998, 2: 297-311, 418-24, on European countries.  
     
49The analysis of liability when victims are the employees of firms would parallel the analysis of this part. In much the 
same way that customers, if informed, can decide not to purchase unsafe products or can insist on lower prices as 
compensation for bearing extra risk, employees, if informed, can decide not to work at firms with unsafe working 
conditions or can demand higher wages as compensation for bearing added risk. I do not examine the issue of firms’ 
liability to employees in part because this would be similar to the present analysis and in part because, in fact, employers 
tend not to be liable to employees. Employees are generally barred from suing employers by workers’ compensation 
legislation. (This legislation provides that employees may obtain compensation for accidents arising at the workplace and 
that employers must pay insurance premiums to support the compensation program.) See, for example, Dobbs 2000, 1097-
1108; Keeton et al. 1983, chapter 19; and Larson 1994.    
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if the utility of the product to him exceeds its perceived full price -- the price actually charged in 
the market plus the perceived expected accident losses that liability payments would not cover 
and thus that he would have to bear. The expected accident losses that a customer perceives that 
he would have to sustain will depend on his information about product risks. Alternative 
assumptions about customers’ information are considered in the following two sections. 
2.1 Customers’ knowledge of risk is perfect. When customers’ knowledge is perfect, 
firms will be led to take optimal care even in the absence of liability. To see exactly why, 
observe that in the absence of liability customers will bear their losses, and the full price will 
equal the market price plus expected accident losses. (The full price of a water heater will be 
seen as its price in the market plus the expected losses due to the possibility that it will rupture.) 
If a firm were to take less than optimal care, its potential customers would recognize this and 
factor into the full price the relatively high expected accident losses. Consequently, the firm’s 
customers would go elsewhere; they would prefer to make their purchases from competitor firms 
exercising optimal care and offering the product at a lower full price, although at a higher market 
price. In other words, the force of competition will lead firms to take optimal care despite the 
absence of liability.   
Example 3. Suppose the situation is as in Example 1, except that the victims are 
customers; and assume that firms do not face liability for accident losses. A firm that does not 
take care may be able to set the market price of its product at the direct production cost of 10, but 
the full price will then be 19, for the firm’s customers will add to the market price the expected 
accident losses of 9 that they will bear. The firm would thus lose its customers to firms that do 
take care. The price charged by firms that take care will be 12 (because the price will have to 
include the cost of care of 2), yet the full price will be just 15, because expected accident losses 
will amount to only 3. Hence, a firm that does not take care will not survive in competition 
against firms that do take care.// 
Firms will also be led to take optimal care under strict liability with the defense of 
contributory negligence and under the negligence rules. Similarly, customers will be led to take 
optimal care in their use of products under these liability rules,
50 as well as in the absence of 
liability. 
Moreover, customers will buy the socially optimal amount of the product regardless of 
the absence or presence of the foregoing liability rules. This is true because the full price that 
customers will compare with their utility will not be affected by the absence or presence of such 
liability. In particular, the market price both in the absence of liability and under the negligence 
rule will equal the cost of optimal care plus direct production costs, as firms will be led to take 
optimal care in either case, and customers will add to this market price the expected accident 
losses in calculating the full price. Under strict liability with the defense of contributory 
negligence, the market price will simply equal this same full price. In Example 3, the market 
 
     
50Under strict liability without the defense of contributory negligence, however, firms might take excessive care and 
customers might take inadequate care.  For example, users of water heaters might not drain them or watch for signs of 
leakage even though this would cost users little in time and effort.  Manufacturers might therefore be led to produce 
heaters with safety features that are expensive relative to the cost of users’ care.   
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price will be 12 in the absence of liability and under the negligence rule, and the full price will 
be 15; under strict liability the market price and the full price will be 15. Thus in all cases only 
those customers for whom the utility of the product exceeds 15 will buy it, which is the socially 
desirable outcome.     
2.2 Customers’ knowledge of risk is imperfect. Suppose now that customers do not 
have enough information to determine product risks at the level of individual firms. (Customers 
cannot ascertain the risk of rupture of a particular firm’s water heaters.) Then firms will not take 
care in the absence of liability. No firm will wish to incur added expenses to make its product 
safer if customers will not recognize this to be true and reward the firm with their willingness to 
pay a higher price. Liability will thus be needed to induce firms to take optimal care. 
Furthermore, the level of care taken by customers will not be optimal in the absence of 
liability. Customers will take too little care if they underestimate risks and too much care if they 
overestimate them. In the presence of liability, however, customers who possess accurate 
knowledge of the level of due care used to determine contributory negligence may be led to take 
due care despite their misperception of risk. 
In addition, the quantity of customers’ purchases will not be optimal in the absence of 
liability or under the negligence rule. If customers overestimate risks, they will overestimate the 
full price and might decide not to buy products when in fact the utility of the products exceeds 
the true full price. If customers underestimate risks, the opposite problem might occur; they 
might make purchases that are not in their interest. Under strict liability with the defense of 
contributory negligence, however, customers will make appropriate decisions whether to buy 
products regardless of their misperception of risk. It will not matter that customers incorrectly 
estimate risks since they will be fully compensated for their losses (because they will take due 
care); the market price will then reflect the true risk of accident losses, and it will be this market 
price alone on which customers base their decisions to make purchases.
51 
2.3 Actual customer knowledge of risk. Before I comment on the analysis of the last 
two sections, it will be helpful to consider briefly the likely character of customers’ knowledge 
of risk. 
One point to emphasize is that customers’ knowledge of risk will vary with the type of 
product or service. Customers’ knowledge of the risks attending use of a wide class of 
modern-day products (automobiles, drugs, machines) is, one assumes, limited in significant ways 
because of customers’ quite natural inability to understand how the products function. And 
customers’ knowledge of the quality of most professional services (medical, legal, architectural) 
is, one supposes, similarly limited. By contrast, customers’ information about the risks of 
common items of fairly simple design (hammers, bicycles, can openers) is probably good on the 
whole, and the same is likely true of their knowledge of the risks of many of the services that 
they purchase in ordinary life (barbering, sports instruction). 
 
     
51This conclusion would usually be different, however, if losses include nonpecuniary elements for which liability 
awards would not or could not fully compensate. Suppose, for example, that product-related accidents could result in the 
death of a customer (as when an automobile=s brakes fail). Then a customer would base his purchases in part on his 
estimate of the risk of death in an accident; if he incorrectly estimated this risk, his decision whether to purchase the 
product might be inappropriate.   
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    Not only will customers’ knowledge of risk vary with the type of product or service, it 
will vary also with the type of customer. Commercial customers will often have relatively 
accurate  knowledge of risk because they tend to be repeat purchasers, buy in large quantity, and 
make decisions in a calculated way. The typical consumer may be in a quite different position; 
he buys many products (especially durables) only on an infrequent basis and may not have the 
ability or the motive to approach his purchase decision in the manner the commercial customer 
would. 
When customers’ knowledge of risk is imperfect, there does not seem to be an appealing 
general assumption to make about the direction of their errors. A customer’s assessment of the 
risk of a particular product or service will tend to be based on his estimate of the average risk for 
the class of products or services that have the same outward appearance as the one in question.  
Because actual risks will deviate from average risks about as often from above as from below, 
the frequency with which customers underassess risks should approximate the frequency with 
which they overassess risks -- assuming that they correctly perceive average risks. Of course, 
customers may not accurately perceive the average, but systematic mistakes in their assessment 
of risk for a class of products or services can be either positive or negative. Customers can 
readily be imagined to exaggerate certain kinds of risks, because, for instance, of their vivid 
aspect (dying in an airplane crash), and they can well be thought to underestimate other kinds of 
risk, because, say, of the innocuous appearance of the products creating the risks (could drinking 
hot liquids from styrofoam cups release a carcinogen resulting in stomach cancer?)
52 
That customers’ information about risks may sometimes be imperfect seems inevitable. 
As was suggested above, customers’ ability to ascertain risks directly is, , naturally limited by 
their incomplete knowledge of how products work and by their lay understanding of professional 
and many other services. Also, their ability to evaluate risks that are numerically small -- as the 
risks of accidents often are --  may be questioned. The problem that customers may be unable to 
learn directly about risks may be remedied if customers are apprised of risks by firms. But firms 
clearly lack appropriate incentives to provide information about the dangerousness of their 
products and services.
53 In addition, organizations specializing in the collection of information 
about risks may not be able to earn enough (through sale of publications like Consumer Reports) 
to finance their activities at a socially desirable scale, in part because individual buyers can pass 
on the information to others in various ways. Finally, the very capacity of customers to absorb 
and act upon information about the risks they face seems restricted. Customers purchase a great 
variety of products and services, and the risks of even a single one may be complicated to 
describe because they depend on the manner and the circumstances in which the product is used 
 
     
52Eisner and Strotz 1961 discuss the overestimation of the risk due to airplane crashes.  For a general discussion of 
pyschological factors affecting the assessment of risk, see Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982 and Tversky and 
Kahneman 1974; see also Jolls, Sunstein, Thaler 1998 for a synthesis and review of literature.  For empirical study of risk 
assessment, see, for example, Viscusi 1983, 1992, 1998. 
     
53This is not to deny that firms may have a legal duty to provide information about risk (liability for failure to warn of 
defects) or that they can secure marketing advantages or enhance their reputation by doing so.  But such motives to 
provide information about risk arguably are imperfect.   
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or the service is performed. Customers could not realistically be expected to keep track of and to 
employ all this information even if it were freely available to them. 
With these observations in mind, the reader should assume below that there will 
sometimes be a useful role for liability to play in reducing risks and in influencing the volume of 
purchases.
54 
2.4 Problems in applying the negligence rule. Information about firms’ conduct and 
about their products and services may be particularly difficult for courts to obtain or evaluate as 
they arrive at a determination of negligence.
55 Such information may be of a complicated, 
technical nature (dealing, for example, with industrial engineering, or with the practice of 
medicine), or it may be special in character (concerning idiosyncratic features of the production 
process, or a particular patient’s condition), or it may have to do with events that occurred 
relatively far in the past (the production of an old machine, or the treatment of a patient many 
years ago). Consider, by contrast, that information will be relatively easy to obtain or evaluate in 
the typical accident between strangers, as when a person fails to clear a sidewalk of ice and 
someone slips on it and breaks his leg. 
Courts’ difficulty in obtaining and evaluating information about firms’ conduct leads to 
two problems. First, courts may be likely to make errors in determining optimal levels of due 
care. When firms are able to predict courts’ incorrectly calculated levels of due care, firms will 
often be led to take these levels of due care and thus to take excessive or insufficient levels of 
care, as the case may be. And when firms are unable to predict levels of due care, or when there 
are other uncertainties surrounding the determination of negligence, firms may well be led to 
take excessive levels of care so as to avoid being found liable by mistake (a manufacturer may 
use an undesirably costly safety feature, or a physician may practice “defensive medicine”).
56 
The second problem is that courts may fail altogether to consider certain dimensions of firms’ 
behavior in the negligence determination, either for want of any evidence or because evidence is 
scant. With respect to such dimensions of behavior, firms may do little or nothing to reduce risk. 
These problems are avoided under the strict liability approach because firms will be 
motivated to take all justified steps to reduce risk, and only those steps, whether or not courts 
would be able to decide what steps could and should have been taken. 
    2.5 Problems in applying the negligence rule to research and development and 
product design decisions. An important illustration of the problems with the negligence rule 
concerns research and development with regard to product safety and design. To make a 
determination of negligence in this area, courts are faced with a complex task: They must decide 
whether, at the time that a firm had an opportunity to engage in an investigation, the then-
relevant probability and value of success were sufficiently high to warrant the costs of the 
 
      
54This general view is a theme of Croley and Hanson 1993.  
 
      
55Much of what is said in this and the following sections applies equally in the context of accidents involving 
firms and strangers. 
56Why firms may be likely to take excessive care, even though mistakes in the negligence determination may 
favor them as well as disfavor them, is explained in section 1 of chapter 4.   
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investigation.  Because courts will be prone to make mistakes in determining the probability or 
value of success or the costs of investigation, firms may be led to make socially undesirable 
decisions. For instance, a firm that is highly uncertain whether a given degree of research or 
design effort will later be seen by courts as adequate may decide to engage in research to a 
socially excessive extent. Or a firm that believes that courts would never learn that it had a 
particular opportunity to reduce a risk (for example, that a pharmaceutical company had a chance 
to develop a substitute drug without an adverse side effect) may decide not to pursue the 
opportunity. Indeed, the likelihood of this outcome is increased by the perversity that the initial 
pursuit of an avenue of investigation could provide the very evidence that would allow courts to 
conclude that a research opportunity had existed. 
2.6 Problems in applying the defense of contributory negligence under strict 
liability. Courts may experience difficulty in determining due care levels of customers and their 
actual care levels, as well as in incorporating various dimensions of their behavior into due care. 
 It may be hard to determine what customers can and should do to reduce risk (whether users of 
lawn mowers should wear safety glasses in view of the danger that stones would be thrown up by 
the cutting blades), how customers actually use products (whether, when mowing, a person tries 
to steer clear of areas with stones), whether customers adequately maintain products, and the 
like. In addition, courts typically do not include the intensity of use of products (how often a 
lawn mower, a can opener, or a forklift is used) in determining customer negligence, because 
calculation of the appropriate intensity of use is a practical impossibility or because evidence on 
the actual intensity of use is difficult to obtain. 
As with courts’ difficulties in determining the negligence of firms, the courts’ difficulties 
in determining the negligence of customers can lead to two types of problems. With respect to 
dimensions of behavior that are included in the determination of contributory negligence, 
customers may be led to do too little or too much to reduce risk, and with respect to dimensions 
of behavior that are left out of the determination, customers will do too little to lower risk. In any 
event, the problems would be lessened if, as under the negligence and no-liability regimes, 
customers expect to bear their losses. 
2.7 Strict liability versus negligence reconsidered. The discussion of the last several 
sections should help to organize thinking about important factors bearing on the appeal of strict 
liability versus the negligence rules as means of providing incentives toward safety. To illustrate, 
suppose that individuals’ knowledge of the health risks associated with use of microwave ovens 
is imperfect (there is a potential need for liability); that the harmful effects of microwave 
radiation might be of substantial importance (a liability-induced reduction in radiation might 
prevent significant injury); that the possibilities for changing the design of microwave ovens 
would be hard for courts to ascertain (a determination of negligence about oven design would be 
problematic); and that there is relatively little that users of microwave ovens can do to reduce 
risk (there is no real issue of contributory negligence).
57 In such a case, employment of the strict 
liability approach rather than the negligence rule would be desirable on grounds of creation of 
incentives toward safety in product design. 
 
57The doors of most microwave ovens must be closed for them to operate, so that users cannot “cook” 
themselves, but arguably users could take care not to stand too close to ovens when they are in operation.   
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The situation might be different, however, with respect to use of commercial freezers and 
the risk that they would break down, causing frozen foods to thaw and spoil. Suppose that buyers 
of the freezers, being in business, know fairly well the risks that freezers would fail (the potential 
need for liability is small in the first place); that the scope for manufacturers of freezers to reduce 
risk of freezer failure is modest because the risk is already low (liability could not reduce risk 
substantially); that the adequacy of user maintenance of freezers -- checking coolant levels, 
keeping filters clean -- would be difficult for a court to determine in deciding upon contributory 
negligence; and that the intensity of use of freezers -- the amount and value of frozen food kept 
in each freezer -- would be omitted from a negligence determination (implying that users would 
be likely to overuse the freezers unless they bear the losses of freezer failure).  Here the 
negligence rule would be the better form of liability on grounds of creation of incentives. 
Of course, in these two examples it was assumed that all the relevant factors worked in 
the same direction, in favor of either strict liability or the negligence rule; in reality, this will 
rarely be the case. 
   2.8 Product warranties. An addition to the model so far considered would allow firms 
to offer product warranties, which is to say, to choose their own liability rules.
58 The type of 
warranty that a firm would offer is the one that would minimize the full price of its product as 
perceived by customers. A firm not offering that warranty would lose its customers to 
competitors. This means that if customers do not misperceive risks, the warranty that is sold will 
be the one that results in the lowest true full price and therefore that is socially best. For 
example, if buyers of commercial freezers have good knowledge of the risks of breakdown, the 
character of the warranty on the freezers would reflect the optimal balancing of manufacturer 
and buyer incentives. A warranty that covered the freezer motor but not the coolant system might 
serve as an implicit inducement for manufacturers to improve the reliability of the motor and for 
buyers to maintain the coolant system properly. Such an arrangement would result in a lower full 
price of freezers than if the warranty covered the coolant system as well as the motor. 
If customers misperceive risks, however, the warranty that is sold in the market may be 
socially undesirable. Notably, customers who mistakenly think that a risk is lower than it 
actually is will tend to buy warranties with terms limiting or disclaiming coverage of that risk. (If 
customers overestimate risk, they will buy warranties that are too inclusive.) To illustrate, 
consider the case where customers erroneously believe that a risk is nonexistent. Imagine, for 
instance, that they believe there is no chance that electric pencil sharpeners will throw off slivers 
of wood and cause injury when in fact there is this chance. Customers will therefore place no 
value on a warranty term giving coverage against injury due to such events, although offering the 
term would cost manufacturers a positive amount. Electric pencil sharpeners will therefore be 
sold without a warranty term covering injuries due to slivers, or with disclaimers of liability for 
these injuries. Consequently, manufacturers of electric pencil sharpeners will not have an 
incentive to reduce optimally the risk of sliver accidents. Moreover, because customers are 
unaware of this risk, they will buy too many electric pencil sharpeners (as opposed to safer hand-
 
  
58On the economic theory of warranties, see Cooper and Ross 1985, Grossman 1981, Priest 1981, and Spence 
1977; see also the survey of Wehrt 2000.   
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operated pencil sharpeners, or mechanical pencils). 
It follows that where customers misperceive risks, it could be socially beneficial for 
courts to override certain terms of warranties, especially by broadening firms’ responsibilities for 
injury. For courts to know when to override or to expand coverage terms in warranties, however, 
requires that they be able to distinguish between situations in which customers misperceive risk 
and situations in which they do not. Courts would have to be able to determine whether 
customers misperceive the risk that electric pencil sharpeners will cause injury from slivers, for 
if customers do understand this risk, they might still desire limitation of the warranty for such 
injuries (perhaps because they can reduce the risk of accident by discarding old pencils that are 
likely to break apart, perhaps because they have health insurance that would cover losses due to 
such injuries). 
2.9 Imperfect competition and market power.  Finally, it should be noted how, if at all, 
the possibility that firms in a less than perfectly competitive market have the ability to set price 
above cost affects the conclusions of this chapter.
59 Firms that enjoy such market power will 
wish to minimize unit costs, as do firms in a perfectly competitive market, in order to maximize 
profits. Because the conclusions reached above about firms’ exercise of care rested only on the 
assumption that firms seek to minimize unit costs, the statements made about liability and firms’ 
levels of care will not be altered where firms possess market power. 
The enjoyment of market power by firms will, however, make some difference with 
respect to the social desirability of the effect of liability on levels of production. Because firms 
with market power will set price higher than unit costs, customers will purchase less than they do 
in a perfectly competitive market setting. Therefore, under strict liability firms with market 
power will set price above the sum of their production cost, the cost of care, and accident costs 
per unit; and customers will tend to purchase too little, rather than the optimal amount, of the 
product due to the higher price. Under the negligence rule, because firms will set price above the 
sum of production cost and the cost of care per unit, customers’ tendency to purchase too much 
if they underestimate risks will be counteracted, and so forth. 
2.10 Actual liability of firms to customers. In most jurisdictions in the United States 
today, firms are held strictly liable for accident losses caused by defects in their products, though 
an aspect of negligence is involved in the definition of product defect.
60 Customers need not 
prove negligence in the production process; they need only show that their losses were due to 
defects in products. Firms may sometimes avoid or reduce their liability when accident losses 
were the result of product misuse or other contributory behavior of customers
61 or of dealers, and 
firms may challenge whether losses were in fact caused by their products. But there has been 
 
   
59On market power and the effect of liability rules, see Epple and Raviv 1978 and Polinsky and Rogerson 1983. 
      
60The description here is confined to liability of producing firms to customers; it does not include liability of 
dealers to customers. On product liability in the United States, see for example Dobbs 2000, chapter 24, Phillips 1998, 
Keeton, Dobbs, et al. 1984, chapter 17, and Shapo 1994.    
     
61Although the defense of contributory negligence is often not permitted, use of comparative negligence and doctrines 
relating to product misuse and to assumption of risk may allow courts opportunity to take into account plaintiffs’ behavior.   
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some narrowing of these defenses and thus an expansion of firms’ liability; moreover, firms are 
increasingly prevented from escaping liability by having disclaimed it in warranties.
62 
    In two important areas -- product design and warning of risk -- the negligence rule is 
employed. Specifically, a firm will be held liable for harms resulting from a dangerous 
characteristic in all units of its product if an alternative, safer design could have been used at 
reasonable cost. And a firm will be held liable for failure to warn of a product risk if the firm 
could have done so at a reasonable cost. 
In England, France, and Germany, the trend in product liability has been in the direction 
of strict responsibility for defects, with this result often being reached by other legal doctrines 
(presumption of producer negligence where losses are caused by defects, contractual liability, or 
implied warranties).Yet the scope of product liability does not appear to be as great in these 
countries as in the United States.
63 
Note on the literature. Oi (1973) and Hamada (1976) examine models of product 
liability in which victims are customers and possess perfect information about risk; Goldberg 
(1974) emphasizes that legal intervention must be premised on impefect customer information. 
Spence (1977) analyzes strict liability in a unilateral model of accidents in which victims are 
customers who misperceive risk and firms offer warranties. In Shavell (1980c), I consider strict 
liability and negligence rules in a bilateral model of accidents along the lines presented here. For 





     
62See, for example, Epstein 1980, Priest 1991, and G. Schwartz 1992 on the expansion of firms’ liability.   
     
63See Fleming 1998, chapter 23, on product liability in England;  Markesinis 1994, 79-95, on Germany;  Zweigert and 
Kötz 1998, 676-78 on France and Germany; and Stone 1983, sections 257- 95, and Von Bar 1998, 2: 418-24, on Europe. 
    
64See also Litan 1991 and the surveys of Dewees et al. 1996, chapter 4, and Geistfeld 2000.   
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  Chapter 4 
 
  EXTENSIONS OF THE BASIC THEORY  
 
In this chapter I consider a number of extensions of the basic theory of liability and deterrence. 
In the first four sections, I discuss various issues concerning the negligence determination, the 
judgment-proof problem, and vicarious liability; in the later sections, I examine a number of 
topics about damages, that is, about the magnitude of liability.
65 
 
1. Problems in the Negligence Determination 
Factors leading to uncertainty in the finding of negligence, and the consequences of such 
uncertainty, will be considered in the initial subsections here. Then the effect of systematic, 
anticipated error in the courts’ determination of due care levels will be analyzed. At the end, the 
effect of misperception of due care levels will be discussed. 
1.1 Uncertainty in the finding of negligence. One  factor leading to uncertainty in the 
finding of negligence is that courts may err in assessing a party’s true level of care. For example, 
a court might not accept a physician’s claim that he had performed a diagnostic test (that he 
listened carefully to a person’s heartbeat after a series of exercises) when in fact he had done so. 
The possibility that a court would make an error of this type might lead a physician to administer 
a redundant but easily verifiable test (such as an electrocardiogram) that would reduce the 
chance of a court finding him negligent by mistake. Of course, the possibility that a court would 
make an opposite type of error may also exist. A court might decide that a physician had taken 
proper care when in truth he had not. For instance, a court might conclude from incomplete 
medical records that there was no need for a physician to refer his patient to a specialist when the 
patient should have seen one.  
The significance of these two types of error, however, is not likely to be the same. The 
disadvantage to a party of being found negligent by mistake is that he will have to pay the 
victim’s losses. This disadvantage will often be of greater importance than the savings that the 
party could obtain by reducing his level of care somewhat and hoping that he would erroneously 
escape liability if an accident occurred. 
    The reader should not be surprised, then, to learn that a fairly general consequence of 
uncertainty in the assessment of true levels of care is that parties will tend to take more than due 
care -- and thus to take socially excessive levels of care (presuming that due care is set at 
socially optimal levels).
66 To illustrate, consider the following example. 
Example 1. The probability of an accident that would cause a loss of 100 is related to the 
 
   
65The material here draws on chapters 4, 6, and 7 of  Shavell 1987a, which also contains proofs of conclusions. 
     
66I am not saying that uncertainty in the assessment of care will always lead to excessive care. Obviously, other things 
being equal, if there is a high enough chance of overassessment of care and a low enough chance of underassessment, 
parties will take less than due care. But in a wide class of situations (including ones in which the chance of overassessment 
of care exceeds by a significant amount the chance of underassessment), parties will take more than due care.    
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level of care as shown in Table 1. The socially optimal level of care, which is assumed to be due 
care, is moderate care. If there were no chance of mistake in courts’ assessment of care, parties 
could avoid liability for sure by taking moderate care at a cost of 3; they would not take high 
care, since that would involve a greater cost of 5. 
 
 
Table 1: Care Level and Accidents 
 
Level of care 
 










       None 
 
       0 
 
      15% 
 
       15   
 
       15 
 
       Moderate 
 
       3 
 
      10% 
 
       10 
 
       13 
 
       High 
 
       5 
 
        9% 
 
         9 
 
       14 
 
Suppose, however, that there is a 33 percent chance that courts will misperceive care by 
one level and a 5 percent chance that courts will misperceive care by two levels. That is, there is 
a 33 percent chance that no care would be seen by courts as moderate care and a 5 percent 
chance that no care would be seen as high care. Further, there is a 33 percent chance that 
moderate care would be seen by courts as none and a 33 percent chance that moderate care 
would be seen as high care. And there is a 33 percent chance that high care would be seen by 
courts as moderate care and a 5 percent chance that high care would be seen as none. 
In this situation, parties will take high care. If they take no care, their expected expenses 
will be 62% H 15% H 100 = 9.3 (as they will mistakenly escape liability 33% + 5% = 38% of the 
time). If they take moderate care, their expected expenses will be 3 + 33% H 10% H 100 = 6.3 
(for they will mistakenly be found liable 33 percent of the time). Yet if they take high care, their 
expected expenses will be only 5 + 5% H 9% H 100 = 5.45 (because they will mistakenly be 
found liable only 5 percent of the time).// 
As this example shows, if raising the level of care reduces the chance of being found 
negligent by mistake, parties may decide to take more than due care, even though the chances of 
courts’ overestimating care are as large as the chances of their underestimating care.
67 The 
example illustrates also the point that despite parties’ increasing their level of care, they may still 
face a positive risk (5 percent in the example) of being found negligent if they cause accidents. 
                                                           
     
67Actually, in the example, as long as the chance of overestimating care by one level is less than 58.66 percent -- a 
chance substantially exceeding the 33 percent chance of underestimating care -- parties will still take high care. Assuming 
the chance of overestimating care by one level is 58.66 percent, parties who take no care will escape liability 58.66% + 5% 
= 63.66% of the time, so their expected expenses will be 36.34% H 15% H 100 = 5.45; parties who take moderate or high 
care will expect to spend, as before, 6.33 and 5.45, respectively. Thus taking no care and taking high care will result in 
equally low expected expenses. If  the chance of overestimating care is lower than 58.66 percent, taking no care will result 
in higher expected expenses.    
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Much the same conclusions hold with respect to two other factors leading to uncertainty 
in the finding of negligence. One of these factors is that a party may be unable to control 
completely his momentary level of care. A driver may be unable to control completely his level 
of care at each instant (because of a lapse of attention, a sudden glare, a sneeze), or a physician 
may be unable to act with all the care he intends with each of his patients on each of their visits.  
However, as it is the driver’s care at the time of an accident and the physician’s treatment of the 
particular patient on a particular visit that courts will ordinarily consider in determining 
negligence, the driver and the physician will generally bear some uncertainty regarding their 
being found negligent. A little reflection should convince the reader that such uncertainty will 
usually lead parties to try to take more than due care in order to reduce the likelihood that their 
momentary level of care will fall short of due care (in terms of their usual habits and attitudes -- 
see the next section) and thus cause them to be found negligent. (The logic behind this assertion 
is essentially that of the previous paragraphs, that the disadvantage of being found negligent will 
outweigh the advantage of conserving on the cost of taking care.) 
The other factor leading to uncertainty in the determination of negligence is the level of 
due care that will be applied by courts. It may be difficult for a party to predict how courts will 
assess the cost of care or its effectiveness in reducing risk, and thus what they will determine due 
care to be. There may be uncertainty, for instance, in how courts will evaluate the cost to a 
physician in time and effort of performing a diagnostic test or in how courts will assess the value 
of the test in providing information about a disease; in this case the physician will not  know 
whether courts will see failure to perform the test as negligence. It should be clear to the reader 
that such uncertainty will tend to induce parties to take higher than desirable levels of care to 
guard against being found liable by mistake.
68 
1.2 Remarks on uncertainty. The relative importance of the three sources of uncertainty 
– courts’ errors in assessing true levels of care, parties’ inability to control their momentary level 
of care, and courts’ errors in calculating levels of due care -- will depend on the context.
69  For 
example, when there are few witnesses to, or little evidence concerning, a party’s act, errors in 
assessing true levels of care may be important; when courts are not able to obtain or to evaluate 
reliably information about the costs and benefits of care, errors in the calculation of the level of 
due care may be important (a problem that may be of general significance for physicians and 
other professionals, or for firms using new technology).  
With respect to parties’ inability to control their momentary levels of care, three 
comments seem worth making.  First, an individual’s momentary level of care can be regarded as 
an imperfect indicator of his true, and inherently unobservable, level of care, namely, the degree 
 
   
68The points made in this subsection were first studied by Diamond 1974a and further developed in Calfee and Craswell 
1984, Craswell and Calfee 1986, and chapter 4 of  Shavell 1987a; qualifications to these points are pointed out in Grady 
1983 and Kahan 1989, as observed in note 36 below.  The notion of defensive medicine comports with the explanation for 
excessive care advanced here;  for empirical evidence of defensive medicine, see, for example, Danzon 1985 and Kessler 
and McClellan 1996. 
    
69See Tunc 1983, sections 141, 143-46, for a discussion of the importance of uncertainty in the negligence determination 
in different legal systems.   
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to which he adopts a prudential mental attitude.  Hence, in strict logic, the cause of uncertainty 
in the finding of negligence due to an individual’s inability to control his momentary level of 
care may be viewed as courts’ inability to assess an individual’s true prudential mental attitude.  
Second, one wonders whether courts might sometimes lower the level of due care in implicit 
recognition of parties’ problems in controlling their momentary level of care. (Might not courts 
allow for some irregularity in driving behavior, knowing that individuals cannot maintain full 
concentration at all times?) Third, there are two types of situations that appear to involve 
uncertainties similar to those regarding the momentary level of care: situations in which parties 
are responsible for the negligence of subordinates whose behavior they cannot control 
completely; and situations in which parties operate machines that occasionally function 
erratically. 
Finally, it should be added that the more general interpretation of the fact that uncertainty 
in the level of due care may induce parties to take socially excessive care is that uncertainty 
about the law may lead parties to take socially undesirable steps in order to avoid liability. 
1.3 Anticipated errors in the choice of due care. Now suppose that parties know in 
advance that the level of due care set by courts will be different from the optimal level, and how 
so. (But, for simplicity, suppose that the courts can correctly measure parties’ true levels of care 
and that parties can control completely their levels of care.) 
It might be that parties know that the due care level will be less than the optimal level.  
This would be true, for instance, when parties know that they will not be found negligent for 
failure to use a particular safety device despite its low cost and substantial effectiveness in 
reducing risk. In such a situation parties will obviously not choose to purchase the safety device; 
they will not take more than due care. 
    The other possibility is that the parties know that the level of due care will exceed the 
optimal level (that a safety device will be required despite its high cost and low effectiveness in 
reducing risk). In this situation parties will take due care unless its level is so high that they are 
better off acting negligently. In the latter case, parties will take optimal care since they will, in 
effect, be strictly liable. 
    1.4 Misperception of the level of due care. Suppose, finally, that parties misperceive 
the level of due care that courts will apply. Then parties will take the level of care that they 
believe constitutes due care, unless it exceeds optimal care by so much that they are better off 
acting in a way they think is negligent, in which case they will take optimal care. Hence, parties 
who overestimate due care will either take more than due care or take optimal care; those who 
underestimate due care will take less than due care. 
  1.5 Comparison with strict liability. The various reasons why uncertainty surrounding 
the negligence determination may lead to inappropriate levels of care constitute implicit 
advantages of strict liability. Because under strict liability there is no investigation of the 
adequacy of an injurer’s care level, the problems that would occur in determining negligence are 
moot, and levels of care will tend to be optimal. 
 
2. Why Negligence Is Found and Implications of Findings of Negligence  
2.1 Reasons for findings of negligence. What explains findings of negligence? This    
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question arises because, as the reader will recall, according to the basic theory of liability 
presented in chapter 2, parties were never found negligent: It was in an individual’s interest to 
act with due care, and courts therefore always exonerated injurers.  
It is evident from the discussion in the last section, however, that there are a variety of 
reasons why parties may face a risk of being found negligent, including errors in the courts’ 
assessment of care actually taken or in ascertaining the proper standard of due care, inability of 
individuals to control their momentary behavior, and inability of firms to control the behavior of 
employees.  
Another significant reason for findings of negligence is that parties may not find taking 
due care worthwhile, and thus will decide definitely to act in a negligent way. We saw that this 
might be so when parties anticipate an excessive standard of due care. Parties also might not find 
it in their interest to take due care because they do not have enough assets to pay a judgment or 
because they think they would escape suit (these possibilities will be discussed in sections 3 and 
9 below). 
2.2 Significance of findings of negligence. The occurrence of findings of negligence 
implies that there is an element of strict liability -- of having to pay for harm done -- associated 
with use of the negligence rule. Hence, many of the conclusions reached above about strict 
liability carry over to a degree to the negligence setting. For example, the point that under strict 
liability injurers will take into account the losses their activity creates has relevance under the 
negligence rule; injurers will take some account of the losses their activity creates because they 
will face some risk of being found negligent. In addition, the occurrence of findings of 
negligence will be referred to later, in chapter 5, to explain why injurers should wish to purchase 
liability insurance against being found negligent. 
 
3.  Injurers’ Inability to Pay for Losses: The Judgment-Proof Problem 
3.1 Dilution of incentives to reduce risk. If injurers do not have assets sufficient to pay 
fully for the losses they cause -- and may thus be judgment-proof -- their incentives to reduce 
risk by taking care may be inadequate, as they will treat losses that they cause that exceed their 
assets as imposing liabilities only equal to their assets. For the same reason, injurers’ activity 
levels will tend to be socially excessive and they will contribute too much to risk. These points 
are more important the lower are injurers’ assets in relation to the harm they might cause (in the 
extreme, if injurers have no assets, they will have no liability-related incentive to reduce risk).
70 
           3.2 Significance of dilution of incentives. (1) There are many contexts in which 
inability to pay for losses plausibly may lead to dulling of incentives to reduce risk. This is so 
not only for parties with low or moderate assets, but also for parties with substantial assets 
whose activities pose special risks. (Consider, for instance, even large corporate enterprises and 
the chance of fires or explosions causing mass injuries, or the possibility that a widely 
distributed product has toxic or other dangerous properties.)  Incentives are particularly likely to 
be diluted with respect to those actions that would serve primarily to lower the severity or 
 
   
70I analyze the nature of the dilution of incentives due to the judgment-proof problem in Shavell 1986; see also Pitchford 
1998 and Ringleb and Wiggins 1990.     
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likelihood of extremely large losses exceeding parties’ assets, yet not of small or moderate 
losses. (Consider the motive of the owner of a nuclear power plant to spend on a safety measure, 
perhaps an extra concrete shell around the reactor core, that would limit harm only in a 
catastrophic accident involving rupture of the core and causing losses far greater than the 
owner’s net worth.)    
(2) Incentive problems are exacerbated if parties have the opportunity to shield assets, 
such as when an individual puts his property in a relative’s name or when a firm transfers assets 
to a holding company. 
(3) The problem of dilution of incentives is distinct from the problem that scholars and 
practitioners often identify with injurers’ inability to pay fully for losses, namely, victims’ 
inability to obtain complete compensation. This and related issues (concerning, chiefly, 
insurance) will be addressed in chapter 5. 
3.3 Solutions to the problem of dilution of incentives. Several types of social responses 
to the problem of inadequate incentives to reduce risk are possible, depending on the 
circumstances. 
One possibility is vicarious liability. If there is another party who has some control over 
the behavior of the party whose assets are limited, then the former party can be held vicariously 
liable for the losses caused by the latter. This solution will be discussed in section 4 below.   
A second possibility is minimum asset requirements. Parties with assets less than some 
specified amount could be prevented from engaging in an activity. This approach would ensure 
that parties who do engage in an activity have enough at stake to be led to take adequate care.  
However, the minimum asset requirement is a blunt tool that could unduly discourage 
participation in an activity: Suppose that a person who could not meet the asset requirement 
would obtain a large benefit from the activity and would cause little expected harm, even though 
his incentives are diluted. 
A third response is regulation of liability insurance coverage. This is a somewhat 
complicated topic, and discussion of it will be deferred until section 7 of chapter 5. 
A fourth approach is direct regulation of parties’ risk-creating behavior.
71 Thus, for 
example, a regulatory authority might mandate that milk be pasteurized or that trucks carrying 
explosives not travel through tunnels. Such regulation could force parties to reduce risks in 
socially beneficial ways that would not be induced by the threat of liability, due to its dulled 
effect from the judgment-proof problem.
72 However, a regulatory authority’s ability to devise 
appropriate regulations is limited by its knowledge. I will discuss this issue further in section 5 
of chapter 10. 
A final way of mitigating dilution of incentives is resort to criminal liability. A party who 
would not take care if only his assets were at stake might be induced to do so for fear 
of a criminal sanction; see chapters 21 and 24. 
 
    
71See, for example, Faure 2000, Kornhauser and Revesz 1998, and Menell 1998. 
   
   
72It should be noted that the judgment-proof problem also limits the ability of a regulatory authority to enforce 
regulations in some circumstances.    
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4. Vicarious Liability    
4.1 Definition of vicarious liability. The concern here is with the imposition of liability 
on one party -- the principal -- for some or all of the losses caused by a second party -- the agent. 
The principal is presumed to have a relationship with the agent that may allow him to observe 
the agent’s level of care and to control it or come to an agreement about it. The reader may wish 
to think of the principal and the agent as employer and employee, contractor and subcontractor, 
or parent and child. 
4.2 Vicarious liability increases levels of care and reduces levels of activity if the 
agent is judgment proof.
73 Suppose that the agent is judgment proof. Then, as discussed in 
section 3, the agent’s incentives to take care will be inadequate if he alone is liable. However, 
imposition of vicarious liability alters the situation because it puts the principal’s assets at stake. 
If the principal can observe and control the agent’s level of care, then imposition of 
vicarious liability will induce the principal to compel the agent to exercise optimal care, because 
that will reduce the expected liability payments of the principal. (If the principal is in a 
contractual relationship with the agent, as would be true of an employer and employee, the 
principal might have to pay the agent to take added care, but the principal will still prefer to do 
that in order to reduce his liability payments if the level of care is optimal.) 
    If the vicariously liable principal cannot observe and directly control the agent’s level of 
care, the principal will attempt to induce the agent to take care by instituting penalties for 
adverse outcomes, such as demotion, discharge, or suit in the case of employees. However, since 
the agent’s assets are less than the losses he might cause, the principal will not generally be able 
to induce the agent to choose the optimal level of care. 
Whether or not the principal can observe and control the agent’s level of care, imposition 
of vicarious liability will lead the principal to reduce the agent’s participation in, and level of, 
risky activity, assuming that the principal can control the agent’s level of activity. 
4.3 Factors bearing on the appeal of vicarious liability. (1) The advantage of vicarious 
liability in desirably affecting incentives to reduce risk will be greater the lower the agent’s 
assets are, and the higher the principal’s assets are, relative to the probable magnitude of harm 
the agent can cause. The advantage will also be greater the better able the principal is to control 
the agent’s behavior.    
To illustrate the relevance of these factors, consider the important example of the large 
firm and its employees.
74 It is apparent that the assets of employees are likely to be much lower 
than the losses they could cause, for the scope of a firm’s activities is frequently such that a 
 
   
73Sykes 1984 contains a general analysis of vicarious liability stressing, in addition to some of the issues of incentives 
discussed here, the allocation of risk between agents and principals; see also Kornhauser 1982.  For analysis of a particular 
form of vicarious liability, imposed on suppliers of services (such as lawyers, accountants, and lenders) to possibly 
judgment-proof parties, see Kraakman 1986 and Pitchford 1995.  For analysis of another important form, imposed on 
owners of a firm, see Hansmann and Kraakman 1991 and Halpern 1998. 
     
74The reader should be reminded that I am considering here only issues of incentives. In particular, I am not considering 
any advantages (or disadvantages) vicariously liable parties may have as risk bearers.   
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single employee’s behavior may result in harm to many parties or otherwise lead to significant 
losses. Thus, were employees only individually liable, one suspects that their incentives to take 
care would often be seriously inadequate. One also supposes that imposition of vicarious liability 
on the firm helps to cure this problem because the firm’s assets are usually much greater than 
those of any of its employees and because the firm typically has the ability to exert significant 
control over its employees’ behavior.    
In other contexts, and especially those in which a principal engages an agent on a 
one-time basis, vicarious liability is not necessarily as effective, because there is no natural 
presumption that can be made about the agent’s assets relative to the principal’s. Contrast the 
following two examples: (a) A homeowner (the principal) of average means pays a national 
pest-control firm (the agent) to carry out extermination services; here the principal’s assets are 
much smaller than the agent’s. (b) A large construction firm (the principal) subcontracts with a 
small, family-owned plumbing company (the agent) to help on a job; here the principal’s assets 
are much greater than the agent’s. These examples serve also to illustrate that the principal’s 
ability to control effectively the agent’s behavior may be adequate in one situation but poor in 
the next -- whereas the construction firm should be able to watch over the plumbing 
subcontractor quite well, the likelihood that the homeowner can judge the performance of the 
exterminator is not great. Evidently, then, the attractiveness of vicarious liability will depend 
significantly on the features of the situation at hand. 
(2) The desirability of vicarious liability is enhanced by two additional factors. First, 
principals may have better knowledge than agents about the nature of risk or be able themselves 
to take actions that can reduce risk. Where this is so, imposition of vicarious liability will 
obviously lead principals not only to have agents take appropriate care, but also to take 
additional actions of their own to reduce risk. In the presence of vicarious liability, firms will be 
led to issue instructions, organize the conditions of the workplace, schedule operations, select 
employees, and so forth, in ways that better reduce risk. Second, principals may have more 
information than courts do about the appropriateness of agents’ behavior. If that is the case, and 
if under vicarious liability principals frequently replace courts as the discipliners of agents, fewer 
mistakes will be made and better conduct will be promoted. 
(3) There are, however, disadvantages of vicarious liability that should be kept in mind. 
Specifically, imposition of vicarious liability will increase the administrative cost of using the 
legal system, because it will raise the number of defendants named in actions brought by victims, 
otherwise complicate proceedings, and also engender claims by principals against agents. 
 4.4 Actual use of vicarious liability. Vicarious liability is a significant feature of legal 
systems today.
75 Most important, firms are held responsible for the losses caused by their 
employees. Vicarious liability is in addition sometimes imposed on principals for losses caused 
by their agents (here I am using these terms in their legal sense), on automobile owners for 
accidents caused by those whom they allow to drive, on parents for harms resulting from their 
children’s acts, on teachers for their students’ negligence, and so forth. Although the pattern of 
 
     
75See Dobbs 2000, chapter 22, Fleming 1998, chapter 19, and Keeton, Dobbs, et al. 1984, chapter 12, on Anglo-
American law; and Le Gall 1983, Eörsi 1983, and Von Bar 1998, 1: 351- 63, for comparative treatments.    
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use of vicarious liability is complicated and varies among legal systems, the general principles 
that are applied seem to be such that the greater the degree of one party’s control and authority 
over a second party, and the more knowledge the first party has about the second party’s 
behavior, the more likely the first party is to be held responsible for the losses caused by the 
second party. 
 
5.  Damages and the Level of Losses 
5.1 Damages equal to the level of losses. It was shown above, in chapters 2 and 3, that 
the threat of liability generally leads parties to take optimal levels of care, and sometimes to 
choose optimal levels of activity. The arguments for these optimality conclusions were made 
using examples in which there is one possible level of harm that results if an accident occurs and 
in which the magnitude of liability -- so-called damages -- equals that level of harm. These 
optimality conclusions carry over to situations in which there are multiple possible levels of 
harm.  Consider the following illustration, in which there are two possible levels of harm. 
Example 2. If injurers do not take care, the probability of an accident will be 10 percent.  
And if an accident occurs, there will be a loss of 100 with a probability of 80 percent and a loss 
of 500 with probability 20 percent. Expected losses if care is not taken will therefore be 
10% H (80% H 100 + 20% H 500) = 18. Hence, if exercising care eliminates the possibility of an 
accident and costs less than 18, it will be socially desirable to do so. 
Suppose that liable injurers must pay for the losses that occur, whether these are 100 or 
500. Then under strict liability injurers will bear expected liability of 18 if they do not take care, 
and thus will be led to take care when they ought to. Injurers will behave in the same way under 
the negligence rule if the cost of taking care is less than 18 because they will be liable if they fail 
to take care.// 
This example illustrates why, in the general setting in which an accident can result in 
more than one level of harm, injurers will act optimally if damages equal actual harm. The 
reason is that if a liable party must pay for the actual harm he causes, whatever the level of harm 
happens to be, his expected damage payments will equal the expected harm he causes. And the 
condition that expected payments equal expected harm is exactly the assumption on which the 
arguments about optimality of parties’ behavior under liability rules has been based in previous 
discussion. If damages tend to fall short of harm, so that expected payments are below expected 
harm, incentives to reduce risk will be inadequate, and if damages exceed harm, so that expected 
damages exceed expected harm, incentives to reduce risk will be too high.
76 
5.2 Actual magnitude of damages. The starting principle in most legal systems is that a 
liable party should pay for the actual level of losses caused, whether they be high or low. It is 
said, for instance, that an injurer takes his victim as he finds him, that the injurer should pay for 
harm caused if the victim turns out to be affected by a latent aggravating condition (a thin skull, 
 
   
76It should be noted, however, that if damages equal the expected harm regardless of the actual magnitude of harm, 
incentives to reduce risk will also be appropriate. This setting of damages, however, would usually not be desirable, for 
actual harm is generally easier to determine than expected harm (where that is not so, damages may be set equal to 
expected harm -- see section 7). Moreover, it would mean in particular that damages would be less than actual harm when 
actual harm is higher than average, something that victims would view as problematic.   
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hemophilia), and that the injurer should pay similarly if the property he damaged had some 
structural weakness or was unusually valuable. At the same time, a liable injurer is responsible 
only for small losses if only a small harm resulted from his act.
77 (Nevertheless, there are 
subsidiary principles, which will be noted in section 6, under which liable injurers do not pay 
damages equal to losses.) 
 
6. Damages and the Probability of Losses 
6.1 Optimal damages are unaffected by the probability of losses. The conclusion from 
the last section that behavior will be optimal if the magnitude of liability equals the actual level 
of losses suggests that behavior will not be optimal if liability is adjusted on the basis of other 
factors -- in particular, if damages are lowered because a loss was very unlikely, or if damages 
are raised because a loss was very likely. These two possibilities will now be considered. 
6.2  Limitation of damages for unusual losses. Suppose that damages are limited to an 
average or typical level when losses happen to be unusually high. Then expected liability 
payments will be less than expected losses and the incentive to take care may be inadequate. In 
Example 2, if liability for the relatively unlikely losses of 500 is limited to 100, then an injurer’s 
expected liability if he does not take care will be only 10% H 100 = 10, which is less than the 
expected losses of  l8. An injurer will therefore take care only if the cost of doing so is less than 
10, rather than whenever the cost is less than 18. 
To better appreciate the conclusion that, under present assumptions, liability for unusual 
accidents should not be limited, observe that the contrary conclusion would lead to a reductio ad 
absurdum. Any accident, after all, can be seen as extremely unlikely if it is described in 
sufficient detail. For example, the initially likely-sounding accident in which a person drives his 
automobile into his neighbor’s picket fence becomes a very unlikely one when it is mentioned 
that the accident occurred on a Tuesday at 4:23PM, that the left side of the automobile’s fender 
struck the fence, and that the eighteenth through twenty-seventh pickets were broken. Were one 
to contend that liability for unlikely accidents should be limited, one might thus be led to say that 
liability for any accident whatever should be limited. 
Another way to understand this point is to recognize that the magnitude of expected 
losses reflects all manner of possible accidents (striking the neighbor’s fence with the right side 
or the middle part of the fender if not with the left side, breaking the nineteenth through 
twenty-eighth pickets if not the eighteenth through twenty-seventh). Expected losses are a 
probability-weighted aggregation of losses that can arise in many individually unlikely ways. 
Were liability reduced because of the improbability of the particular accident, expected liability 
could not equal expected losses. 
6.3 A qualification. Nevertheless, it might be acceptable to limit liability for certain 
accidents: If the possibility of some type of accident is overlooked, then there would be no 
decrease in injurers’ incentives caused by reducing liability for that type of accident. (Note that 
this argument is not an affirmative reason for reducing the magnitude of liability; it says only 
 
     
77See for example Dobbs 2000, 464-65 and Fleming 1998, 234-37, on Anglo-American law, and Stoll 1983, sections 
26-28, and Von Bar 1998, 2: 156-62, on law in other countries.       
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that reducing liability may not have a detrimental effect on incentives.)  
To decide which types of accident may be overlooked, consider that individuals cannot 
practically contemplate each and every one of the multitude of possible accidents that could 
follow from their actions. People must amalgamate potential accidents into a relatively small 
number of categories, assign probabilities to the categories, and make decisions with reference to 
them. In the process, the possibility arises that some accidents will not be taken into account 
because they do not fit into the list of categories used in decisionmaking. Such accidents might 
be described as freak.
78 
There are, however, several problematic aspects of a policy limiting liability for accidents 
whose possibility is overlooked. First, this policy invites parties to deceive courts about 
accidents that they had in fact contemplated; second, the policy reduces parties’ incentives to 
consider the full range of consequences that could result from their actions; and third, it may 
increase the costs of adjudication.
79 
6.4 Actual damages for unlikely losses. Although, as was stated in section 5.2, the 
starting principle in most legal systems is that liability equals losses caused, there are exceptions 
to the principle in Anglo-American law that fall under the rubric of unforeseeability.
80 According 
to this notion, liability should not extend to harms that the injurer could not reasonably foresee. 
It appears from examination of cases and legal commentary that the accidents that are held not to 
be reasonably foreseeable generally have a far-fetched, extraordinary, freak character. 
6.5 Damages for highly likely losses. If liability for accidents that are very likely to 
occur exceeds the level of actual losses, then parties may have too great an incentive to reduce 
risk.  Suppose that a construction firm that blasts to excavate a large area will be virtually sure to 
cause some losses. If the firm has to pay for more than these losses because of their high 
likelihood, the firm may be led to take excessive precautions in blasting, or may decide to use 
alternative, more expensive means of excavation, even where blasting is socially best. 
6.6 Actual liability for highly likely losses. Again, because the starting principle is that 
liability should equal actual losses, the fact that the probability of losses might have been high 
does not ordinarily result in liability greater than the losses. A partial exception occurs when the 
injurer was reckless or knew harm would occur, especially when intended; see section 9.  
 
7. Damages and Courts’ Uncertainty about the Level of Losses 
7.1 Damages equal to expected losses. Suppose that courts are not able to assess 
 
     
78As in the celebrated American case of Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., in which a package containing fireworks was 
dislodged from the arms of a man boarding a train and fell under the train’s wheels, causing an explosion that knocked a 
scale onto and injured a woman at a platform some distance away. 
     
79Limiting the magnitude of liability will tend to increase the cost per case brought, but it may also reduce the number 
of cases that are brought and thus lower the costs of adjudication. 
     
80On unforeseeability, see Fleming 1998, 237-46, Keeton, Dobbs, et al. 1984, section 43, and the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts 1965, section 435. In other legal systems there are some parallels with unforeseeability (chiefly in the 
interpretation of the “adequacy” theory), but there does not seem to be an exactly corresponding notion; see the discussion 
in Honoré 1983, sections 91-93, Markesinis 1994, 107-08, and Zweigert and Kötz 1998, 601-02, 621.    
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accurately the level of losses that occur in individual accidents, but use estimates of losses that 
are correct on average. Then liable parties’ expected  damage payments will still equal the 
expected losses they cause, so they will still be led to act optimally under liability rules. In 
Example 2, for instance, suppose that courts are not able to assess whether losses are 100 or 500 
but know that expected losses are 180 and impose damages of this amount. Then injurers will be 
led to behave optimally.
81 
7.2 Comments on courts’ uncertainty. Courts may be uncertain about the level of 
losses when the harm has already occurred, as when a house burns and the value of its contents 
are not easy to determine. Similarly, uncertainty may arise when some elements of the harm will 
occur in the future. A primary example of the latter is when an individual’s subsequent earnings 
will be reduced due to an injury. The interpretation of the point under discussion in this type of 
situation is that if courts’ estimates of future losses are correct on average, injurers will have 
appropriate motives to reduce risk. There will be no need for courts to determine what victims’ 
losses turn out to be. 
     It should also be noted that estimating uncertain elements of harm may be a difficult and 
much disputed process, raising the administrative costs of use of the legal system. Therefore, it 
may be socially desirable for courts to exclude uncertain components of losses from the 
computation of damages if the probable magnitude of these losses, and the consequent dilution 
of incentives to reduce risk, is not too large. However, an alternative and superior approach is for 
courts to approximate uncertain components by means of some easily applied formula, and not to 
allow dispute over this part of the damage calculation. 
7.3 Actual determination of damages in the face of uncertainty over the level of 
losses. When losses involve harm to property, courts ordinarily attempt to estimate uncertain 
components that are not too speculative; they follow the same course when property losses are 
associated with forgone profits, but their approach is conservative.
82 
With respect to accidents resulting in injuries to persons, courts can usually ascertain 
medical expenses borne and income lost up to the time of trial fairly reliably, but subsequent 
medical expenses and diminution in earning capacity may be highly uncertain. In many countries 
courts estimate these amounts as best they can, often using actuarial and statistical data to award 
a lump sum to injured parties or, in the case of fatal accidents, to their dependents for loss of 
support. However, in Germany, the preference is against lump-sum awards; instead, courts favor 




   
81I am continuing to assume here, as in sections 5 and 6, that when the injurer chooses his level of care and activity 
level, he does not know what the magnitude of accident losses will be (100 or 500 in the example), he only knows the 
probability distribution of accident losses.  Therefore, the injurer will have proper incentives to take care as long as his 
expected liability equals expected harm. 
     
82The description here is based mainly on Fleming 1998, chapter 10, sections 1, 3, and on Stoll 1983, sections 12-48, a 
general comparative treatment of damages and other remedies. 
     
83See McGregor 1983, sections 49-52, and Von Bar 1998, 2: 197-200.      
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8. Damages and Pecuniary versus Nonpecuniary Losses 
8.1 Definition of the two types of losses. Pecuniary losses are those that either are 
monetary or are losses of goods that can be purchased in markets, in which case the measure of 
the losses are the replacement costs. Nonpecuniary losses correspond to the losses in utility 
suffered when irreplaceable things have been destroyed, such as family portraits or other unique 
objects, or, importantly, injuries involving individuals’ health, physical integrity, or emotional 
well-being.
84 
8.2 Damages equal to the sum of pecuniary and nonpecuniary losses. Because both 
pecuniary and nonpecuniary losses reduce social welfare, it is clear that parties will be led to act 
appropriately under liability rules only if damages equal the sum of pecuniary and nonpecuniary 
losses. If damages do not fully reflect nonpecuniary losses, parties’ incentives to reduce risks 
may be inadequate. 
8.3 Courts’ ability to assess pecuniary and nonpecuniary losses. Because pecuniary 
losses are equal either to actual losses in wealth or to the cost of replacing goods, such losses are 
often easy for courts to determine. By contrast, because nonpecuniary losses cannot be observed 
directly, they are difficult for courts to estimate. Hence, it might be thought that courts ought not 
to attempt to estimate nonpecuniary losses if they are probably small: In this way administrative 
costs would be avoided, while incentives to reduce risk would be little affected, as was generally 
suggested in the case of courts’ uncertainty about the level of losses. But, as was noted, in 
principle a better approach to adopt when nonpecuniary losses are likely to be small, and thus 
not worth the administrative costs of measuring, is to make use of simple tables or formulas. In 
any case, if nonpecuniary losses are likely to be large, it is important for courts to attempt to 
estimate them, and especially when pecuniary losses are small. Otherwise, incentives to reduce 
risk may be seriously compromised. This may be the situation, for example, with respect to the 
death of young children.
85 
 8.4 Actual liability for nonpecuniary losses. The categories of losses typically 
described as nonpecuniary include pain and suffering, emotional distress, and the like. Losses of 
money and of goods for which substitutes can be bought are regarded as pecuniary, with the 
prices of the substitutes measuring the losses. 
The willingness of courts to increase awards on account of nonpecuniary losses varies 
considerably among legal systems. French law may be the most liberal in the types of 
nonpecuniary losses recognized. Anglo-American law is less liberal (though the size of awards, 
 
   
84To be more precise about the definitions, consider a model in which there are two goods -- a good that can be directly 
consumed and from which other goods can be produced, and an irreplaceable good, which cannot be produced.  In this 
model, assume that the utility of an individual equals the number of units of the first good and its equivalent in produced 
goods, plus the utility to him of the irreplaceable good if he possesses it. 
     
85As will be suggested below, the nonpecuniary component of awards for the death of children is low or nonexistent.  
The pecuniary awards are usually small as well, because they are based on the future loss of support -- often zero -- that 
parents will suffer in their later years. (For these reasons, one might wonder about the adequacy of the incentives of, say, 
toy manufacturers to reduce the risk of fatal accidents.)  See McGregor 1983, sections 253-55, 273.   
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when given, seems highest, especially in the United States). German law is more restrictive than 
French or Anglo-American in the types of nonpecuniary losses for which damages are allowed.
86 
Moreover, treatment of nonpecuniary losses within legal systems may depend on the type 
of accident and other factors. Nonpecuniary losses are not usually compensated unless there is 
accompanying physical injury (but if the injury results in death, nonpecuniary losses suffered by 
the victim’s family are not ordinarily compensated, at least in Anglo-American law). 
Additionally, nonpecuniary losses associated with losses of unique objects of property are rarely 
compensated. 
 
9. Damages Greater than Losses: Punitive Damages 
9.1 Terminological note. It is conventional to refer to damages that are greater than 
losses as punitive, and I shall sometimes use this terminology here. The explanation for the 
terminology is that damages exceeding losses are often imposed as a form of punishment (see 
section 9.7), even though, as will be discussed, there are rationales for the imposition of damages 
exceeding losses that would not naturally be described as punitive in nature. 
9.2 Damages greater than losses generally create excessive incentives to reduce risk. 
 As was stated in section 5, if damages are set equal to losses, incentives to reduce risk will 
generally be desirable. If damages exceed losses, levels of care will tend to be excessive, and 
levels of activity will be too low (at least under strict liability). Nevertheless, there are several 
possible rationales for imposition of damages exceeding losses, including the following.
87  
9.3 Escape from suit. Suppose that injurers who ought to be liable might escape suit.  
This could be so because it is difficult for victims to identify who injured them (as in the case of 
a driver who flees from the scene of an accident that he caused, or of a firm that discharges an 
untraceable but disease-causing pollutant into the air). In addition, suit might not be brought 
because of litigation costs. 
If injurers who sometimes escape suit are made to pay only the usual level of damages on 
those occasions when they are sued, then their expected payments will be less than the expected 
losses they generate. Consequently, their incentives to reduce risk will be inadequate. For 
incentives to be restored appropriately, damages must be raised above the level of losses when 
they are found liable. Specifically, if damages equal losses multiplied by the inverse of the 
probability of suit, then expected damages will equal expected losses and incentives will be 
correct. If, for instance, the probability of suit is 50 percent and losses are $10,000, damages 
should be multiplied by 1/.5 or 2, for then damages will be $20,000, so that expected damages 
will be 50% H $20,000 = $10,000 the correct amount; and if the probability of suit is 33.33 
percent, then damages should be multiplied by 3, making them $30,000 and expected damages 
 
     
86See Fleming 1998,  266-70, 285, for a description of Anglo-American law; Stoll 1983, sections 35-48, and Von Bar 
1998, 2: 69-88, 169-89, for a general comparative survey; and McGregor 1983, sections 35-47, 146-72, 212-17, 264-73, 
for a comparative treatment of damages for personal injury and death.    
   
87On economic analysis of punitive damages, see generally Cooter 1989 and Polinsky and Shavell 1998b.  For empirical 
work, see, for example, Eisenberg et al. 1997 and Karpoff and Lott 1999.    
 
 
Chapter 4 – Page 15 
                                                          
$10,000; and so forth.
88 
9.4 Illicit utility from causing harm.  Suppose here that an injurer will obtain utility 
from causing losses and that this utility is not credited in social welfare. When, for instance, a 
person breaks the windows of his neighbor’s house because he positively enjoys the unhappiness 
his neighbor will experience, society may not want to count the person’s utility as an addition to 
social welfare.
89 (Contrast this situation to one in which an individual playing catch accidentally 
throws a ball that breaks a window; here his pleasure derives from playing catch, and breaking a 
window does not raise it.)   
Given the assumption that the utility the injurer obtains from doing harm is not credited 
in social welfare, society wants to discourage the injurer’s harmful act. To accomplish that, the 
damages that are imposed must exceed the utility that the injurer would obtain from his act.  
Therefore, damages may have to be higher than the losses caused. To discourage a person from 
spitefully breaking his neighbor’s windows may require a penalty greater than the cost of 
replacing the windows because the person may derive substantial pleasure from committing this 
act.
90 
9.5 Encouraging market transactions. In some circumstances it is possible for a party 
to communicate with a potential victim before causing harm. For example, this might be so when 
a firm contemplates infringing on another’s copyright. When prior communication is possible, a 
potential injurer could negotiate in advance with the potential victim to purchase the right to 
engage in the loss-creating conduct. The firm deliberating about the copyright violation could 
secure a license to use the copyrighted material. 
In such circumstances, it may be socially desirable to induce a potential injurer to bargain 
and purchase the right to engage in harm-creating conduct; this can be accomplished by 
threatening to impose punitive damages on the potential injurer if he acts to cause harm.
91  
Specifically, suppose that the usual level of damages would be an underestimate of harm for 
 
     88More precisely, if injurers are risk neutral and damages d equal h/p, where h is harm and p is the probability of suit, 
then expected damages will be p(h/p) = h, and incentives will be correct. If injurers are risk averse, then damages need not 
be as high as h/p to give injurers adequate incentives to reduce risk. 
   
89I examine this assumption because it seems to be one that is held by many individuals, and the view that different 
sources of utility might count differently in the social calculus has a distinguished pedigree -- see for example Mill 1861,  
56, and Harsanyi 1977, 62. However, I myself do not find the trumping of malevolent (or other) preferences appealing, for 
reasons that are articulated in Kaplow and Shavell 2002c, section B.3, chapter 8. In brief, I see no principled basis for 
distinguishing among sources of utility to individuals, and any way of so doing leads to the possibility that all individuals 
would be made worse off. 
   
90A similar rationale concerns illicit disutility associated with the exercise of care.  Suppose that some people claim that 
the exercise of care would cause them special and peculiar disutility that is not counted as a cost in the social welfare 
calculus. For instance, a driver might claim that to be attentive to the road is extraordinarily bothersome. If society does 
not credit this disutility, it will want to induce the person to be attentive to road conditions, and that may require a level of 
damages exceeding losses. 
   
91This point apparently originated with Calabresi and Melamed 1972 and was further developed by Biggar 1995, 
Haddock, McChesney, and Spiegel 1990, Kaplow and Shavell 1996b, and Landes and Posner 1981b.   
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some reason (see section 7.2). A potential injurer then might cause harm when doing so is 
socially undesirable C because the benefit to the injurer might be greater than the low estimate of 
harm but less than the actual harm. There may be additional undesirable repercussions from an 
underestimate of harm. If injurers can take property from victims without having to pay its full 
value, injurers will devote effort to identifying and appropriating such property (copyright 
violators will seek out material to copy), and victims will expend effort to protect their property 
(copyright owners will invest resources in preventing duplication of their material). Such efforts 
are socially wasteful. The foregoing problems can be avoided if punitive damages are imposed 
for unilaterally causing harm, for that will induce bargaining and exchange only if the injurer’s 
benefit exceeds the property owner’s loss.
92 
Another possible reason to employ punitive damages to encourage bargaining and market 
transactions concerns administrative costs. If compensatory damages are used alone, harm and 
the taking of property might be more frequently mediated through the legal system by the 
bringing of  lawsuits than if punitive damages are used as well; thus, if bargaining is less 
expensive than litigation, administrative costs will fall as a result of the use of punitive damages. 
9.6 Punishment. A further rationale for punitive damages derives from a consideration 
that will be addressed later in this book (see section 3 of chapter 23, on the retributive motive), 
namely, the objective of imposing proper punishment on a wrongdoer. Assume that, given the 
degree of a party’s blameworthiness, individuals believe that there is a correct level of 
punishment, and that either higher or lower punishment detracts from the utility that individuals 
obtain from satisfaction of the punishment objective. (This utility is distinct from any utility that 
individuals obtain from deterrence of harm caused by imposition of penalties.) Acts that have 
certain outrageous qualities may call for levels of damages higher than losses to help satisfy the 
punishment objective and thus can justify punitive damages. 
Two observations should be made about the punishment objective. First, the optimal 
level of damages will be an implicit compromise between this objective and deterrence, as 
discussed above. Second, in considering the punishment objective when the defendant is a firm, 
one presumes that the goal is to punish culpable individuals within the firm (not the firm as an 
abstract entity). This means that account needs to be taken of the degree to which blameworthy 
individuals within firms will be punished as a consequence of imposition of damages on the 
firm, and also of the degree to which those not considered responsible (employees generally, and 
perhaps stockholders) will be punished. 
 9.7 Actual award of punitive damages. Punitive damages are awarded in the United 
States in cases where parties acted with ill will, malice, or conscious disregard for others, or 
 
   
92An important qualification to the argument of this paragraph concerns the question why the use of punitive damages 
should be expected to induce bargaining, for it might be expected to occur anyway. To illustrate, suppose that punitive 
damages are not employed and that the copyright holder is willing to pay more to prevent infringement than the potential 
infringer values infringement.  One might expect the copyright holder to pay the potential infringer not to infringe. Thus, 
punitive damages would not be needed to induce bargaining -- it would occur anyway.  However, if there are multiple 
potential infringers, the copyright holder would be unwilling to bargain with each and every one, so punitive damages 
would be needed to induce bargaining and prevent infringment by an infringer unwilling to pay enough to satisfy the 
copyright holder. This point is emphasized in Kaplow and Shavell 1996b.   
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where their behavior was outrageous or provoked indignation for some other reason, although it 
is not very common in cases where harm has been done to property alone. In other countries, 




10.  Damages and Victims’ Opportunities to Mitigate Losses    
10.1 Victim actions to mitigate losses. In the event of an accident, the victim may be 
able to limit the harm by taking various actions. For instance, if workers from the phone 
company accidentally cause a telephone pole to fall, and it breaks through the roof of a person’s 
home, the homeowner may be able to keep his losses to a minimum by removing articles from 
his attic that could be damaged by rain and also by having his roof repaired promptly. (Such 
actions that victims can take to mitigate losses after accidents occur are, of course, to be 
distinguished from the precautions that victims can exercise before accidents occur in order to 
reduce the likelihood or severity of harm.)    
 10.2 Social welfare optimum. Given the goal of minimizing total social costs associated 
with accidents, including here the costs of mitigation of losses, it will be socially desirable for a 
victim to act to mitigate losses if the cost of so doing is less than the reduction in losses thereby 
accomplished.     
Example 3. If a victim takes an action to mitigate losses due to an accident, the losses 
will equal 100; otherwise losses will equal 150. It will therefore be socially desirable for him to 
take the action if its cost is less than 50. If, for instance, the costs of the mitigation action is 10, 
the action should be taken.//   
Thus, in the case of the homeowner who can easily mitigate losses by removing articles 
from his attic, we might interpret 10 to be the cost of removing the articles, and 100 as the loss 
given that he does so. 
If an accident occurs, total social costs due to it should be regarded as the optimally 
mitigated level of losses plus the costs of mitigation. In Example 3, therefore, the total social 
costs due to an accident are 110, for if an accident occurs, not only are 100 in direct losses 
suffered, but also costs of 10 are incurred in mitigating the losses (preventing them from rising 
to150). Because total social costs due to an accident are 110, it is this figure that should 
determine the optimal level of care that injurers exercise to prevent accidents from happening. 
10.3 Optimal damages. The claim here is that the optimal level of damages is the level 
of losses that a victim would sustain had he optimally mitigated his losses -- whether or not he 
actually did so -- plus the costs of optimal mitigation actions. In the example above, therefore, 
the optimal level of damages is 110. If this is set as the level of damages, the assertion is that two 
things will be true: Victims will be led to optimally mitigate their losses, and injurers will be 
induced to choose the optimal level of care in order to prevent accidents. 
To explain, consider the victim in Example 3. He knows that he will receive 110 in 
damages whether or not he mitigates losses, and in particular, he will not receive 150 if he fails 
 
     
93See Dobbs 2000, Keeton, Dobbs, et al. 1984, section 2, and Fleming 1998, 2, 23, 27, 562-64, on Anglo-American 
law, and Stoll 1983, sections 103-25, and Von Bar 1998, 1: 627-31, on law in other countries.      
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to mitigate losses. Thus, the victim will decide to spend the 10 to mitigate his losses: If he does 
so, he will sustain true losses of 100 and mitigation costs of 10, so he will be fully compensated, 
whereas if he does not mitigate, he will lose 40 (that is, 150 in true losses less 110 in damages 
received). Because, then, victims are induced to mitigate losses optimally, the damages paid by 
injurers equal the social costs incurred, so that injurers will indeed be induced to take optimal 
precautions.
94 
 10.4 Actual law regarding mitigation. In the Anglo-American and French legal 
systems the size of awards is restricted to losses that an injured party could not reasonably have 
avoided plus expenses reasonably incurred in so limiting losses. Thus awards are based on the 
assumption that any reasonable repairs to damaged property have been made, that injured parties 
have obtained proper medical treatment to alleviate their condition (but not that they have 
submitted to dangerous procedures), and so forth. In the German legal system, as well as in some 
others, the problem of mitigation of losses is viewed as an aspect of the injured party’s 
contributory fault.  Since liability is normally reduced on account of contributory fault, the end 




11.1 Definition and introduction. The principal meaning of causation that will be 
employed here is the one used in ordinary language: we will say that a person’s act caused harm 
if the harm would not have occurred had the person not committed the act. For example, a 
person’s speeding will be said to have caused an accident if the the accident would not have 
occurred if he had not been speeding. This notion of causation is sometimes referred to as 
causation in fact, or as but for causation  (as in “but for the speeding, the accident would not 
have occurred”), or as necessary causation, to distinguish it from other concepts of causation 
that fall under the heading of  proximate causation.   
A fundamental characteristic of liability law is that a party must have caused harm in 
order to be held liable for it.
96 The main question to be examined here is how this feature of law 
affects the functioning of the liability system under strict liability and the negligence rule. Then I 
will discuss proximate causation and uncertainty over causation. 
11.2 Strict liability. As was elaborated in chapter 2, if parties are held strictly liable for 
harm, they will generally be led to choose the socially desirable level of care and the socially 
desirable level of activity. The issue of causation, however, was not raised there, and once 
considered, it becomes evident that for parties to have socially correct incentives to take 
precautions and to engage in activities, they must escape liability for harms that they do not 
 
    
94Wittman 1981 first suggested that both victims and injurers will act desirably if damages equal optimally 
mitigated losses plus optimal mitigation costs. 
      
95See Dobbs 2000, sections 203-05, Fleming 1998, 285-87, and McCormick 1935, chapter 5, on Anglo-American 
law, and Stoll 1972, section 155, and Von Bar 1998, 2: 562-63, on law in other countries.   
96 See, for example, Dobbs 2000, chapter 9, on Anglo-American law, and Honoré 1983, sections 15, 106-18, and 
Zweigert and Kötz 1998, 601, 621, on the law in civil law countries.  
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cause.   
To illustrate that in order for the level of care to be optimal, parties must not be liable 
when they are not the causes of loss, suppose that a firm’s production generates pollution, which 
can cause house paint to peel and will lead to aggregate repainting costs of  $100,000.  Suppose 
too that peeling may also come about from prolonged exposure to the sun and that the cost of 
repainting homes for this reason is $80,000. It is then socially desirable for the firm to invest in a 
device like a smoke scrubber to eliminate the pollution if and only if the device costs less than 
$100,000, for $100,000 is the increase in harm due to the pollution. Further, this is precisely how 
the firm will be motivated to act if it is liable for repainting homes if and only if its pollution is 
the cause of  peeling house paint. In particular, if the firm is liable even when it is not the cause 
of losses, it will have an excessive incentive to spend on care. In that case, as its pollution-
assocated liability would be $180,000, the firm would be willing to spend up to $180,000 on the 
smoke scrubber to eliminate pollution and avoid liability for the costs of repainting homes.   
To illustrate that incentives to engage in activities may be inappropriate if parties are 
liable even when they are not the cause of losses, suppose that the firm in the example is unable 
to avert the pollution by taking care (perhaps smoke scrubbers are prohibitively expensive). In 
this case, the firm can discontinue the activity that generates pollution. Clearly, it should do so if 
and only if the benefit from the activity is less than $100,000; it is socially desirable for the firm 
to continue with its activity if the benefit from the activity exceeds $100,000. Again, this is what 
the firm will do if it is liable for repainting costs if and only if it is their cause. If by continuing 
its activity it becomes liable for all repainting, that is for $180,000, the firm may be undesirably 
discouraged from continuing with its activity (that would be so if the benefit from the activity is 
between $100,000 and $180,000). 
The basic function of the causation requirement under strict liability, in other words, is 
that it furnishes socially appropriate incentives to reduce the risk of harm and to moderate the 
level of activity by imposing liability equal only to the increase in social costs due to a party’s 
actions.
97   
11. 3 Negligence rule. Under the negligence rule, we know from chapter 2 that parties 
will generally be led to exercise optimal care if due care is set at this level, but the analysis did 
not take causation into explicit account. If parties do not escape liability for negligence, will they 
have inappropriate incentives to take care? Is it necessary to allow parties to escape liability in 
order for their incentives to be correct (as it is under strict liability)? As will be discussed, the 
answer is that there is no need to allow parties to escape liability for negligence if they do not 
cause losses, but optimal incentives are maintained even if they do escape liability if they do not 
cause losses. In other words, basic incentives to take due care are correct whether or not there is 
a causation requirement. Thus, other factors must be adduced as a warrant for the causation 
requirement under the negligence rule. 
To explain, let us reconsider the example of the polluting firm. Suppose that a smoke 
 
97This tolling-of-social-costs function of the causal requirement was initially emphasized in an important 
article, Calabresi 1975, and was amplified in Shavell 1980a in a formal economic treatment of causation and 
liability. 
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scrubber costs $30,000, an amount less than the $100,000 of additional harm the scrubber would 
avert, so that it would be negligent for the firm to fail to install it. Suppose too that if the firm 
negligently omits to install the scrubber, it will be held liable for harm even if it is not the cause 
of harm, that is, even if paint peels due to exposure to sun rather than to pollution. This cannot 
cause the firm to take excessive precautions. All that it does is to increase the firm’s incentive to 
take due care and install the scrubber, for the firm will be threatened with $180,000 of damages 
for failure to install the scrubber rather than with $100,000. However, a question arises: Could it 
be that allowing the firm to escape liability for negligence when it is not the cause of peeling 
paint dilutes unduly the firm’s incentive to install the scrubber? The answer is no; the firm will 
be threatened with $100,000 of damages for the harm it does cause, so it will install the scrubber. 
Rational actors will always be led to act non-negligently even if they would escape liability 
when they are not the cause of losses.
98  
Although allowing parties to escape liability if their negligence does not cause losses still 
leaves sufficient deterrence to induce proper care-taking, an affirmative reason for insisting on 
causation before imposing liability has not been supplied. One advantage of the causation 
requirement is that to the extent that there are errors in the negligence determination, the 
negligence system takes on aspects of strict liability, so that the problem of overdeterrence 
discussed in section 1.1 would be exacerbated were the scope of liability extended to losses not 
caused by negligence. A second advantage, probably more important, is that the administrative 
costs of the liability system are reduced because the volume of cases is lowered owing to the 
causation requirement.
99  These advantages of restricting liability under the negligence rule to 
harm caused by the actor may justify the causation requirement.
100 
 
98The general proof of this conclusion involves, among other elements, the point that the socially desirable 
level of care itself implicitly reflects causation; care is socially valuable only to the degree that it can reduce accident 
losses in circumstances in which losses would otherwise result. This was first demonstrated in Shavell 1980a; see 
also Shavell 1987a, 105-08, 118-21.  
 
99A qualification is that use of the causation requirement for liability means that, in cases that are brought, 
causation has to be determined (whether the pollution or exposure to sun caused paint to peel), with attendant costs. 
Consequently, it is possible that use of the causal requirement for liability increases rather than reduces 
administrative costs. 
 
100An additional, somewhat subtle feature of the causation requirement under the negligence rule is worth 
mentioning. Under the negligence rule, a person’s expected liability is often assumed to rise discontinuously with his 
level of care: Liability is zero if a person is not negligent, yet becomes distinctly positive as soon as his behavior 
crosses the negligence threshold.  For example, if it is negligent to drive at speeds exceeding 50 mph, a person’s 
liability will be zero if he drives at speeds up to 50 mph but suddenly will rise if he drives at 51 mph, for then he will 
be liable for all accidents that he causes. This jump in expected liability makes the incentive to be non-negligent 
sharp, which has both socially advantageous and disadvantageous aspects. It may be socially advantageous because 
it means that parties will have incentives to be non-negligent even if they cannot pay for the entire harm, or even if 
they will not always be sued for harm; see Cooter 1982 and Shavell 1986. And it may be socially disadvantageous 
because it means that parties may be led to take excessive care to reduce the risk of mistakenly being found 
negligent and bearing liability; if people drive at 45 mph they will lower the chance of erroneously being clocked at 
a speed of over 50 mph; see section 1.1. But, as originally noted by Grady 1983 and Kahan 1989, there may not be a 
sudden increment in expected liability -- expected liability will rise continuously -- if liability for negligence is 
properly limited by the causal requirement under discussion. If a person drives at 51 mph, it might be thought that he   
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11.4 Proximate causation. Even if a party is shown to be a cause of losses, he may still 
escape liability because he was said not to be the proximate cause of losses, where this term has 
two major meanings (additional meanings will not be reviewed here).
101 One connotation of 
proximate cause is that harm came about in a direct or expected way, rather than in an unusual, 
freakish manner. The legal policy of relieving a party of liability for unusual accidents was 
discussed in sections 6.2 and 6.3, where no clear justification was apparent.  
A second notion of proximate causation concerns coincidence, and is illustrated by two 
cases. Suppose that a speeding bus happened to be at just the “right” point on a road to be struck 
by a falling tree. Here, note that the excessive speed of the bus did cause the accident -- had the 
bus not been speeding it would not have been struck -- but the accident would also have been 
avoided if the bus had been going even faster. In the other case, a person negligently handed a 
loaded gun to a child to be used as a plaything and the child dropped the gun on his toe, suffering 
an injury. In such cases, liability is not found because of lack of proximate cause in the sense that 
the accidents are said to be coincidental to defendants’ behavior, unrelated to the normal risk 
created by their behavior.   
It can be demonstrated that allowing parties to escape liability for accidents like these 
does not lead to inadequate precautions. Holding a bus company liable when trees fall down on 
buses will not induce the company to have its buses go more slowly, for the probability of a bus 
being struck by a falling tree does not depend on the speed of the bus. Likewise, holding a 
person liable when an object he gives to a child drops on the child’s toe will not induce people to 
remove bullets from guns, for the probability of a gun dropping on the child’s toe will not be 
affected by its being loaded (setting aside the negligible weight of the bullets).
102 
An advantage of permitting defendants to escape liability when accidents are 
coincidentally caused is that this will lower administrative costs by reducing the scope of 
liability, unless the cost of deciding about the issue of coincidental causation exceeds the savings 
from the reduction in the scope of liability. A disadvantage of allowing defendants to escape 
liability for coincidental accidents is that this means that actors do not bear the full increase in 
social costs due to their activity (if people did not ride in buses, they might not be struck by 
falling trees), and the control of levels of activity is an object of, at least, strict liability. 
11.5 Uncertainty over causation. In many situations there is uncertainty about 
causation.  For example, it may not be known which manufacturer out of many sold the product 
(a drug, lead paint) that caused the injury, or whether an injury was caused by the defendant or 
by background factors (was cancer caused by a firm’s pollutant or by unknown environmental or 
 
should be liable only for accidents that were caused by going the extra mile per hour beyond 50 mph; the driver 
should not be liable for accidents that would have occurred had he been traveling at 50 mph or less. However, if the 
court is unable to tell whether or not an accident would have occurred had a person been driving more slowly (often 
a plausible assumption), the person driving 51 mph will be liable for any accident that his driving causes, and there 
thus would be a jump in his expected liability. 
 
101 Other meanings will not be reviewed here. On proximate causation, see, for example, Dobbs 2000, chapter 10, 
Hart and Honoré 1985, and Keeton 1963 on Anglo-American law, and Honoré 1983, sections 20, 80-90, and Zweigert and 
Kötz 1998, 601, 621, on the law in France and Germany. 
102See Calabresi 1975, Shavell 1980a, and Shavell 1987a, 110-15, 121-23; the latter references formalize the idea 
of coincidence as illustrated by the two cases mentioned in text.   
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genetic determinants?).  
   The law takes two approaches in such situations. The traditional approach is to hold a 
defendant liable if and only if the probability that the defendant was the cause of losses exceeds 
50 percent.
103 This approach may lead either to inadequate or to excessive incentives to reduce 
risk. Suppose that a firm sells to only 20 percent of the market. Then the likelihood of the firm 
being the cause of losses from a product-related injury will lie below the 50 percent threshold 
and it will escape liability for any harm caused by its product. Consequently, the firm will have 
no liability-related incentive to take precautions. If, however, a firm’s market share exceeds 50 
percent, the firm will be liable for all harms due to the product it sells -- and for all harms due to 
the products that others sell -- for it will always be more likely than not the cause of harm. Thus, 
the firm’s liability burden will be socially excessive. These potential problems of inadequate and 
of excessive incentives may arise under any liability criterion based on a threshold probability of 
causation; they are not unique to a 50 percent threshold.
104  
The second approach that the legal system has taken (though not often) is to hold 
defendants liable despite any uncertainty over causation but to impose damages only in 
proportion to the likelihood of causation.Thus, liability has been imposed according to the share 
that firms have in the market for a product.
105 Under the proportional liability principle, it is 
readily shown that incentives to reduce risk are proper. If, for example, a firm has 20 percent of 
the market, it will pay 20 percent of harm in every case, so that its liability bill will be the same 
as if it pays for all the harm in the 20 percent of cases it truly causes -- in which case we know 
that safety incentives will be socially  appropriate. That the proportional liability principle 
engenders optimal incentives (without a need to establish causation in particular cases) is an 
advantage of the principle relative to the traditional threshold probability criterion.
106   
 
103See, for example, Dobbs 2000, 420-22; on civil law countries, see Honoré 1983, sections 201-03.  
 
104Essentially this point has been frequently mentioned; see, for example, Tribe 1971, and Landes and Posner 
1983, and it is formally developed in Shavell 1985b.  
 
105This principle has been applied by some courts in cases involving the drug DES, which was made by many 
companies but the identity of the company that produced the drug that caused harm in particular instances often could not 
be determined. The proportional liability principle has so far not been widely used.  See, for example, Dobbs 2000, 430-
32.  
 
106See Rosenberg 1984 and Shavell 1985b, 1987a, 115-18, 123-26. It should be noted that if products about   
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Yet a disadvantage of the proportional approach is that it could lead to a substantial 
increase in the volume, complexity, and cost of litigation, for under the proportional approach 
any party for whom the probability of having caused a loss is positive can be sued and may have 
to pay damages. Hence, the proportional approach should be employed only if the incentive 
advantage of so doing is sufficiently strong.  
 
 
which there is uncertainty as to causation differ in the risks they create, this must be recognized in the application of 
proportional liability. For example, if two products each command half the market but the first creates twice the risk of the 
second, then the first product should bear two thirds of damages, not one-half.       
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  Chapter 5 
 
  Liability, Risk-bearing, and Insurance 
 
The accident problem involves not only the goal of appropriately reducing the risks of accidents, 
but also a second objective: allocating and spreading the risk of losses from accidents that do 
occur, so that those who are risk averse do not bear them, in whole or in part. Insurance -- both 
accident insurance for victims and liability insurance for injurers -- provides a method of 
allocating and spreading risks of loss.   
Liability insurance is of particular interest for two reasons. First, liability insurance 
changes the way in which the liability system functions to reduce accident risk, for to the degree 
that an injurer owns insurance coverage, he will not have to pay damages if found liable. The 
incentives to reduce risk thus have to do with the extent of insurance coverage and with other 
terms of liability insurance policies. Second, and related, the question arises whether, or in what 
sense, liability insurance is socially desirable if it might interfere with liability-related incentives 
to reduce risk, and thus whether liability insurance should be regulated. (As will be described 
below, serious doubts about the social wisdom of liability insurance have been raised, and its 
sale is subject to some restrictions today, although it is widely owned.) 
I will begin by reconsidering the accident problem in the light of risk-aversion.  
Specifically, I will discuss the socially ideal solution to the accident problem, what occurs in the 
absence of liability, what occurs in presence of liability when insurance is not available, and 
finally what occurs in the presence of both liability and insurance. This step-by-step method of 
analysis will give us an understanding of the separate value of both liability and insurance in 
reducing accident risks and in allocating accident risks.  
I will then address two important extensions to the foregoing analysis: nonpecuniary 
losses, and the judgment-proof problem. 
 
1. Risk Aversion and the Socially Ideal Solution to the Accident Problem 
1.1 Risk aversion.  In this book risk aversion should be understood as a term of art, 
describing an attitude of dislike of pure financial risk.  A risk-averse person would pay to avoid a 
risk, such as one involving a 50 per cent chance of losing $1,000 and a 50 per cent chance of 
winning $1,000.
107 A risk-averse person would also purchase insurance against risk if the 
insurance premium is actuarially fair.
108 A person will be risk averse if the marginal utility of 
 
   
107This risky situation involves an expected return of zero: 50% H $1,000 ! 50% H $1,000 = 0. But a risk averse 
person would also pay to avoid a risky situation with a positive expected return, such as one in which there is a 51 
per cent chance of winning $1,000 and a 49 per cent chance of losing that amount. At some probability of winning, 
however, even a risk-averse person would become just willing to participate in the risky situation. This probability 
reflects the individual’s degree of risk aversion (the higher the probability needed to induce him to participate, the 
higher the degree of risk aversion). 
   
108An insurance premium is said to be actuarially fair if it equals the expected cost of coverage to the insurer. For 
instance, if a policy pays coverage of  $1,000 with probability 10 per cent, the fair premium is $100, for the expected cost   
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money to him declines as his wealth increases; the reason is essentially that, for such a person, 
losing an amount of money will reduce his utility more than gaining the same amount of money 
will increase his utility. 
Risk-aversion is most relevant in situations in which losses would be large in relation to a 
person’s assets and thus would impinge substantially on his utility. Individuals are typically 
viewed as risk-averse actors in relation to serious accidents, as these would be likely to cause 
losses that are significant in relation to their assets. If, however, losses would be modest relative 
to a person’s assets, he would be likely to display a roughly risk-neutral attitude toward them.  
This would be the case of small accidents that individuals suffer. Also, firms might be usually be 
considered as risk neutral actors in relation to many accidents, for these would cause losses that 
are small in relation to their assets.
109 Moreover, firms are sometimes treated as risk-neutral if 
they are owned by well-diversified shareholders, for being well-diversified, the shareholders 
should not be concerned about the risk borne by a particular firm. However, to the degree that 
the managers of a firm are risk-averse and have the freedom to make decisions, the behavior of 
the firm may reflect risk-aversion. 
1.2 Socially ideal solution. Social welfare will be taken here to be a function of 
individuals’ expected utilities.
110 Therefore, social welfare will depend not only on the factors 
emphasized in previous chapters -- positively on the benefits parties obtain from their activities, 
and negatively on costs of care and on accident losses -- but social welfare will depend as well 
on whether risk-averse parties bear risk. It follows that, under the socially ideal solution to the 
accident problem, two things will be true: Not only will parties make decisions about engaging 
in activities and about their exercise of care in the way that was described as optimal in chapter 
2, but also, risk-averse parties will not bear risks, which is to say, their risks will be perfectly 
spread through insurance arrangements or will be shifted to risk-neutral parties. It is important to 
emphasize that the risk-averse parties who ideally ought not to bear risk may be victims or 
injurers. Injurers will bear risk if they face the risk of liability; thus, ideally, risk-averse injurers 
should not bear this liability risk.  
 
2. The Accident Problem in the Absence of Liability and Insurance 
Assume here that there is no liability system and also no insurance system. Then because injurers 
will not be liable for accident losses, they generally will not reduce risk appropriately. That is, 
they will tend to engage in risky activities to an excessive extent and will have no motive to take 
care. Still, injurers will bear no risk; this aspect of the outcome is socially desirable if injurers are 
risk-averse. 
 
of coverage is $100. 
   
109If a firm faces the risk that it would cause harms that are small for each victim but the harms would simultaneously 
affect many victims (as might be true if there is a defect in the design or manufacture of a product), then the risk for the 
firm could be substantial, so that it might be appropriate to regard the firm as risk-averse. 
   
110The expected utility of an individual is the sum over all possible outcomes of the probability of each outcome 
multiplied by its utility.   
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Because victims will not be able to obtain judgments from injurers in the absence of 
liability, they will be left bearing risk. This bearing of risk is socially undesirable if victims are 
risk-averse. Thus, the outcome is undesirable not only because risks are not reduced by injurers, 
but also because the risks that exist may be borne by uninsured risk-averse parties. 
 
3.  The Accident Problem Given Liability Alone 
Assume now that injurers are subject to liability, but that insurance is again unavailable; thus, 
injurers do not possess liability insurance coverage and victims do not hold accident coverage.  
In this situation, the outcome is, in essence, that injurers will be led to reduce risk due to the 
effect of liability, but the allocation of risk will depend on whether the form of liability is strict 
or the negligence rule. 
In particular, under strict liability injurers will have a motive to reduce risk and victims 
will, by definition, be compensated for any losses they sustain; it is injurers who will bear risk.  
If injurers are risk-neutral, their bearing of risk will not matter, and the outcome will be socially 
ideal.   
But if strictly liable injurers are risk averse, the outcome will not be socially ideal 
because injurers will bear risk. Moreover, they may be led to exercise excessive care to avoid 
liability (consider how cautiously risk-averse and uninsured individuals would drive if subject to 
strict liability). In addition, for these reasons injurers may be undesirably discouraged from 
engaging in an activity. One way of alleviating these problems of excessive care and too low a 
level of activity under strict liability is to reduce damages; indeed, it can be shown to be 
beneficial for damages to be less than harm for this reason. In other words, if injurers are risk 
averse, it is not socially desirable to “internalize” fully the harm they do.
111 
The situation is quite different under the negligence rule, because injurers will not bear 
risk provided that they take due care (and that the courts accurately assess their level of care), 
which they will decide to do. Hence there will be no particular problems respecting injurers 
when they are risk averse; they will not be led to take excessive care nor be undesirably 
discouraged from engaging in an activity. Victims, on the other hand, will bear their losses 
(presuming that injurers are not mistakenly found negligent). As a consequence, social welfare 
will be less than optimal if victims are risk averse and are not insured. 
The foregoing points thus introduce a new element into the comparison of strict liability 
and the negligence rule. Under strict liability, risk will be borne by injurers, whereas under the 
negligence rule risk will be borne largely by victims. In the absence of insurance, therefore, the 
relative appeal of strict liability will be enhanced when injurers are risk neutral or, more 
generally, when they are less risk averse than victims, and the relative appeal of the negligence 
rule will be enhanced when victims are less risk averse than injurers. 
 
 
   
111See Proposition 2 in Shavell 1982a.   
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4. The Accident Problem Given Liability and Insurance 
4.1 Insurance. Now let us assume that insurance is available and sells at actuarially fair 
rates. One form of insurance is, as mentioned, accident insurance for victims. If victims are risk-
averse, they will buy complete coverage against any risk that they bear. Thus, for example, if 
injurers take due care under the negligence rule, so that victims bear the risk of accidents, 
victims will fully insure against these risks if they are risk averse.  
The other form of insurance that we will consider is insurance for injurers against 
liability. If injurers are risk-averse, they will wish to purchase such liability insurance. However, 
the insurance purchase decision, and the nature of insurance policies, becomes somewhat 
complicated because ownership of insurance may itself change the incentives of injurers to 
prevent accidents, and thus the likelihood of liability. This will be discussed below.
112 
4.2 Strict liability. As stated in section 3, when liability is strict, victims will be 
implicitly insured by the legal system, and so will not bear risk, but injurers bear risk. Therefore, 
risk-averse injurers will wish to purchase liability insurance. In order to describe their insurance 
purchases, we will consider two standard cases about liability insurers: one in which the insurers 
can observe the level of care exercised by insureds and are able to link premiums to this factor, 
and another in which the insurers cannot observe the level of care and base premiums on it. In 
both cases, we will conclude that liability insurance is socially desirable. 
Liability insurers can observe care. Suppose first that insurers can observe the level of 
care and thus can lower the premium to reflect the risk reduction that care engenders. An insurer 
might, for instance, inspect an insured injurer’s building to see whether or not he purchased fire 
extinguishers to decrease the risk of liability for fires, and lower the premium if extinguishers 
were purchased. In such a setting, two points are true. First, insureds will purchase full coverage 
to protect themselves completely against risk. Second, insureds will be led by fair premium 
reductions to take optimal care. Suppose that an injurer purchases full coverage against a 
$1,000,000 liability for harm to others from fire and that extinguishers would lower fire risk 
from 5 per cent to 1 per cent, so would lower expected liability by $40,000. Then premiums for 
full coverage will be reduced by $40,000 if the extinguishers are purchased, implying that the 
insured will buy the extinguishers as long as their cost is less than $40,000, which is to say, the 
injurer’s decision to take care will be optimal. 
It should be noted from what has been said that the outcome will be socially optimal.  
Risk-averse injurers will be fully protected against risk and will be induced by premium 
reductions to take optimal care. And victims will be protected against risk by definition of strict 
liability. 
Because the outcome is socially optimal, liability insurance is socially desirable. To put 
the point differently, were liability insurance not present, or forbidden, injurers would be worse 
off because they would bear risk (and might take excessive care or engage too little in desirable 
activities), whereas victims would be just as well off. 
Liability insurers cannot observe care. Now suppose that insurers cannot observe the 
 
   
112See Shavell 1987a, chapters 8, 10, for a presentation of the elements of the theory of insurance that are relevant to this 
chapter.   
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level of care and therefore do not charge a premium that depends directly on the level of care an 
injurer exercises. We might imagine, for instance, that in the example of fire risk, the level of 
care corresponds to the caution with which flammables are handled, something that an insurer 
would have a more difficult time checking than the presence or absence of fire extinguishers. In 
a case like this, injurers will usually purchase only partial coverage and the level of care will 
tend to be less than optimal.   
To explain, observe first that because the assumption is that insurers cannot observe and 
thus cannot penalize injurers for not being careful with flammables, injurers will have no 
premium-related incentive to take extra precautions (like training workers in the handling of 
flammables). Consequently, if injurers have full coverage, the risk of a $1,000,000 fire liability 
would be 5 per cent, and premiums would thus have to be $50,000. If, however, coverage is 
partial, then injurers will have some incentive to take care because they will suffer some 
uncompensated losses if held liable. For example, suppose that they have $600,000 of coverage, 
exposing them to a $400,000 risk. Therefore, a precaution that lowers risk from 5 per cent to 1 
per cent would have value to them of at least 4% H $400,000 or $16,000. This factor in turn may 
lead injurers to prefer partial coverage. Suppose that the precaution costs $10,000. Then if 
coverage is $600,000, injurers will be led by their exposure to risk to take the precaution, for 
spending the $10,000 will save them $16,000 in expected losses that they will bear. And because 
the risk for injurers who buy partial coverage of $600,000 will thus be only 1 per cent, the 
premium they will be charged will be $6,000.
113 Injurers might well prefer 60 per cent coverage 
that costs them only $6,000 to full coverage that costs them so much more, $50,000. Such 
policies with less than complete coverage, however, do not expose injurers to enough risk to 
induce them always to take optimal precautions. 
The outcome in the situation under consideration is thus not socially ideal for two 
reasons: Injurers tend to be only partly protected against risk, and their level of care tends to be 
less than optimal.
114 However, victims are protected against risk by definition of strict liability. 
Nevertheless, liability insurance is socially desirable. (That the outcome is not socially 
ideal does not mean that liability insurance is undesirable.) One way of seeing that liability 
insurance is socially desirable is to notice that it obviously raises the well-being of injurers -- 
after all, they choose to purchase liability insurance -- and does not affect the well-being of 
victims -- they are fully compensated for accidents whenever they occur. Thus, the presence of 
liability insurance raises social welfare.
115 Conversely, were liability insurance prohibited, 
 
   
113To amplify, insurers will charge $6,000 because injurers who purchase coverage of $600,000 will suffer losses and 
make claims with only a 1 per cent probability.  Insurers do not need to observe in a direct way that the injurers are led to 
take care; the insurers need only note the statistical fact that injurers who buy the $600,000 partial coverage policy make 
claims with a 1 per cent probability. 
   
114In the example, care is discrete in nature: it is either taken or not. Therefore, it turns out that if care is optimal to take, 
either there exists a partial coverage policy that insureds prefer that induces care to be exercised, or else there does not, in 
which case a full coverage policy is purchased.  In other words, either coverage is partial and care is optimal, or coverage 
is full and care is zero. But in a model with care continuously variable, it is usually true that coverage is partial and that the 
level of care is less than optimal. 
   
115This argument is not really a proof, because it presumes that the level of damages equals harm. In fact, that the level of   
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injurers would be exposed to risk and made worse off (and perhaps would not engage in 
desirable activities and/or would take excessive care), whereas victims would not be helped. 
4.3 Negligence rule. Under this rule, we will argue that injurers will tend to take due care 
even though they can buy liability insurance, and that liability insurance will tend to be socially 
desirable. Because injurers tend to take due care, victims will bear the risk of losses and will 
purchase accident insurance if they are risk averse.   
Consider initially a perfectly functioning negligence system. In such a regime, the basic 
logic from chapter 2 about behavior under the negligence rule implies that injurers will be led to 
take due care, assuming that they are not insured. In our example, suppose that a $10,000 
precaution reduces the $1,000,000 fire risk from 5 per cent to 1 per cent, so that the precaution is 
required to avoid negligence. An injurer will take the precaution, because that will free him of 
the liability he would otherwise bear, a 5 per cent chance of a $1,000,000 liability. (More 
precisely, it is clear that the injurer will be led to take the precaution if he is risk neutral, and he 
will want to take it more strongly if he is risk averse, which is the assumption.)  
Although an injurer will wish to take due care if he is not insured, might he want to 
purchase liability coverage in order to act negligently? The answer is no -- because the insurance 
would cost him too much. If an injurer were to purchase an insurance policy that covered him for 
negligently caused harm, he would decide not to take the precaution, that is, to act negligently, 
and thus would cause harm of $1,000,000 with probability 5 per cent. Hence, the premium for 
the insurance policy would have to be $50,000. Clearly, when faced with the choice of paying 
$50,000 for the insurance policy in question, or instead spending $10,000 on the precaution so as 
not to be negligent, the injurer would do the latter. 
In the basic model of a perfectly functioning negligence rule, therefore, the outcome is 
socially ideal. Injurers are led to take due care, and, being non-negligent, do not bear risk. 
Victims purchase accident insurance if they are risk averse so they do not bear risk if they want 
to avoid it. Liability insurance is not undesirable, because it does not interfere with the deterrent 
of the negligence rule; indeed, liability insurance is essentially moot, as it is not purchased. 
Next consider briefly the realistic situation in which the negligence rule does not function 
perfectly and there is a risk of findings of negligence due to errors in the negligence 
determination or to inability of injurers to control perfectly their levels of care (see section 1 of 
chapter 4). In this case, the main difference to note is that injurers might be found negligent even 
if they try to take due care. Thus risk-averse injurers will decide to purchase liability insurance, 
and the type of policy risk-averse injurers will purchase will protect them primarily against being 
found negligent through some type of error or lapse. The policy will not protect injurers so 
broadly as to induce them definitely to act negligently because, as explained above, a policy that 
induced injurers definitely and intentionally to act negligently would not be purchased because 
the premium would be too high. Therefore, the liability insurance coverage tends not to 
compromise deterrence, and is socially desirable because it protects injurers against risk. 
Moreover, its ownership reduces the problem of excessive care caused by uncertainty in the 
negligence determination (see again section 1 of chapter 4). 
 
damages equal harm can also be shown to be optimal; see Shavell 1982a.   
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4.4 Summary. Three points about liability and insurance summarize the analysis to this 
point. First, because liability insurers pay for some or all of the losses for which injurers are 
found liable, the manner in which liability rules alter injurers’ behavior is to a significant degree 
indirect, being associated with the terms of their liability insurance policies (notably, the 
connection between premiums or the payment of claims and injurer behavior, and the level of 
coverage).
116 
Second, the availability of liability insurance is socially desirable. The particular 
arguments demonstrating this result depended on the form of liability and insurers’ information 
about insureds’ behavior. The arguments were, roughly, based on the following considerations.  
The availability of liability insurance increases the welfare of risk-averse injurers because it 
protects them from risk and ameliorates the problems that they would otherwise take excessive 
care or be discouraged from engaging in desirable activities. Moreover, the availability of 
liability insurance does not necessarily dilute injurers’ incentives to reduce risk, and where it 
does do that, the dilution of incentives will be moderate, for policies that would substantially 
increase risks would be so expensive that they would not be attractive for purchase.   
This conclusion about the social desirability of liability insurance is not to deny the 
possibility that liability insurance might be socially disadvantageous, and I will discuss below 
circumstances in which it should be regulated (see section 7). But the conclusion does mean that 
thinking about the social desirability of liability insurance should proceed from the 
understanding that, as in the basic model of liability studied here, the insurance is socially 
desirable. 
Third, the availability of accident and liability insurance limits the importance of the 
allocation of risk as a factor to be considered in evaluating liability rules. For example, the fact 
that in some areas of accidents the typical injurers might be large, essentially risk-neutral firms 
and the victims risk-averse individuals will not constitute an argument in favor of imposing 
liability to the extent that the individuals are insured against their losses. 
4.5 Liability and insurance in reality. The importance of insurance to the liability 
system is very great, so that the theory of this section, rather than that of section 3, is the most 
relevant for understanding the liability system. In particular, accident insurance is widely held.
117 
Liability insurance is also owned by many individuals, and an indication of its salience is that 
over 90 per cent of all payments made to tort victims are paid by liability insurers.
118 Although 
 
     
116Other possible terms of coverage, though not discussed above, are the link between loss history and premiums or the 
future right to insure. 
   
117Notably, approximately 86 per cent of the population possesses health insurance benefits; see U.S. Census 
Burean 2001, 2. Also, approximately 85 per cent of husband-wife families with children possess life insurance on at 
least one family member; see ACLI Fact Book 1999, 1. Additionally, in 2000 about 88 per cent of the adult 
population was covered by the Social Security system; see Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2001, 13, 345. 
Moreover, over half the workforce possesses some form of private disability coverage; see U.S Department of Labor 
2001, 1. 
   
118See, for example, O’Connell et al. 1994, App. A, from which it is evident that total liability payments made in 
1990 were $65.199 billion, of which $60.981 billion were made by liability insurers; thus about 93.5 per cent of tort 
liability payments were made by liability insurers. See also Tillinghast-Towers Perrin 2002, App. 4, which reports   
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commentators occasionally raise the issue that liability insurance might undermine deterrence, 
and there are some restrictions on its sale (see section 7 below), it is generally legal. Historically, 
however, the sale of liability insurance was resisted, and in some countries it was not permitted 
until the early twentieth century.
119 Perhaps the most notable instance of antagonism against 
liability insurance was the complete ban on its use in the former Soviet Union.
120    
Note on the literature. The functioning of the liability system together with insurance is 
first formally studied in Shavell (1982a, 1987a), where the social desirability of liability 
insurance is proved; this chapter largely follows my treatment there. However, an early and 
insightful informal examination of the subject is contained in Calabresi (1970). 
 
5. The Purpose of Liability   
5.1 Compensation of victims is the traditional conception of the purpose of accident 
liability. The great majority of legal scholars, lawyers and judges, and, probably, citizens appear 
to assume that providing victims with fair compensation for harm is the primary purpose of 
accident liability.  A representative statement is that of Prosser: “There remains a body of law 
which is directed toward the compensation of individuals. . . . This is the purpose of the law of 
torts.”
121  That the object of accident law should be so viewed is not surprising, for the goal of 
the plaintiff in an action is generally to be compensated and that of the defendant is to avoid 
paying the plaintiff; the two do not usually consider deterrence to be nearly as important, if it is 
an issue. Moreover, the classical and intuitively appealing notion of corrective justice, that a 
wrongdoer should compensate his victim, comports with the view of compensation as the 
purpose of liability (at least under the negligence rule). This is not to say that deterrence is never 
seen as an additional purpose of accident law; one sometimes reads statements by commentators 
and judges to that effect. However, rarely does one encounter the belief that the main purpose of 
accident law is deterrence and not compensation. 
5.2 Reduction of risk through deterrence of harm is the true purpose of liability 
today, but compensation and avoidance of strife were also important historically. In 
contrast to the traditional view, and as the discussion of this chapter should make clear, 
compensation cannot be said to be a primary purpose of accident liability if, as is the case, 
accident insurance is largely available to victims (and could be provided to them through social 
insurance if need be).  In other words, in the absence of the liability system, compensation of 
 
that about 98 per cent of personal tort costs were paid by liability insurers in the period 1973-2000. 
   
119As Tunc writes in his survey of tort law worldwide, “At the beginning of the nineteenth century, liability 
insurance would have been unthinkable.  It would have been considered as immoral.” He goes on to mention, among 
others, French and Scandinavian resistance to the sale of liability insurance. Tunc 1983, 50-51. 
   
120On the Soviet ban on coverage, see generally Rudden 1966; see also Tunc 1983, 51-52. 
  
121Keeton, Dobbs et al. 1984, 5. See also, for example, Fleming 1998, chapter 1.  Fleming is quite direct in stating that 
deterrence is not a primary purpose of accident law; he says at p. 10 that “in the core area of tort accidents . . . It is being 
increasingly realized that human failures in a machine age exact a large and fairly regular toll . . . which is not significantly 
reducible. . . through the operation of tort law.”     
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victims would probably be about as well accomplished through private and social accident 
insurance as it is today. The main difference that the liability system can make to outcomes is the 
creation of incentives toward safety. (Further, as explained in section 4, we know that the 
liability system can generate these incentives despite the existence of liability insurance.) Hence, 
if the liability system has a real purpose today, it must lie in the creation of incentives to reduce 
risk.
122 
It is worth noting, however, that the function of accident liability was different in the 
past. Before the development of insurance markets in the latter part of the nineteenth century, 
liability furnished victims a source of compensation that would not otherwise ordinarily have 
been forthcoming. Tort liability law thus served to an important degree the dual purposes of 
compensation and deterrence. Moreover, in early times before criminal law and tort law had 
emerged as separate branches of law, a significant additional purpose of the making of money 
payments for harm was the maintenance of social order. Without the system of money payments, 
private vengeance would often have followed the doing of harm.
123   
5.3 Is use of the liability system justified? It has been explained that the main route 
through which the liability system benefits society is by reducing accident risks, so that this, if 
anything, should be the warrant for use of the liability system. However, the deterrent benefit of 
the liability system is not necessarily sufficient to outweigh the costs of the system and thereby 
to justify its use. As I will discuss in the next chapter, the costs of the liability system are great. 
Moreover, safety regulation is available as an alternative means of reducing risk. Therefore, the 
question of the net social desirability of the liability system is a serious one. 
 
6. Extension: Nonpecuniary Losses 
6.1 Nonpecuniary losses and insurance. Let us consider the relationship between 
nonpecuniary losses and accident insurance before re-examining the functioning of the liability 
system.
124 To understand insurance for nonpecuniary losses, observe that suffering a 
nonpecuniary loss often will not alter an individual’s need for money or, more exactly, the utility 
he would derive from receiving additional money. If, for example, an irreplaceable family 
portrait with great sentimental value is destroyed, there is no obvious reason to believe that the 
owner’s need for money will increase, however much he regrets the loss; the utility he would 
obtain from having more money to spend would be whatever it was beforehand. Similarly, if a 
 
   
122To avoid confusion, let me note that  I am assuming that the “purpose” of the liability system means the difference to 
outcomes that the liability system actually makes. This definition of the purpose of the liability system -- as opposed to 
what people say its purpose is -- is both both natural and a guide to policy, for policy must be based on the true effects of 
the liability system on outcomes, not the supposed effects. 
   
123On the point that the making of money payments for harm prevented feuds, when there was no criminal law, see, for 
example, Berman 1983, 55, and Pollock and Maitland 1911, 2: chapter 8, section 1. When a criminal system exists, this 
system exacts punishment for many types of act (like murder and rape) that would give rise to feuds, so that accident law 
is not as much needed to avert feuds. 
   
124Arrow 1974, Cook and Graham 1977, and Zeckhauser 1973 first developed the theory of insurance for nonpecuniary 
losses. For relevant empirical evidence, see Viscusi and Evans 1990.    
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person loses a small toe in an accident, then aside from requiring some money for medical 
treatment, he might well place the same value on having additional money as he had prior to 
losing his toe. 
In some cases, though, events with adverse nonpecuniary consequences will result in a 
person attaching a higher value to money. An individual who is crippled by an accident may 
value money more, even after being compensated for medical expenses and forgone income, 
because of a need to obtain household help, special transportation services, and the like. 
It is also possible that suffering a nonpecuniary loss will lower the utility of money to an 
individual. The individual who is crippled by an accident could turn out to value money less 
because venturing forth to spend is less pleasurable and more difficult. Perhaps the most 
important example of a nonpecuniary loss that results in a lower value of money involves death. 
The value of money in that contingency is, in effect, the value to a person of knowing that his 
survivors will receive a bequest, and this will often be less than the value to the person of having 
money while he is alive. 
The amount of insurance coverage against nonpecuniary losses that an individual will in 
principle wish to purchase will depend on whether such losses will affect the utility he would 
derive from receiving additional money. The reason is that the purchase of insurance is in 
essence the giving up of money today for the receipt of money in a contingency, and this will 
make sense only if money is more valuable in that contingency.   
Now if nonpecuniary losses will not result in a change in a person’s valuation of money, 
then the best insurance policy for him, the policy under which his expected utility would be 
maximized, will not cover him for the nonpecuniary element of his losses. His coverage will be 
restricted to pecuniary losses, if any. Thus, a person might not insure against the loss of his 
family portrait and might limit coverage against loss of a toe to medical expenses. Notice that 
this implies that, under the optimal insurance policy, the coverage a person will receive will not 
make him whole in utility terms (even though this may be possible). In other words, the notion 
that optimal insurance for a loss will restore his utility to its level before the loss is incorrect. 
If, however, nonpecuniary losses will raise the value of money to a person, then under the 
optimal insurance policy coverage will exceed his pecuniary loss. Thus a person might purchase 
greater coverage against the possibility of being crippled than an amount equal only to the costs 
of medical treatment and forgone earnings. It is unlikely, however, that he will purchase 
coverage sufficient to make him whole (if this is possible). 
If the value a person will place on money will decrease as a result of a nonpecuniary loss, 
expected utility maximizing insurance coverage will be less than his pecuniary losses. A person 
who has little desire to leave a bequest will rationally purchase little or no life insurance, despite 
the possibility that the earnings forgone by his death will be large. 
6.2 Actual insurance coverage against nonpecuniary losses. It seems that actual 
insurance coverage is intended mainly to remedy pecuniary needs created by losses, not to 
compensate for the disutility due to losses, suggesting that nonpecuniary losses tend not to raise 
the value of money to individuals or are small. In particular, insurance coverage against loss of 
property does not ordinarily seem to reflect its sentimental value, only its market value or 
replacement cost. Coverage against personal injury usually approximates only direct medical   
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expenses and forgone earnings. Insurance against death is ordinarily bounded by lost earnings; if 
a person (such as an unmarried or elderly individual) has no dependents, he normally possesses 
little or no insurance coverage; parents do not often carry significant coverage on the lives of 
their children.  
6.3 Nonpecuniary losses and the socially ideal solution to the accident problem. As 
just emphasized, the amount of insurance an individual would wish to purchase against 
nonpecuniary losses -- and therefore the amount of money he will receive under the socially 
ideal solution to the accident problem -- will be based on the value he will place on money if he 
suffers nonpecuniary losses; the amount he will receive will not generally make him whole. By 
contrast, and as was noted in section 8 of chapter 4, the socially optimal level of care taken by 
injurers (and their level of activity) will fully reflect the nonpecuniary elements of accident 
losses as well as the pecuniary. Thus, for instance, it will be best that injurers take substantial 
care to reduce the risk of accidentally killing children even though their deaths may not impose 
an economic burden on their parents and consequently, in the ideal, may not call for the parents 
to receive significant amounts in compensation. It might be, say, that for injurers to be led to take 
appropriate care, they should pay $2,000,000 for the death of a child, but that the parents’ 
optimal insurance coverage is only $10,000 for funeral expenses. 
6.4 Socially ideal solution cannot be achieved under the liability system. Because 
injurers must exercise a degree of care reflecting both nonpecuniary and pecuniary components 
of victims’ losses under the ideal solution to the accident problem, the magnitude of payments 
that injurers make under liability rules has to reflect both these components of losses for injurers 
to be led to take optimal care. But if injurers’ damage payments are this high, then the amount 
victims receive will exceed optimal compensation, which may well usually approximate only 
pecuniary losses. If parents receive $2,000,000 for the wrongful death of a child, this will exceed 
the $10,000 optimal compensatory amount. Yet if injurers’ damage payments equal only the 
$10,000 optimal compensatory amount, injurers’ incentives to take care will be inadequate. Thus 
the socially ideal outcome cannot be achieved under the liability system.
125 The damage 
payments will inevitably result in a compromise between awarding victims correctly and 
creating appropriate incentives for injurers to reduce risk.
126 
6.5 The case for fines as a supplement to liability. An improvement over the situation 
with the liability system may be achieved by a regime in which liability is supplemented by fines 
collected by the state.
127 With the use of fines, the total amount that injurers are made to pay can 
 
     
125This statement is correct under strict liability, but under the negligence rule there is a qualification to it. Under a 
perfectly functioning negligence rule, the socially ideal outcome can be achieved, because under that rule injurers will 
always take due care and never be found negligent if damages are sufficiently high (include nonpecuniary losses). Hence, 
victims will bear their losses and can and will optimally insure for amounts less than what injurers would have to pay were 
they liable. But if, as is realistic, findings of negligence occur, the optimal outcome cannot be achieved because victims 
will in fact sometimes receive awards. 
   
126This section is, of course, premised on the assumption that victims of harm are not buyers of a product sold by 
injurers. If victims are buyers, then an ideal outcome can clearly be achieved, as long as liability does not exceed the 
optimal compensatory amount. On the latter issue, see, for example, Rubin 1993. 
 
   
127Spence 1977 first demonstrated the desirability of employing fines in addition to liability as a result of nonpecuniary   
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be raised to the point that their incentives to reduce risk are appropriate, while at the same time 
liability can be held to the lower level equal to optimal compensatory awards. Thus, in the 
example, under the contemplated regime injurers would pay fines of $1,990,000 reflecting 
nonpecuniary losses, whereas victims would receive in liability awards payments of $10,000 
reflecting only their otherwise uncompensated pecuniary losses. 
One way to understand why individuals may find a regime with supplemental fines 
advantageous is to recognize that their taxes can be lowered under it, because the state may use 
fine revenues to replace tax revenues. Specifically, individuals will find a regime with fines  
advantageous if they would prefer a savings in taxes to collecting higher liability judgments, or, 
equivalently, if they would not be willing to pay the insurance premium necessary to purchase 
coverage in the amount of the fine. Parents should thus find advantageous a regime with fines for 
the wrongful death of their children and with correspondingly lower taxes if the parents do not 
choose to insure their children’s lives.
128 
Several comments should be added about supplemental fines. First, it would ordinarily be 
best for these fines to be insurable. The general argument made in section 4 that it is desirable to 
allow risk-averse injurers to purchase coverage against liability can be employed to demonstrate 
this result.
129 
Second, to calculate the magnitude of supplemental fines for nonpecuniary losses, one 
can employ extrapolations from the amount individuals would be willing to pay for a small 
reduction in the probability of suffering nonpecuniary losses. Suppose, for instance, that an 
individual would be willing to pay $1,000 for a 1 percent reduction in the likelihood of losing his 
arm. Then the optimal fine for causing the loss of his arm would be approximately $100,000. 
Information about persons’ willingness to pay for reductions in risk could in theory be obtained 
by survey or, in some cases, perhaps, by attributing wage differences to differences in risks of 
accidents.
130 
Third, the argument favoring supplemental fines applies more broadly than here, to any 
situation in which the amount that injurers should pay to be properly deterred exceeds the 
 
losses. 
   
128To amplify, suppose that the likelihood of death of a child is .1 per cent. Suppose too that a parent would not want to 
buy an insurance policy for $2,000,000 if a child died but rather would limit coverage to $10,000. Hence, the supposition 
is that the parent is worse off with coverage of $2,000,000 and a premium of $2,000 (that is, .1% H  $2,000,000) than with 
$10,000 coverage and a premium of $10 (that is, .1% H $10,000). In other words, increasing coverage from $10,000 to 
$2,000,000 is not worth the $1,990 increase in premiums that would be required. But this statement implies that the parent 
is better off under a liability system that gives the parent $10,000 in damages and imposes a fine of $1,990,000 than under 
a liability system that gives the parent $2,000,000 in damages; for under the fine system, the state’s expected revenues 
increase by $1,990, lowering the parent’s taxes by that amount. 
     
129It should be mentioned, however, that if fines are not employed, then in principle it could be advantageous to set 
liability at a level approximating optimal compensation and to limit purchase of liability insurance, so as to induce injurers 
to take more care. 
     
130On the latter, see Moore and Viscusi 1990 and Viscusi 1983. See also Danzon 1984, which discusses how such data 
can be used to calculate supplemental fines.   
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optimal compensatory amount for victims. Notably, it was emphasized that when liable injurers 
will not always be identified as responsible for harm done, the amount they pay if they are 
identified and sued must be raised so that their incentives to reduce risk will be maintained at the 
correct level.  When, for instance, the likelihood is 50 percent that a liable injurer will be 
successfully sued, the amount he pays if sued must be on the order of twice the victim’s losses. 
Optimal payments by injurers may therefore exceed optimal compensatory awards by a 
substantial factor, so fines would be desirable. Another reason why optimal payments by injurers 
may be greater than optimal awards concerns taxes that would have been paid on income forgone 
by accident victims. For injurers’ incentives to reduce risk to be proper, they must pay an amount 
based on before-tax income forgone by victims.Yet the amount of money that victims will in fact 
lose, and thus the amount that will constitute the optimal compensatory award, is after-tax 
forgone income.  An additional reason why optimal payments by injurers may exceed optimal 
compensatory awards is that victims may receive insurance benefits or gifts. In this case, optimal 
compensatory awards will equal only the shortfall between victims’ receipts and their losses, but 
injurers must pay victims’ entire losses to be adequately deterred. 
 
7.  Extension: The Judgment-Proof Problem 
7.1 The judgment-proof problem and insurance. The possibility that injurers do not 
have sufficient assets to pay for harm has implications both for the purchase of accident 
insurance by victims and for the purchase of liability insurance by injurers. 
First, the incentive of victims to purchase accident coverage is increased due to the 
judgment-proof problem, for it means that there is now a risk that a victim who ought to be able 
to collect from a liable injurer is unable to do so.   
 Second, the motive of injurers to purchase liability insurance is diminished because of 
the possibility that they would be judgment-proof.
131 The reason is that insuring against liability 
that one would not otherwise fully bear, because one’s assets would be exhausted, is in a sense a 
waste for a party. An injurer with assets of $20,000 who faces a 10 per cent risk of liability of 
$100,000 would have to spend $10,000 on premiums for full coverage, 80 per cent of which 
would be attributable to coverage of the $80,000 that he could not pay in the absence of liability 
insurance coverage. Consequently, the individual might well decide against buying full liability 
insurance coverage even though he is risk averse. In general, a risk-averse party might rationally 
decide to purchase less than complete coverage, or no coverage at all; his purchase decision will 
depend on what his assets are in relation to the potential liabilities, their likelihood, and his 
degree of risk aversion. 
7.2 Problems with the functioning of the liability and insurance system. It was 
emphasized before, in section 3 of chapter 4, that the judgment-proof problem dilutes injurers’ 
incentives to reduce risk because they do not have the capacity to pay for the harm they might 
cause. The fundamental nature of this problem is not altered in the present context, but there are 
 
   
131Calabresi 1970, 58, observed that the motive to purchase insurance will be diminished when parties’ assets are less 
than the losses for which they may be held responsible; Keeton and Kwerel 1984 and Huberman, Mayers, and Smith 1983 
first investigated the point formally.     
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two differences in its character worth noting. First, to the extent that injurers are risk-averse and 
do not own liability insurance coverage -- a real possibility in view of their reduced incentives to 
purchase such coverage as just discussed -- the problem of insurance-related dulling of 
incentives to lower risk will be less severe than before; moreover, a risk-averse injurer will tend 
to take more care to prevent liability than a risk-neutral injurer. Second, to the extent that 
injurers own liability insurance, the problem of the dulling of their incentives to reduce risk 
might be exacerbated. This could be so if liability insurers cannot observe injurers’ levels of care 
and link premiums to those levels. However, if liability insurers can observe levels of care, the 
conclusion would be different. 
The judgment-proof possibility not only lowers incentives to reduce risk, it also creates 
problems in respect to the bearing of risk. In particular, because injurers have a diminished 
motive to purchase liability insurance coverage, and may buy none at all, they are left bearing 
risk, which lowers social welfare. However, victims should not bear risk as a result of the 
judgment-proof problem because they will rationally purchase accident insurance coverage 
against not being compensated by liable injurers. 
7.3 Regulation of liability insurance. The problems that the judgmentBproof issue 
creates leads to the possibility that it would be desirable to regulate liability insurance, and in 
either of two contrasting ways -- to forbid its purchase, or to require its purchase.
132 We will 
discuss the circumstances in which each type of regulation may be socially advantageous. It 
should be noted that the desirability of intervention in the purchase of liability insurance is 
different from the situation in the absence of the judgment-proof problem. As I emphasized in 
section 4, in the benchmark case without the judgment-proof problem, regulation of liability 
insurance coverage is not desirable.  
Requirement to purchase coverage. Consider first a requirement to purchase complete 
liability insurance coverage. How will such a requirement affect incentives to reduce risk?  If 
insurers can observe levels of care, a requirement to purchase coverage will lead to optimal 
incentives to reduce risk because premium reductions will reflect the full effect of care on 
expected harm. Suppose that an injurer with assets of only $100,000 who faces a $1,000,000 
potential liability is required to buy complete liability insurance coverage and can reduce the risk 
of liability by 1 per cent by spending $5,000. He would receive a premium reduction of $10,000 
for taking the step, so would be properly led to do so, but he might well not do so if he did not 
own coverage and had only $100,000 at risk, for then the expected value of the reduction would 
be only $1,000 to him. 
         However, if liability insurers cannot observe levels of care, a requirement to purchase 
complete coverage will tend to reduce incentives to take care. If the injurer with assets of 
$100,000 is required to purchase full coverage against the $1,000,000 risk, and insurers cannot 
observe his level of care, he will have no incentive at all to take care. Yet if he had not purchased 
coverage (or his coverage was less than $100,000), he would have a positive incentive to take 
 
   
132The implications of the judgment-proof problem (and of escape from liability, see section 7.4 below) for the regulation 
of liability insurance were first addressed from an economic perspective in Shavell 1986, 1987a. See also Jost 1996, 
Polborn 1998, Shavell 2000, and Skogh 2000.   
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care, even though generally a suboptimal level of care. Thus, when insurers cannot observe 
levels of care, a requirement to purchase coverage tends to exacerbate the inadequacy of 
incentives due to the judgment-proof problem. 
In any case, a requirement to purchase coverage has the beneficial aspect that it improves 
the activity level decision, because it confronts the injurer with the full social cost of his 
activity.
133 Otherwise, the activity level of injurers tends to be excessive, due to the judgment-
proof problem. 
A requirement to purchase coverage also has the advantage that it results in injurers being 
protected against risk. It should not, however, be considered to have the advantage that it 
protects victims against risk, because our assumption is that victims can purchase accident 
insurance coverage against risk. 
The conclusion is that a requirement to purchase full liability insurance coverage is 
desirable if liability insurers can observe injurers’ levels of care, for in that case the requirement 
results in optimal levels of care, and has other benefits as well, concerning activity levels and 
risk-bearing. But the requirement may not be desirable when insurers cannot observe levels of 
care, for in that case there will be a perverse effect on incentives to reduce risk. 
Prohibition against coverage. Now let us examine the opposite policy, of prohibiting the 
purchase of liability insurance. This may increase the level of care that injurers would take if 
injurers would otherwise have purchased some liability coverage. For if their entire assets are 
exposed to risk, injurers may well take more care than otherwise. The resulting level of care 
might be an improvement, but it might also be excessive.   
A prohibition against coverage will also tend to reduce activity levels from their too high 
levels in the absence of regulation. As with the level of care, the reduction in activity levels 
might be an improvement, but it might also be excessive. 
Also, a prohibition against coverage has the disadvantage that it subjects injurers to 
greater risk than they would bear if they would have purchased any liability insurance coverage. 
On balance, therefore, a prohibition against coverage might be beneficial (and superior to 
requiring coverage), but only if liability insurers are unable to observe levels of care.  In that 
case, prohibiting coverage may increase levels of care and reduce activity levels. The potential 
social benefits of doing this might outweigh the disadvantages. 
7.4 Comment on escape from liability and regulation of liability insurance. The  
arguments just discussed concerning regulation of liability insurance apply in part when injurers 
are not judgment-proof but nevertheless have inadequate incentives to take care because they 
escape liability with a probability (see the discussion in section 9 of chapter 4). If this is the case, 
then regulation of coverage may help to increase an otherwise too low effort to reduce risk.  In 
particular, prohibiting coverage may do that and thus might be beneficial. (Requiring full 
coverage would in principle be a moot form of regulation, because parties would not rationally 
under-insure due to the chance of escaping liability; they would only do that due to the 
judgment-proof problem.) 
 
   
133This is clearly the case under strict liability. Under the negligence rule, there is a beneficial activity level effect to the 
degree that injurers might be found negligent, as noted in section 2 of chapter 4.     
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7.5 Regulation of liability insurance in reality. Although, as stated in section 4.5, the 
sale of liability insurance is generally permitted, there are exceptions. Liability insurance is not 
allowed to be sold in some jurisdictions against punitive damages, against liability arising from 
certain willful acts, and against many criminal penalties.
134 The justification given is that this 
would tend to interfere with the public policy of deterring and punishing very undesirable 
behavior.
135 This justification comports with some of the points made in sections 7.3 and 7.4, in 
view of the possibility that deterrence may be inadequate because of the judgment-proof problem 
and the likelihood of escaping detection.
136 Liability insurance is also required in certain 
domains, notably for drivers of cars.
137 However, the chief justification given for such 
requirements is that they furnish implicit coverage to victims.
138 That seems a mistaken 
justification, as the rationale ought to be, as argued here, that the requirement would improve 
incentives to reduce risk, moderate activity levels, and provide insurance for injurers. 
 
134See, for example, Jerry 1996, 471-77, Keeton 1971, 285-305, McNeely 1941, and Keeton, Dobbs, et al. 1984, 
586. 
 
135 See, for example, Keeton, Dobbs, et al. 1984, 586, and Jerry 1996, 400, 472.  
 
136This statement is speculative, in part because in some contexts it is not evident on a priori grounds why 
mandated liability coverage would not be a good way of increasing adherence to the law. 
137 See, for example, Keeton, Dobbs, et al. 1984, 601-03, and Jerry 1996, 859-63.  
 
138 See, for example, Keeton, Dobbs, et al. 1984, 600-03, and Jerry 1996, 860.    
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  Chapter 6 
 
  Liability and Administrative Costs 
 
In this chapter, I consider a third element, that of administrative costs, in evaluating the liability 
system. Administrative costs are the legal and other expenses borne by parties in resolving 
disputes that arise when harm occurs. I will first discuss the general nature and magnitude of 
administrative costs; as will be seen, they are of substantial importance. Then I will discuss the 
socially desirable use of the liability system given its administrative costs. Last, I will compare 
the private incentive to make use of the liability system to its socially desirable use. 
 
1.  Nature and Importance of Administrative Costs 
1.1 Administrative costs described. As stated, administrative costs comprise the legal 
and other expenses that parties bear when accidents occur. These nonlegal expenses include the 
often significant time and effort of the involved parties as well as emotional costs and disutility.  
(There may also be utility enjoyed from the litigation process, especially by plaintiffs, and this 
must be set off against the costs of litigation.) 
It is important to recognize that administrative costs are incurred not only with cases that 
go to trial, but also with cases that settle. Cases that settle involve substantial administrative 
costs because settlement may involve considerable time and negotiation, as well as the use of the 
legal system in motions and other actions that precede trial. Indeed, because more than 95 per 
cent of cases settle,
139 accounting for settled cases is of major significance, and it would be a 
mistake to attribute administrative costs mainly to the costs of trials. 
What is the magnitude of administrative costs? Existing data suggest that in the United 
States the administrative costs of the liability system are large. Many studies find that 
administrative costs, averaged over settled and litigated claims, approach or exceed the amounts 
received by victims.
140 That is, for every dollar received by a victim, a dollar or more is spent 
 
     
139Recent data on state courts show that in fiscal year 1992, over 96 percent of civil cases were settled or otherwise 
disposed without trial; see Ostrom, Kauder, and LaFountain 2001a, 29. Similarly, statistics on civil cases in U.S. district 
courts during the 2001 fiscal year show that almost 98 percent of cases were resolved without trial; see U. S. Department 
of Justice 2001a, 154. Cane 1999, 213, cites various studies suggesting that perhaps 99 percent of claims are settled 
without trial in the United Kingdom.  
      
140A recent study, Tillinghast-Towers Perrin 2002, 12, reports that 42 per cent as victims’ share of payments made by 
defendant parties in a nationwide survey of the tort system; in an earlier version of the study, Tillinghast-Towers Perrin 
1995, 8, the figure was 46 per cent. Other studies include: Danzon 1985, 187, who reports 60 per cent as victims’ share of 
medical malpractice liability insurance payments; Huber 1988, 151, who reports 40 per cent as victims’ share of medical 
malpractice liability insurance payments, 50 per cent as victims’ share of products liability insurance payments, and 50 per 
cent as their share of motor vehicle accident liability insurance payments; Kakalik et al. 1983, who estimate 37 per cent as 
victims’ share of asbestos liability payments; Kakalik and Pace 1986, vii, who suggest from 45 per cent to 47 per cent as 
victims’ share of tort payments; Keeton et al. 1983, 891, who review studies implying 44 per cent as victims’ share of   
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delivering the dollar to him.  It is not clear, however, to what extent these administrative costs 
should be viewed as intrinsic to the liability system or as a feature of the particular system that 
has developed.
141 
1.2 Margin over administrative costs of insurance. For some important purposes, it is 
not the total administrative costs of the liability system, but only their margin over the 
administrative costs of the accident insurance system that matters. If the liability system did not 
exist in some area of accident, those who would have received compensation under the liability 
system would often receive compensation through accident insurance. Therefore, the liability 
system increases administrative costs by the difference between its administrative costs and 
those of the insurance system.   
The administrative costs associated with provision of accident insurance are much lower 
than those of the liability system, sometimes less than 10 percent of what victims receive.
142 The 
administrative costs of accident insurance are small by comparison because accident insurers 
have much less need than courts to inquire into the cause of losses or about injurers’ behavior, 
because accident insurers have adopted comparatively simple procedures for verifying the 
magnitude of insureds’ claims, and because accident insurers are not in an adversarial 
relationship with insureds.
143 
Because the accident insurance system is relatively inexpensive, the additional 
administrative costs of the liability system are quite high. Moreover, for victims who would not 
purchase accident insurance in the absence of liability (victims of low-magnitude harms, and 
large corporations), it is the total administrative cost of the liability system that should be 
considered to be its social cost, not its margin over insurance costs. 
1.3 Strict liability versus negligence and administrative costs. The evaluation of strict 
liability and negligence rules depends on administrative costs as well as on incentives and risk-
allocation. As will be seen, however, it is not clear on a priori grounds whether administrative 
costs will be higher under one rule than under the other, because of two conflicting 
considerations. 
 
autombile accidents liability insurance payments. For the United Kingdom, Cane 1999, 397, reports 15 per cent as victims’ 
share of tort compensation paid.  
 
     
141I can readily imagine much less complex systems (for example, employing tabular schedules to decide damages).  
Also, the costs of the liability systems in other countries, such as France and Germany, may be significantly lower than in 
the United States. 
     
142For example, the cost of administering the federal Old Age and Survivors Insurance Program is one half per cent of 
total expenditures and that of the Disability Insurance Program is 3 percent; see Social Security Bulletin: Annual Statistical 
Supplement, 2000, 18. The sales and administrative costs of commercial lines of all property and casualty coverage is 
about 25 per cent; see Fact Book 2001, 24; but most of this is probably sales costs, not administrative.  For instance, for 
automobile coverage, administrative costs are 5 per cent and sales costs are 17 per cent; see Fact Book 2001, 50. And for 
homeowners policies, administrative costs are 6 per cent and sales costs are 22 per cent; see Fact Book 2001, 76.    
     
143While there may, of course, be disagreement between insureds and insurers, it is unlikely to be as serious as that 
between victims and injurers. In part this is because insurers have an interest in honoring their policies: Private insurers 
will want to maintain their reputations; social insurers are presumably strongly motivated to serve insureds in any event.   
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First, the total number of claims is likely to be larger under strict liability than under the 
negligence rule, suggesting that administrative costs tend to be higher under strict liability.  
Under strict liability, a victim will have an incentive to make a claim whenever his losses exceed 
the costs of making a claim (assuming that he can credibly establish that the injurer was the 
cause of harm and that he himself was not contributorily negligent). Under the negligence rule, a 
victim will not have an incentive to make a claim so often because he will also be concerned 
about establishing the injurer’s negligence. If a victim and an injurer both believe that a court 
will find the injurer free of fault, the victim will be unlikely to make a claim under the 
negligence rule. 
But second, the average administrative cost per claim should be higher under the 
negligence rule. Under the negligence rule, it is more probable that a claim will be litigated than 
under strict liability, for under the negligence rule there is an additional element of dispute -- that 
of the injurer’s negligence -- and hence more room for disagreement leading to trial. Because the 
probability of trial should be greater under the negligence rule and because trials will usually be 
more costly than settlements, we have one reason for saying that average administrative costs per 
claim are likely to be larger under the negligence rule. A second reason is that the costs of trial 
itself are likely to be higher under the negligence rule than under strict liability because the issue 
of negligence must be adjudicated under the former rule. 
In sum, then, the comparison of the size of administrative costs under the two forms of 
liability is ambiguous as a theoretical matter. One would predict that a greater number of claims 
will be made under strict liability, but one would expect the average cost of resolving claims to 
be higher under the negligence rule because of both a higher propensity to go to trial and a 
higher cost per trial. 
 
2. Socially Desirable Use of the Liability System Given Administrative Costs 
2.1 The question whether the liability system is socially worthwhile.
144 Because of the 
administrative costs of the liability system, its use will be socially desirable if and only if its 
social benefits are sufficiently high. In particular, these social benefits concern the reduction in 
accidents (net of the costs of preventing them) but not compensation of risk-averse victims, 
given the assumption that accident insurance would be likely to furnish victims with 
compensation in the absence of the liability system. Thus, the use of the liability system will be 
socially worthwhile if and only if the savings from accident reduction it brings about exceed its 
administrative costs.
145 
A general implication is that the liability system will not be socially worthwhile if it 
would produce a sufficiently small expected reduction in accident losses. We would expect that 
to be true when the magnitude of accident losses is low, and thus for a whole range of rather 
 
   
144The subject of the socially desirable amount of litigation, and of the possible divergence between this and the 
privately-determined amount of litigation (see the next section), will be considered in greater detail in section 2 of chapter 
17. 
   
145Of course, if the benefits of the liability system are properly conceived to be wider, this statement would be modified 
in a straightforward way.   
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trivial harms, such as bumping into someone when boarding a bus or insulting someone in a 
minor way. The reduction in accident losses following from liability would also be small where, 
even if the magnitude of possible harms is not low, there is little that individuals would do to 
prevent losses on account of liability. For example, it might be that liability for automobile 
accidents does not much affect the incidence of these accidents, for drivers’ precautions may be 
determined largely by their fear of injury to themselves in accidents and by criminal liability for 
traffic offenses and for drunk driving.
146   
When, however, the liability system creates substantial incentives toward safety that do 
exceed administrative costs, the liability system will be socially worthwhile. Other things being 
equal, that would be so when the magnitude of possible losses is high, and when there are steps 
that will be taken to reduce them or their likelihood substantially.   
2.2 Optimal payments by liable injurers, given administrative costs. Supposing that 
the liability system is worthwhile to employ, the presence of administrative costs affects the 
amount that liable injurers ought to pay because these costs raise the social costs of accidents: 
When an accident occurs that results in a legal dispute, the true social costs of the accident are 
comprised of its direct costs (harm to property and to person) plus administrative costs. The 
administrative costs are real social costs just as are the direct costs. For example, lawyers’ 
services absorb valuable human resources, just as do physician services. Therefore, for injurers 
to have correct incentives to prevent harm, the amount that liable injurers ought to pay should 
equal the sum of the direct harm plus administrative costs. Now injurers naturally bear their own 
legal costs, time, and effort. Therefore, the optimal amount for injurers to pay equals the direct 
harm plus the legal and associated costs of victims and of the state. If the victim’s harm is 
$100,000, his legal and other costs of handling the dispute are $30,000, and the court’s costs are 
$5,000, the injurer’s payment should be $135,000, not $100,000. For injurers’ payments to be 
limited to $100,000 would lead to underdeterrence. 
It should be noted that the point that injurers should pay for the direct harm plus the 
victim’s and the state’s costs does not mean that damages received by victims should equal that 
amount. The general argument made about victims’ need for compensation and the optimality of 
fines (see section 6 of chapter 5) suggests that damages equal the direct (pecuniary) harm plus 
the victim’s litigation costs, but that the state’s costs be collected from the injurer in the form of 
a fine. 
In fact, damages are not generally raised in the light of the victim’s litigation costs or of 
the state’s. Because the magnitude of victims’ and the state’s costs may average at least one third 
of direct harm,
 147 damages appear to be inadequate for purposes of deterrence by a significant 




   
146For a particularly direct and sustained expression by a torts scholar of the general view that the costs of the liability 
system may outweigh its incentive-related benefits, see Sugarman 1985.   
 
   
147For example, in 1985 victims’ legal payments as a fraction of harm was at least 33 per cent; see Hensler et al. 1987, 29 
(in which harm is estimated by subtracting defendants’ legal fees from their total payments).   
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3. Private versus Social Incentive to Use the Liability System Given Administrative Costs  
3.1 Private and social incentives may diverge. When a victim is injured, he will make a 
decision whether to sue, that is, whether to make use of the liability system, based on a 
comparison of his private benefits, and notably the expected judgment, and his legal costs. How 
are such private decisions concerning use of the liability system related to what is socially 
desirable, as discussed in section 2.1? The answer is that the private decision is quite different 
from the social one, and this leads to the possibility that the privately-generated use of the 
system could be either too large or too small relative to what is socially desirable. 
To illustrate the possibility that victims may bring a socially excessive number of claims, 
suppose that liability is strict, that there is absolutely nothing injurers can do to reduce risk, and 
that the social goal is to minimize the expected costs of accidents plus administrative costs.  
Clearly, in this example, it is socially undesirable for any claims at all to be made, for by 
assumption that cannot result in any reduction in accident losses, yet claims do result in 
administrative costs for victims and injurers. Nevertheless, claims obviously will be made: 
whenever a victim’s loss exceeds his cost of making a claim, he will make a claim. The reason 
that claims are socially excessive here is evidently that victims’ own financial return from 
making claims is often positive, even though the incentive thereby created is nil, a fact that is of 
no moment to a particular victim. 
Let me now illustrate the converse possibility that there may be too few claims, that is, 
that victims might not make claims even though, were they to do so, social welfare would be 
improved. Suppose that victims do not make claims because the cost of doing so, say 200, would 
exceed their loss of 100, which they frequently suffer. Knowing that they would not be sued, 
injurers have no incentive to reduce the high risk of these losses. But suppose that injurers could 
very cheaply take a precaution that would reduce the chance of the losses to almost zero. Then it 
would be socially desirable for victims to bring suit, because that would serve to induce injurers 
to reduce risk, and thereby also reduce the number of claims and administrative costs. The 
reason that the making of claims is socially inadequate in this example is that a victim’s  
personal return from suit is negative; that the social value of suit is positive, due to its deterrent 
effects, is not of consequence to a victim contemplating suit. 
3.2 Divergence in incentives to bring suit may justify social intervention -- to limit or 
to subsidize use of the legal system. Because the volume of use of the legal system that results 
from private decisions to bring suit may diverge from what is socially best, social intervention 
will sometimes be necessary and useful.  
If the volume of litigation is too great because the administrative costs of suit outweigh 
the social benefits, reducing the use of the legal system will be worthwhile. For instance, it 
would be desirable to limit suits for automobile accidents if study showed that the deterrent 
effects of liability are modest (for the reasons noted above) in relation to the costs of the system. 
 In such a case the state could contemplate such measures as imposing fees for bringing suit or 
banning suit altogether.   
Conversely, if the volume of litigation is inadequate, then subsidy or some other means 
of fostering suit may be desirable. For example, some types of low-magnitude harms that would 
not be privately worthwhile to pursue in view of the cost might be socially worthwhile to   
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promote due to the deterrent effect that the readiness of victims to sue would bring. To 
accomplish this, society could provide legal services for the bringing of the suits or otherwise 
support the process. Indeed, certain social efforts to promote access to the legal system, such as 
legal aid programs and small claims courts, might be rationalized in part along these lines.  
The main point to stress is that the observed volume of litigation in any area of harm 
should not be viewed as approximately correct (in the way that the volume of some good sold in 
a normal market is so viewed). Because of the misalignment between social and private 
incentives to use the legal system, study of its benefits and costs is necessary to undertake to 
determine the direction and size of the divergence and the proper policy response to the 
divergence. 
 Note on the literature. In Shavell (1982b) I first examined the contrast discussed here 




   
148See Menell 1983, Kaplow 1986b, Rose-Ackerman and Geistfeld 1987, and Shavell 1997, 1999, for further 
development of the social versus the private incentive to use the legal system..   
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